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Thesis Abstract 
Kurt Schwitters decisively established that Dada was indeed more a 
state of mind than a collection of creeds. Spurned by Berlin Dada, he was 
compelled to construct for himself an alternative Dada existence, and this he 
accomplished in the one-man movement he christened "Merz". Hundreds of 
Merz artworks were produced by the tireless Schwitters, but the summa 
summarum of his oeuvre was the Hanover Merzbau (circa 1923-1943). As it 
transcends architecture, sculpture, and assemblage, I have taken the distinctive 
approach of analyzing it first and foremost in terms of a theory of self- 
reflexivity. 
The first and second chapters of this thesis are dedicated to the writings 
of Georg Simmel and Henri Bergson. The former contributes an 
understanding of the psyche of the modernist metropolitan and how it is that 
the subjective spirit that resides in this enlightened individual substantiates its 
existence by producing forms and objects with which it continuously comes 
into conflict. As witnessed in Schwitters' Merzbau, the self-conscious "I" 
constitutes a centripetal force that organizes and directs the objects it 
encounters and thus exerts a unifying influence over its environment. In the 
Bergson chapter, I pursue an in-depth investigation into how self-reflexivity is 
predicated upon the search for true duration and the manifestation of the elan 
vital. I also include an in-depth analysis of Bergson's treatise on laughter, for 
the theories contained within go a long way towards explicating Schwitters' 
brand of humour and how the comic artist is a self-reflexive figure non-pareil. 
The third chapter, devoted to Schwitters and his place in Dada, takes into 
account the vitalist philosophical underpinnings of the Merzbau and asserts 
that self-reflexive art operates under an enantiodromic law; the presence of 
the artist must be effaced as thoroughly as possible before the creative self 
achieves materialization in the artwork it has engendered. 
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Introduction 
"Surely all art is the result of one's having been in danger, of having gone through 
an experience all the way to the end, to where no one can go anyfurther. Thefurther 
one goes, the more private, the more personal, the more singular the experience 
becomes, and the thing one is making is, finally, the necessary, irrepressible, and, as 
nearly as possible, definitive utterance of this singularity.... Therein lies the 
enormous aid the work of art brings to the life of the one who must make it, 
-: that it is his epitome; the knot in the rosary at which his life recites a prayer, the ever- 
returning proof to himself of his unity and genuineness, which presents itself only to 
him while appearing anonymous to the outside, nameless, existing merely as 
necessity, as reality, as being-. "' 
Something entirely distinctive and inimitable suffuses Sir Joshua 
I? ex I, ynolds' "Self-Portrait", circa 1747. Squared away from his easel towards 
the viewer, the artist's gaze drifts slightly leftward, while a tremulous hand 
hovering over his brow casts an inverted chevron over his eyes. The blank 
canvas to his right and his painter's instruments held in balance suggest that he 
has captured himself in the moment just prior to the creation of the titular self- 
portrait. Unto itself the pose and the method of its depiction are not 
particularly remarkable, but when considered in the context of the genre to 
which it belongs, self-portraiture, the painting unfolds as an intriguingly early 
piece of avant-garde work 
.21 qualify it as avant-garde, or more specifically 
g4T3 
- Romantic avant-garde", based on the distinction Matei Calinescu employs 
when he seeks to demarcate Olinde Rodrigues' usage of the term in 
conjunction with contemporary art from the earlier, stylistically concerned 
usage Etienne Pasquier intended (97-101): 
1 The quotation is Rilke's, extracted from a letter dated 24 June 1907. The punctuation is 
entirely his, and the passage appears in Briefe fiber Cdzanne (Letters on Cdzanne 4). 
2 And so Renato Poggioli's rigid historical parameters begin to face erosion: "it is by now an 
undoubted fact that the term and concept of avant-garde art reach no ftirther back in time than 
the last quarter of the past century" (Teoria dell'Arte d'Avanguardi 
, 
The Theory of th 
Avant-Garde 13). He does, however, immediately concede that some traces are to be found in 
"the preromantic epoch of crisis, ferment, and transition which preceded romanticism, when 
the modem critical classical tradition dissolved" (14). Against this background of shifting 
definitional boundaries stands Reynolds' self-portrait, at once preciously neo-Classical and 
brazenly modem. 
D- 
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if we compare what Rodrigues has to say about the avant-garde 
mission of the artist with the rather narrow significance of Pasquier's 
stylistic figure, it becomes clear that a very important shift has 
occurred in the function of the avant-garde metaphor as well as in 
that of related military analogies. The major change consists in the 
implication that the avant-garde is 
- 
or should be 
- 
conscious of 
being in advance of its own time. (104) 
Extending generally from the Romantic to the current postmodernist era, self- 
consciousness in art has come to be a defining characteristic of the aesthetic 
avant-garde; it is the watershed of self-criticism and especially the origin for 
that self-undermining laughter that challenges the primacy of the artist and the 
3 legitimacy of his craft. As Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane lament 
in their introduction "The Name and Nature of Modernism" (ýLodemism: A 
Guide to European Literature 1890-1930), Romanticism, in spite of its own 
shortcomings as a hard and fast category, is still identifiable as a fairly distinct 
movement and "serves as a broad stylistic description of a whole era" (23). 
Not so with modernism, however, and perhaps its most notorious sub- 
category, the avant-garde, suffers even more from definitional problems by 
virtue of its inclusion in a category the bounds of which are consistently 
challenged. Romantic introspection, which soon problematized itself into 
conflict-ridden self-consciousness and ultimately moved into the nebulous 
realm of self-reflexivity, is responsible for the uncertainty we so profoundly 
sense today whenever we attempt to uncover what makes contemporary art 
modem or avant-garde. Once artists and writers began to unhinge themselves 
from the requisite artifice of representational art, they engendered a legacy of 
self-doubt that came to impinge upon the viewer as well as upon the artist. 
4 
' Calinescu: "self-consciousness 
- 
or the illusion of self-consciousness - is absolutely crucial 
to the defmition of the more recent avant-garde" (100). 
4 Patricia Waugh cites William H. Gass' quotation pertaining to the "Manichean war" 
underway in art, a conflict he identifles as being between communications "as a means" and 
the "impulse to make an artefact out of the materials and so to treat the medium as an end" 
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For this reason, we find in Reynolds' self-portrait a parable for self- 
conscious art and a springboard for a discussion of its more extreme 
manifestation, self-reflexive art. 5 To begin with, Reynolds adopts the familiar 
gesture of the lookout, but as the immediate target of his stare is left 
undetermined (we may infer it is a mirror illumined by a candle), the pose is 
abstracted and thus leaves the viewer with the more general impression of a 
man in search of something. The profundity of the composition is revealed 
when we realize that the "something" for which he is searching is himself, or 
perhaps more appropriately the image of himself he wishes to hamess and 
portray. Once we have attained this realization, the various internal dialogues 
of the work become audible. We find, for instance, that the artist qua subject, 
as he purports to address his own essence in the unseen mirror, articulates with 
the artist, the viewer, and of course with himself. He articulates with his 
creator (read: the artist) in that he seems to be searching for him as he 
prepares (in the context of the fiction of the painting) to paint himself. The 
viewer, similarly, is drawn into an exchange when the gaze of the subject falls 
upon an audience obviously external to the composition. The absence of the 
mirror in this regard is especially crucial, for the viewer comes to supplant it 
as the agent of reflection. How the subject articulates with his own being is 
merely implied by the anticipated presence of the mirror. There are then three 
(Metafiction 14-15). Waugh holds that this tension is distinguished in "contemporary writing" 
because it is "the dominant function" rather thanjust one of many functions (15). Later on she 
proposes that "modernism only occasionally displays features typical of post-modernism" 
(2 1), and her observation is typical of those who believe postmodernist art and literature to be 
the fruition of the self-conscious germ contained in modernism. 
5 There are parallels to be drawn between the relationship of self-conscious art to self- 
reflexive art and modernism as it relates to the avant-garde. Calinescu finds that the avant- 
garde is in every way more extreme than modernism, not only in its insistence on self- 
assertion but also in its doctrine of self-destruction (96). Similarly, self-reflexive art could not 
have developed outside of self-conscious art, but at the same time it has carried itself so far 
from its Romantic origins that on occasion it appears as a phenomenon without precedent. 
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basic dialogues at work when we take as our point of departure the artist as he 
manifests himself in the autobiographical subject. When we consider the artist 
qua artist, we discover three lines of dialogue which, for the most part, follow 
the three we have just traced. The portrait, by virtue of its status as an 
artwork, constitutes the forum in which the artist may engage his audience. In 
addition, as he labours through the execution of his piece, the artist enters into 
a communion with the work at hand and with his craft in general, reaffirming 
as he does his status as an artist. Most importantly, by moving outside of 
himself and undergoing an aesthetically governed externalisation, the artist 
achieves a more informed knowledge of his own being. 6 The path he traces is 
circuitous and perhaps even confusing, hence the quizzical, uncertain look that 
plays across the face of Reynolds' subject. Even the inverted chevron casting 
the mask-like shadow over Reynolds' eyes attests to the necessity for the artist 
to shrink behind coverage and assume a disguise as he treads the route back to 
himself. 7 
' As more modem instances of the dialogues presented in Reynolds' composition, Egon 
Schiele's self-portraits merit attention as Expressionist paintings that exemplify the 
fragmentation and reunification of the artist through the medium of his work. Reinhard 
Steiner, in his introduction "The Artist's Self', cites Ernst Mach and Hugo von Hofinannsthal 
as proof that the modernist ego was undergoing dissolution and reformation, and he relates 
their writings to Schiele's work: 
Schiele countered the sensory fragmentation of the self by means of a 
multiple self which came little by little to form a visual concept which 
reconstituted his unity with the world in a visionary way. Photographs 
taken in 1914 and 1915 show that the man of conflict constantly threatened 
with fracture had changed decisively. True, Schiele was still interested in 
the doppelganger or alter ego; but photography prevented total 
depersonalisation. His new self-confidence, which was reinforced by 
private circumstances, meant that in the work of Egon Schiele's last years of 
life there were but few self-portraits, and in those the unity of self and self 
was almost seamlessly restored. (Egon Schiele 1890-1918: The Midnig 
Soul of the Artist 18) 
7 David Grossvogel states in his article entitled "The Depths of Laughter: The Subsoil of a 
Culture", "modem man is distinguished by self-consciousness: he is both conscious and 
afraid 
- 
afraid that he will be, or appear to be, less than conscious" (63). This incisive 
characterization is exceedingly applicable to the self-portrait under scrutiny and to Romantic 
art in general, as well as to its inheritors. I propose that this uncertainty or fear is responsible 
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Like Ortega y Gasset's technician in his essay "The Self and the 
Other", which appears in Las DeshumanizaciOn del Arte (The Dehumanization 
of ), the conspicuously self-conscious artist struggles with the world 
external to him and enlists in that struggle the essence of his being that marks 
his individuality and renders him distinct from anything he encounters beyond 
his own bounds: 8 
man as a technician is able to modify his environment to his own 
convenience, because, seizing every moment of rest which things 
allow him, he uses it to enter into himself and form ideas about this 
world, about these things and his relation to them, to form a plan of 
attack against his circumstances, in short, to create an inner world for 
himself. From this inner world he emerges and returns to the outer, 
but he returns as protagonist, he returns with a seýf which he did not 
possess before 
- 
he returns with his plan of campaign: not to let 
himself be dominated by things, but to govern them himself, to 
impose his will and his design upon them, to realize his ideas in that 
outer world, to shape the planet after the preferences of his innermost 
being. Far from losing his own self in this return to the world, he on 
the contrary carries his self to the other, projects it energetically and 
masterfully upon things, in other words, he forces the other - the 
world 
- 
little by little to become himself. (169) 
When the self-conscious gaze or act of introspection becomes part of "the 
campaign", that is, when it is actively employed, it matures into the 
phenomenon of self-reflexivity. The terminology is critical here, as "self- 
reflexivity" or "self-reflexiveness" (as Roger Shattuck prefers to call it in The 
Banquet Years) immediately connotes an active exchange in the form of an 
interaction or set of interactions, and so contrasts with its more passive 
for the recurrence of shadows, masks, clowns (understood here as professional disguise 
artists), mirrors, and reflecting pools in self-conscious literature and art. 
8 At the same time his very act of taking up his individuality against external struggles 
reinforces that individuality, for he becomes acutely aware of his essence only when he can 
judge it against things that are not part of that essence. In a similar way Schopenhauer writes 
of becoming "conscious of the frailty, vanity and dream-like quality of all things", and he 
concludes that by matter of repeated contrasts with the external world our own eternity is 
emphasized. There is more than a little irony involved then when we acknowledge the 
necessity of leaving ourselves in order to find ourselves: "because it is only in contrast to this 
that the aforesaid quality of things becomes evident, just as you perceive the speed at which a 
ship is going only when looking at the motionless shore, not when looking into the ship itself' 
("Zur Lehre von der Unzerstörbarkeit unseres wahren Wesens durch den Tod", "On the 
Indestructibility of Our Essential Being by Death", from Essays and Aphorisms 68-69). 
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predecessor, self-consciousness. In self-reflexive art we find a concentrated 
effort on the part of the artist to fragment himself and dissolve into the 
medium of his work. 9 Thus, self-reflexive art often reveals itself to the viewer 
(initially, at least) as radically depersonalised, or at the very least devoid of 
any obvious and tangible authorial presence. ' 0 Furthermore, it is often 
reluctant art, for the artist must suppress or even oppress his individuality if he 
is to attain an understanding of himself via this indirect (but spiritually more 
significant) route. " This reluctance is a symptom of the more problematic 
ailment Poggioli calls "agonism", which he defines as "tension", "sacrifice 
and consecration: an hyperbolic passion, a bow bent toward the impossible, a 
paradoxical and positive form of spiritual defeatism" (66). 12 The tension 
inherent in the agonistic posture is one of the most notable hallmarks of the 
9 Hugo Ball also found evidence of the fragmentation epidemic affecting contemporary art. In 
his entry for 5 March 1916 in Die Flucht aus der Zeit (Flight Out of Time, 1927) he writes, 
"The image of the human form is gradually disappearing from the painting of these times and 
all objects appear only in fragments. This is one more proof of how ugly and worn the human 
countenance has become, and of how all the objects of our environment have become 
repulsive to us" (55). And in his lecture on Kandinsky delivered in April 1917, he states 
unequivocally, "The artists of these times have turned inward. Their life is a struggle against 
madness" (225). It is ironic and yet poignant then that so many of them courted madness and 
frequently succumbed to either actual dementia or the equally pernicious affected dementia 
they had cultivated for themselves. Atlas Press' book, Four Dada Suicides, compiles work by 
Arthur Cravan, Julian Torma, Jacques Rigaut, and Jacques Vachd under this principle. 
10 We shall see in the chapter devoted to Schwitters how collages and the readymades, in spite 
of their cultivated anonymity (or rather because of it), are some of the most self-reflexive 
pieces of artwork ever produced. On the other hand, self-reflexivity, particularly as it 
functions in much postmodernist literature, hyper-emphasizes the author's presence while 
dissolving the fabric of the text. Kurt Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions provides a 
particularly inspired example of this process. 
11 That searching, doleful face worn by Reynolds' in his self-portrait would later, in works of 
the twentieth century avant-garde, give way to self-deprecating or even mutilated faces, such 
as the disturbingly whimsical, soap-encrusted visage Duchamp sports in his "Monte Carlo 
Bond" (1924). 
12 Following this characterization, Poggioli refers the reader to Mallarind's legendary "Coup 
de dds", "thrown 
... 
almost as an ultimate gesture of defiance at the instant of supreme tension" 
(66). So it is that chance and its ironic cultivation (it used to be the enemy of all artists and 
artisans) come to be incorporated into avant-garde art. (Note that Duchamp had a particular 
affinity for Mallarm6. ) In Theorie der Avantgarde (Theory of the Avant-Garde , Peter BUrger 
distinguishes between true (accidental) chance and "manufactured" chance. In the case of the 
latter, "there lies a renunciation of the subjective imagination in favour of a submission to the 
chance of construction" (67). The exploitation of chance by Dada is so well documented that 
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twentieth century avant-garde in general and of Dada in particular, whose 
members often fashioned themselves into some of the most insistent defeatists 
of the era. 
13 
As suggested above, Poggioli's theory of agonism relates to self- 
reflexive art in that the artist reluctantly struggles against his craft but feels 
nevertheless condemned to produce. There is, however, a more profound way 
in which the agonistic gesture engenders (or is enforced by) self-reflexive art. 
Poggioli: 
the agonistic attitude is not a passive state of mind, exclusively 
dominated by a sense of imminent catastrophe; on the contrary, it 
strives to transform the catastrophe into a miracle. By acting, and 
through its very failure, it tends toward a result justifying and 
transcending itself. (65-66) 
That "passive state of mind", the mind of the catastrophist, is given over to 
self-contemplation and finds fulfilment in the self-regarding gaze; it shares its 
passivity with self-conscious art. Agonism, although predicated upon that 
catastrophist mind-set, stands in relation to it as self-reflexivity does to self- 
consciousness. The distinction is more than a matter of action (action on the 
part of self-reflexivity and relative inaction on the part of self-consciousness), 
for according to Poggioli in the above quotation, the kind of action under 
scrutiny is not the kind undertaken to avoid an impending catastrophe. In fact, 
the action that characterizes agonism and self-reflexivity is an action engaged 
in spite of itself. Poggioli clearly states that the agonistic gesture not only 
it does not bear mentioning here, but further information may be obtained, in a concise form, 
in Hans Richter's Dada: Art and Anti-Art. 
13 Poggioli observes that the artist, "alternating between the extremes of self-criticism and 
self-pity", may exalt (or degrade) himself to the status of a victim. Such an observation is at 
times so self-evident it seems a commonplace unworthy of analysis, particularly in discussions 
concerning postmodernist art. Too often "the artist comes to be conceived of as an agnus dei, 
an expiatory scapegoat, almost as if he were the innocent creature upon which society 
transfers its own sense of sin and guilt, and whose sacrificial blood redeems the sins of the 
V, a 
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accepts the imminent catastrophe but also seeks to affinn its action through the 
failure of that action. Hence the tension that marks the agonist, and hence the 
tension that characterizes self-reflexive art. This tension ultimately derives 
from a struggle of the self against the self, and in a lesser way it plays itself 
out in the struggle of the artist with his work and its reception by the public. 
The most tragic and yet necessary of all struggles is precisely that fought 
within, but what is it about this embraced and sought after failure, this most 
wearing of tensions, that produces the self-affirmation and even more 
importantly the transcendence of which Poggioli writes? The transcendence 
attained by the agonistic path is of the same species as the kind, already 
explored, that explains why the self travels outside of itself at all. Only when 
facing itself through a haze of externality is the self able to ascertain its 
essence, and only through denial does transcendence come. 14 
And here we arrive at the crux of self-reflexive art. Self-reflexivity 
involves, or rather is predicated upon, a restless exchange not just between the 
self and the external world, but also between the real self and the ideal 
counterpart to which it aspires. 15 It is a dialogue between the self as it is and 
whole tribe" (I 11). The strains of aesthetic Romanticism in these lines are too obvious to be 
ignored (65). 
14 In his book Von romantischer Ironie zu postmodernistischer Metafiktion, (From Romantic 
Irony to Postmodernist Metafiction 
, 
Christian Quendler addresses the same issue and 
concludes, "the breaking of aesthetic illusion as a self-reflexive introspection on the poetic 
limitations" is not a "destruction" but rather "an opening up of a space" (53). The 
constructive possibility is established because the self-reflexive gesture brings about an 
investigation of "the relation between the real and the ideal" (53). The ideal, or the absolute, 
knows no limitations, aesthetic or otherwise, and so by exploiting the limitations of say, 
painting, the self-reflexive artwork suggests a path towards the absolute. Drawing upon 
Friedrich Schlegel's theories concerning romantic irony, Quendler localizes the 
"transcendental" in this vacillation between the real and the ideal, and credits self-reflexivity 
with being the vehicle by which the real moves towards the ideal (52-53). 
15 There is much to be said for the religious aspects of self-reflexive art, and a study 
addressing these would be able to draw heavily upon the diaristic accounts of Ball. In his 
entry for 13 October 1915, he approaches a question very similar to the one posed above: why 
is the self condemned by its own stubborn insistence to depart its sphere only to return? He 
questions, "For why is it that I seek life for its own sake? Is there so much death in me or in 
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the self it becomes once it gains consciousness of its existence. Furthermore, 
in pondering the term "self-reflexivity" we find two additional kinds of 
exchange that contribute to self-knowledge. The objection has been raised 
that the term is irreparably redundant, for "reflexivity" by definition only ever 
could have recourse to its ultimate predicate, the "self'. Upon closer 
consideration, however, we find that through its very redundancy another 
possible route opens. Self-reflexivity comes to refer not only to a gesture or 
mode in which the self discourses upon its own being, but also to a way for 
reflexivity to address reflexivity in (what else but) reflexive tenns. The 
complexity and abstractness of these interactions may elude focused 
concentration, but analysis in the context of modem art facilitates 
comprehension. Shattuck evidently thought so as well, for in his chapter 
entitled "The Art of Stillness" he writes, 
The form of a work of art can imply this inward direction and stand 
for the fact that the work itself becomes the means, the locus of the 
search. Twentieth-century art has tended to search itself rather than 
exterior reality for beauty of meaning or truth, a condition that entails 
a new relationship between the work of art, the world, the spectator, 
and the artist. (326) 
Art is not the only forum in which to study the complexities of self- 
consciousness and self-reflexivity (philosophy usually fulfils that role). 
However, we may imagine that we are following the natural tendency of the 
self-conscious spirit when we move outside of philosophy and seek the 
my environment? Where does my motive force come from? From darkness or from light? " 
(Flight Out of Time 33). Ball, who came to shun his Dada years as wayward folly and who 
embraced with great sincerity the Catholicism of his youth, concludes that the impetus to 
move comes from the desire to beat a path towards God. "I seek your image, Lord. Give me 
the strength to recognize it" (33). Is the reason he provides much different than Quendler's? 
Reynaga 10 
essence of self-reflexivity in its object (art) rather than its sub ect (the j 
metaphysical self). 16 
Arthur Danto, in a passage from his critical study The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace, offers some enlightening commentary on the issue of 
self-reflexivity as it informs the long-standing relationship between art and 
philosophy: 
the philosophical question of its status has almost become the very 
essence of art itself, so that the philosophy of art, instead of standing 
outside the subject and addressing it from an alien and external 
perspective, became instead the articulation of the internal energies 
of the subject. It would today require a special kind of effort at times 
to distinguish art from its own philosophy. It has seemed almost the 
case that the entirety of the artwork has been condensed to that 
portion of the artwork which has always been of philosophical 
interest, so that little if anything is left over for the pleasure of 
artlovers. Art virtually exemplifies Hegel's teaching about history, 
according to which spirit is destined to become conscious of itself. 
Art has reenacted this speculative course of history in the respect that 
it has turned into self-consciousness, the consciousness of art being 
art in a reflexive way that bears comparison with philosophy, which 
itself is consciousness of philosophy; and the question now remains 
as to what in fact distinguishes art from its own philosophy. (56)" 
A nexus of philosophical factors has often resided at the core of art, but as 
Danto observes above, that core has swollen so much in recent times that in 
much modem art it has become the fruit, often rendering the "artistic" portion 
161 liken the distinction between philosophical and aesthetic contemplation of self-reflexivity 
thusly. Philosophy, particularly metaphysical philosophy, harbours within its bounds self- 
reflexivity in its natural habitat, but the murkiness of these profound depths requires great 
external illumination. In contrast, art is like a diorama illuminated from within, and although 
what we witness may be self-reflexivity removed from its usual domain and yoked into 
serving a purpose beyond itself, we do gain significant insight into its functioning and effects. 
17 BOrger also looks to Hegel's writings, where he finds "the dissolution of interpenetration of 
form and content which was the characteristic of classical (Greek) art" to be predicated upon 
"the discovery of autonomous subjectivity" (92). Hegel attributes this discovery to 
Romanticism, which Bfirger indicates was considered at that time to extend from the Middle 
Ages to the period contemporary with the philosopher. In addition, Hegel connects this 
Romantic development to "the contingency of external existence", and so "for that reason, 
romantic art is both an art of subjective inwardness and one that portrays the world of 
phenomena in their contingency" (Burger 92). Most importantly to BUrger, Hegel perceives 
that a Classical focus is inadequate for interpreting the new art, and so by extrapolating a 
theory from "Dutch genre painting", he predicts a "shift of the form-content dialectic in favor 
of form" (93). The inference at which the philosopher arrived has been proven entirely 
prophetic. 
D- 
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little more than an ornamental skin. 18 One could take as a point of departure 
any number of avant-garde movements in which these theories may be 
revealed, as everything Danto writes above regarding self-reflexive art is 
exemplified by major works of several twentieth century movements. Many 
investigations have focused primarily on the ways in which postmodernist art 
has taken advantage of and ultimately come to determine the methodology 
behind aesthetic self-reflexivity, but recent scholarly study has recognized the 
injustice of such a narrow focus. Modernism 
- 
not just "high modernism" but 
also those extreme avant-garde movements which are much more easily 
dismissed than intellectually engaged 
- 
built upon the self-consciousness it 
inherited from the Romantics and polished it into the vibrant self-reflexivity 
that would soon enough become affogated by postmodernism. 19 This thesis 
seeks to uncover in the most strident of those modernist avant-garde 
movements, Dada (and by association, Merz), the methodology and impact 
generated by self-reflexivity. This theme receives surprisingly scant attention 
in critical studies of Dada, perhaps because the issues of nihilism or the 
manipulation and incorporation of chance too often take precedence. There is 
room for speculation as to why Dada was so predisposed to the production of 
18 Tellingly, Ball in 1917 was noting the conversion art was undergoing as it sacrificed its 
usual appeal to the blossoming of its own philosophy: "art is being changed into philosophy 
and religion in its principles and on its very own territory. The conversions from artistic 
circles will increase. Art itself appears to want to converf' (20.11.1917, Flight Out of Time 
99). 
19 The Dada scholar Richard Sheppard, whose relatively recent contribution to Dada 
scholarship is entitled Modernism - Dada - Postmodernism, emphasises this point 
in his 
concluding chapter, "Dada and the Last Post of Modernism". He lists self-reflexivity, among 
other developments, as being one of those themes too long ascribed exclusively to 
postmodemism (356). 
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self-reflexive artwork, but for our purposes we shall not dwell upon reasons 
but explore instead the manifestation of the phenomenon. 20 
A brief comparison of two entries from Ball's diary enlightens us as to 
the applicability of a theory of self-reflexivity to Dada: 
Art is beginning to concern itself with ascetic and priestly ideals. 
[ 
... 
] There is a wooing of art where it glows with most life, a taste 
for the definitive expression of things and of life. And this interest is 
dictated by the time, not by inclination. It is an interest in the 
threatened self. (4. XII. 1916, Flight Out of Time 94) 
Self-assertion suggests the art of self-metamorphosis. The isolated 
man tries to hold his own in the most unfavorable circumstances; he 
has to make himself unassailable. Magic is the last refuge of 
individual self-assertion, and maybe of individualism in general. 
(9.1.1917,96)21 
Throughout his inestimably valuable diary, Ball writes of the social and 
spiritual decay in which he finds himself immersed. 22 The falling away of 
bourgeois ideals and conventions, the acceleration of mechanical production, 
the explosion of metropolitan centres, and most significantly the terror and 
shock of the Great War all conspired to threaten the sovereignty of the 
individual and undermine his faith in the certainty of his existence. At the 
same time, scientific progress made in subatomic physics was challenging the 
individual's concept of the solidity of his being and of all reality. These 
factors coalesced in the crucible that was 1914 Europe, and as Ball implies 
" There is a very handy list provided by Sheppard that details the major points of social 
contention experienced by the modernists (17-18). These eight diagnoses, ranging from the 
inheritance of a decaying bourgeoisie to the negotiation of perceived "anarchic powers", may 
be applied quite easily to a study of Dada in an effort to uncover the pressures that engendered 
its proclivity towards self-reflexive art. 
" We may infer that "art" in these lines signifies Zurich Dada, as the opening of the Cabaret 
Voltaire, under Ball's direction, occurred just a few months prior in February 1916. 
22 When Ball returned to the strict Roman Catholicism of his youth, he revised his written 
work, no doubt editing material he considered threatening to his newfound attempts to 
reconcile himself with the Church (Introduction to Flight Out of Time, Elderfield x1i). Thus, it 
is nearly impossible to maintain that all of the observations penned when he was a Dadaist 
survived the religiously inspired redaction. Surely, in the days of the Cabaret Voltaire, Ball 
was at least somewhat complicit in the fostering of the decadence he would later come to 
decry. 
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above, a shift occurred from self-awareness to a studied self-interest in what 
constituted "the threatened self'. This observation dovetails with the second 
quotation, in which the self-conscious individual (read: the Dadaist) begins to 
toy with his own boundaries, resorting to magical and mystical endeavours in 
order to preserve his individuality. 23 Herein we find the reasoning behind the 
Dadaist predilection for primitive cultures, fabulous or historical, and further 
evidence that aj ourney outside of the self and its familiar environs must be 
undertaken in order to grasp the essence of that self. 24 Ball retreated into the 
"inner alchemy of the word", but Kurt Schwitters sought to retrieve his elusive 
ego in the one-man movement he was forced to create because he was denied 
affiliation with Berlin Dada. John Elderfield, who has composed the most 
exhaustive study of Schwitters since Werner Schmalenbach, notes that "a 
'hankering after the primitive' had been noticed by Huelsenbeck even in 
Schwitters' earliest work, a desire to get away from 'the complicated, 
overcharged, perspectively seen present" (198). 
In Merz, and to the greatest degree in the Hanover Merzbau, we 
encounter all of the conditions of self-reflexive art thus far proposed. 
Schwitters occupied a problematic space in the Dada realm, as he was clearly 
avant-garde in method but not officially recognized as such, at least not by 
2' Ball's "magic bishop" episode was precisely this sort of magical engagement, but as he 
details in the diary entry for 23 June 1916, such courtship of magic comes with a price, 
namely, that one may lose all touch with the individuality one is trying to preserve Qijyht Out 
of Time 70-71). 
24 Ball: 
Seek the image of images, the archetypal image. Is it pure symmetry? God 
as the eternal surveyor? The Egyptians took their measurements from the 
stars; the earthly topography is a copy of the divine. But does our art, 
abstract art for example, act in the same way? Are our images not 
gratuitous, and do they live on more than the memory of other images? And 
in language: where do we get the authoritarian, style-forming sequences 
and ideas from? What constitutes our mind and spirit? Where do we get 
belief and form from? Do we not steal the elements from all magical 
D- 
. 
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Richard Huelsenbeck, the self-proclaimed leader of the Berlin Dadaists (more 
on the dispute to follow in the chapter on Schwitters). Everything Ball 
observes above then applies twice over to Schwitters. Whereas many of the 
other Dadaists left the provinces and flocked to major metropolitan centres, 
Schwitters remained based in bourgeois Hanover, his relationship to which 
was too muted to be classified as "love-hate" (although he was critical of the 
25 
city at times and its myopic character). Virtually isolated from his more 
stringently political Dada contemporaries, Schwitters experienced the threats 
on his being and his work at the hands of those who were meant to be in 
sympathy with his trials. Whereas the Zurich Dadaists, diverse in vision as 
they were, could at least find suitable company in one another, if only for a 
short while, Schwitters was isolated without recourse to integration into the 
one group whose parameters were elastic enough to absorb his esoteric 
personality and methodology. Marginalized as he was, he began to construct 
for himself a universe that would contain all of his preoccupations, aesthetic 
ambitions, and artwork. And as if he were consciously heeding Ball's 
program voiced in the quotation above, he ensured that his Merz universe was 
mystical enough to offer refuge for his threatened self The cynosure of Merz, 
in theory and in practice, was the Hanover Merzbau, the first of Schwitters' 
major architectural projects, and its conception (and execution) marked it as 
the modernist descendant of the Romantic Gesamtkunstwerk. 
In order to construct a sound contextual basis for my theory of how the 
Hanover Merzbau may be interpreted as a triumph of self-reflexive art, I have 
religions? Are we not magical eclectics? (7. V. 1917, Flight Out of Time 
111) 
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incorporated the contemporaneous writings of Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and 
Henri Bergson (1859-194 1), both of whom form the basis for the vitalist 
philosophy to which Schwitters subscribed. 26 We shall rely on Simmel's 
theories concerning the psychic life of the metropolitan individual as we seek 
to contextualize the Dadaist (or Merzist) in the urban milieu in which he 
developed and laboured. The writings on culture, which define the 
phenomenon as the result of the struggle between the subjective spirit and the 
objective forms it is condemned to produce, will serve to explain the 
mechanism behind artistic production and how the self-conscious "I" exerts a 
27 
centripetal force over its objects. This mechanism behind self-reflexivity is 
analysed in this thesis in terms of Heraclitus' concept of the enantiodromia, a 
concept that I shall repeatedly employ as the principle model of the 
functioning of self-reflexive artwork. In my chapter devoted to some of 
Bergson's major contributions, I shall demonstrate how the self-reflexive 
gesture is informed by Bergsonian intuition and how the search for true 
duration is the same path the artist pursue as he meanders through his self- 
reflexive work on his journey back to himself Finally, I shall prove how the 
materialization of the elan vital occurs most successfully, at least in the 
domain of aesthetics, in artwork that is consciously developed according to the 
25 Richter dedicates two chapters of Dada: Art and Anti-Art to Hanover and Cologne, cities 
that "possessed independent Dadaisms of their own, which were less noisy, perhaps, but no 
less important than Berlin Dada" (137). 
26 Tbe connection between Schwitters and these two philosophers is more a matter of affinity 
than concrete influence, for I know not of any writings by Schwitters that address either 
Simmel or Bergson directly. His work, as we shall see, is clearly vitalist, however, and 
furthermore, his organicist tendencies, which became ever more pronounced in his final years, 
owe much to the intellectual climate Simmel and Bergson helped established. It is Rely, 
though, that Schwitters had read at least some of Bergson's work, for his De Stijl connections 
would have pointed him in that direction: "At the time, Van Doesburg was also espousing 
Bergson's formulation of the intuitive nature of space and time, an esoteric philosophy that 
may have also piqued Schwitters' interest" (Gamard 148). 
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tenets of self-reflexivity. In conclusion, I shall prove that the artist must, 
counter-intuitively, suppress his authorial presence and dissolve himself in the 
fabric of his work before he can attain the critical self-consciousness his 
existence demands. 
27 This centripetal force will be explored in conjunction with Coleridge's notion of the 
esemplastic power as described in his Biographia Literaria. 
D- 
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Chapter I 
Simmel's Vitalist Philosophy and the Conflict-Ridden Cultivation of the 
Self-Conscious Ego 
"Life is at onceflux withoutpause andyet something enclosed in hearers and 
contents, formed about midpoints, individualized, and therefore always a hounded 
form which continuallyjumps its hounds. That is its essence. "' 
Introduction 
In her article "Out With the Old, In With the NeW', Sue Hubbard 
examines the various efforts put forth by seminal modernist and postmodernist 
artists in their negotiation of the late twentieth century cultural crisis. The 
crisis to which she refers is of course multi-faceted, but the essence of it is the 
reluctance and ultimately the inability to espouse, "any consensual system of 
belief that allows for allegiance to anything beyond the self' (53). The 
resulting doctrine, manifested as the uncompromising individualism that lies at 
the core of Dada, led, in Hubbard's opinion, to the pervasive cultural 
emptiness that marked the end of the last century and the beginning of the 
present one. She envisions the great modernist triumph of the individual as 
having significantly contributed to the commodification of art in the 
postmodernist age. Initially, the modernists' doctrine of the self was the 
logical corollary to the enforced purification of art; to free art from the jesses 
of tradition was, in equal measure, to free the artist from the confines of the 
academy. In doing so, however, the artist was now in the precarious position 
of having to cultivate increasingly distinguishable personae, and to this end the 
cult of the new flourished. It brought with it the enslaving desire to be 
1 The quotation is from Simmel's "The Transcendent Character of Life" (1918), which 
originally appeared in Chapter I of Lebensanchauung: Vier Metaphysische Kapitel (A View 
of Life: Four Metal)hysical Chapters, 1918). The essay is translated and reproduced in 
Levine's Georg Simmel: 
- 
On Individuality and Social Forms (1971). 
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- - fashionable (53), and from that point art quickly degenerated into the basest of 
forums, where self-promotion became the modus operandi. The haunting 
spectre of the academy had been defeated, but in its place rose the even more 
pernicious collectivity of the herd, which vociferously demanded that in order 
to be acceptable, an artist had to prove himself exceptional. His merit was to 
be judged by the variability and frequency of his attacks on his audience. It is 
to this reversal that Hubbard speaks when she remarks, "For art to be more 
than another investment, another diversion, in the next century, it needs to 
2 
reconnect itself to its transformative potential" (56). The term she employs to 
describe the progression from the modernist triumph of the individual and the 
c6new conservatism of weary cynicism 
... 
in danger of taking its place" (56) 
derives from Heraclitus; it is the concept of the enantiodromia, which is 
defined in the article as "the law of history 
... 
which claims that once one state 
reaches its zenith it then collapses into its opposite" (56). 3 
Although Sheppard does not use the term in Modernism 
- 
Dada 
- 
Postmodemism, he refers often to Heraclitus and his influence on the 
Dadaists: 
In his uncompleted doctoral thesis on Nietzsche of 1909 and 19 10, 
Ball had approvingly cited Nietzsche's own endorsement of 
Heraclitus's "Lehre vom Gesetz im Werden, und vom Spiel in der 
Nothwendigkeie' (doctrine of law in the process of becoming and of 
play in necessity), and it was undoubtedly Heraclitus's paradoxical 
understanding of the flux of Nature that made Diels's edition so 
important to Arp. Tzara, too, almost certainly got to know 
Heraclitus's writings through Arp, and although he was less 
mystically inclined than either Ball or Arp, he would, in 1948, link 
Zurich Dada with that philosopher's "dialectic". (275) 
2 As the article was published in 1999, the century to which the author refers is, of course, the 
resent one. 
The word would roughly be translated as "the opposite road" or "contrasting way". 
Reynaga 19 
Heraclitus's dialectic concerning the flux of the cosmos drew the attention of 
the Dadaists because they too understood their world as one marked by 
constant flux. It is this appreciation and embrace of the philosopher's theory 
of flux that inspired Ball to write, "Dandyism is a school of paradox (and of 
paradoxology). Heraclitus deliberately tells miraculous stories. He is 
therefore 
... 
a paradoxologist" (1 7. IV. 1916, Flight Out of Time 61-62). Ball's 
ap raisal. of Heraclitus need not be addressed at length for our purposes; what IT 
matters here is the appreciation this Father of Dada held for the philosopher 
whose name came to be synonymous with the doctrine of flux. Of course, 
once the figure of the dandy enters into the equation, his most notable 
4 biographer, Baudelaire, does as well. In the ninth section of "Peintre de la vie 
modeme" ("The Painter of Modem Life", 1863), whif, -h appears in the 
collection of the same title, Baudelaire describes the dandy as one who is "rich 
and idle, and who, even if blase, has no other occupation than the perpetual 
pursuit of happiness" (26). Further on, he concludes that the doctrine 
responsible for influencing such increasingly ubiquitous characters is 
first and foremost the burning need to create for oneself a personal 
originality, bounded only by the limits of the proprieties. It is a kind 
of cult of the self which can nevertheless urvive the pursuit of a 
happiness to be found in someone else 
- 
in woman, for example; 
which can even survive all that goes by in the name of illusions. It is 
the joy of astonishing others, and the proud satisfaction of never 
oneself being astonished. A dandy may be blase, he may even suffer; 
but in this case, he will smile like the Spartan boy under the fox's 
tooth. (27-28)5 
What soon became apparent in the world of the European avant-garde, 
populated as it was by dandies of this sort, was that such strident individua ism 
4 Elderfield, in his introduction to Ball's Flight Out of Time, emphasizes the fact that Ball 
"had been reading Baudelaire", and that his own appraisal of the dandy was predicated upon 
the figure's assessment as laid down by that author (xliii). 
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dissolved rather than solidified a community of like-minded individuals. Such 
one-upmanship stirred barbarous competition, not just between movements 
(the Dadaists' denouncement of all things Expressionist, for example), but 
between members of the same group as well (Huelsenbeck's dismissal of 
Schwitters is a particularly notable case in point). Ball, in his diary entry for 
25 November 1914, testifies to the fact that outrageousness oon enough 
becomes outdatedness: 
Even the demonic, which used to be so interesting, now has only a 
faint, lifeless glimmer. In the meantime all the world has become 
demonic. The demonic no longer differentiates the dandy from the 
commonplace. You just have to become a saint if you want to 
differentiate yourself further. (Flight Out of Time 12) 
Ball alludes here to an enantiodromia which is similar in scope to the one 
Hubbard identifies in her article. At one time all that was necessary to secure 
notoriety was to prove oneself demonic. According to Ball, however, the 
entire world has proven itself so, and therefore, in order for a figure like the 
dandy to distinguish himself in the modem era, he must (ironically enough) 
prove himself a saint. 
In brief summation, the modernist cult of the self, which stressed the 
merits of uncompromised individualism, released the artist from the burden of 
tradition only to enslave him to public taste. Art lost its "transformative 
potential" and instead became the decree by which the artist proclaimed his 
individuality. Thus, the modernist condition gave rise to a postmodernist one 
in which artists were no freer than they had been at the outset of the avant- 
garde rebellion. In fact, individualism soon became unquestioning obedience 
(to the dictates of society), and in this way the cult of the self collapsed, via an 
5 Vehement Dadaists like Huelsenbeck or Picabia would have challenged the notion of being 
"bounded" by "proprieties", yet the public personae they flaunted corroborate Baudelaire's 
Reynaga 21 
enantiodromia, into its opposite. As noted earlier, the term derives from 
Heraclitus and is situated in his doctrine of flux, which (as Sheppard states) 
found a ready audience in Ball and his disciples. For them, the age revealed 
itself to be one massive paradox, and therefore philosophers who were 
sympathetic to or who actively espoused a doctrine of flux drew the attention 
and praise of the Dadaists. 6 Simmel's all-encompassing philosophy (or 
sociology as it is more often recognized in American academia) drew much 
inspiration from flux theory, particularly as his work matured and tended more 
towards a metaphysically inclined Lebensphilosophie. In "Soziologische 
Aesthetik" ("Sociological Aesthetics", 1896) he recalls, "To Heraclitus, all 
being was in continuous flux; the processes of this world were given forin in 
the variety of unlimited contrasts which continuously transformed themselves 
from one into the other" (Etzkorn 68). 
I shall presently explore the concept of the enantiodromia and how it is 
that Simmel's philosophy provides the theoretical ground on which to 
construct a theory of self-reflexivity that acknowledges, and is indeed 
predicated upon, the flux/fixity dialectic. In this chapter, I shall review several 
of Simmel's essays, including "Die Grosstadt und das Geistesleben" ("The 
Metropolis and Mental Life", 1903), "Der Begriff und die Tragbdie der 
Kultur" ("On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture", 1911), and "Der 
Konflict der modemen Kultur" ("The Conflict in Modem Culture", 1918), all 
of which go a long way towards explaining how and why self-reflexive art 
characterization. 6 Baudelaire had, in his own time, recognized that the decadence of the period was directly 
responsible for the proliferation of dandies ("The Painter of Modem Life" 24-29). 
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became so dominant during the Dada years. 7 These essays bring to fruition 
Simmel's theories regarding the mental composition of the urban individual. 
His seminal tome, PhiloSODhie des Geldes (The Philosophy of Money, 1900) 
contextualizes (with great intellectual dexterity) those same theories by 
investigating how the capitalist money economy gives rise and support to such 
individuals. In order to comprehend fully how the issues raised by modernism 
articulated with the socioeconomic conditions that influenced their 
development, it is useful to consult a sociologist contemporary with the period 
under scrutiny. Donald Levine, in his introduction to Simmel's. On 
Individualily and Social Forms, characterizes this period as one of "great 
cultural ferment": "Central Europe from the turn of the century to World War 
I witnessed the birth of psychoanalysis, relativity theory, logical positivism, 
phenomenology, atonal music, and several milestones of literature and 
humanistic scholarship" (ix). Simmel's social commentary, coming as it does 
from one who was a denizen of a major metropolis, impresses the reader with 
its authenticity. Ralph Leck, in his introduction to Georg Simmel and Avant- 
Garde Sociology: The Birth of Modernijy, 1880-1920, identifies Simmel as a 
philosopher who was "one of Berlin's leading exponents of 
7 These three essays have also been selected for the progression in thought they display. It is 
of great interest that Simmel moved increasingly towards vitalism, and his contributions in 
this regard are especially useful for the premise put forth in this thesis. In her "Preface to 
Georg Simmel's Fragments, Posthumous Essays, and Publications ofhis Last Years" 
("Vorwort"to Georg Simmel, Fragmente undAufsdtze aus dem Nachlass und 
Ver6ffentlichungen der leaten Jahre, 1923), Getrud Kantorowicz (a close friend of the 
philosopher) underlines this point: 
Beyond their particular substantive concerns, Siminel's last essays show the 
applications and ramifications of his central metaphysical idea. Not only, 
however, do the sweep and fertility of this idea thus become apparent; not 
only does it become clear that here we have the conception of a world view 
which is capable of focusing on the whole variety of appearance: the 
profundity of the idea itself comes more clearly to light. (Georg Simmel 
1858-1918 3) 
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8 Geisteswissenschaften" (Leck 64). Dedicated to interdisciplinary study, 
Simmel's breathtakingly vast area of research and interests cuts across nearly 
all fields of the humanities, and it always yields constructive observations and 
analyses. In this vein, Simmel proves invaluable for the same reason he 
proves difficult to manage; it is a challenge, or an impossibility for some, to 
focus on a particular passage or theme in his writings without becoming 
distracted by the wealth of information surrounding it. 
The details of Simmel's biography have been sufficiently documented 
elsewhere (for example, in Leck's book cited above), and so I shall not 
dedicate an undue amount of attention to the matter. Still, I wish to draw 
attention to the points which most significantly influenced the maturation of 
his philosophy and sociology, particularly with regards to the theory of 
metropolitan life. Born in Berlin in 1858, Simmel lived most of his life in the 
heart of that metropolis, that is, until his move to Strasbourg University in 
1914, four years before his death. 9 He thus had extensive first-hand 
experience of urban living, especially as it unfolded in one of the greatest 
metropolises of the modernist period. Religiously, he was exposed from an 
early age to the three most prominent faiths in Europe. His mother, Flora 
Simmel (nee Bodstein), was bom into a Jewish family but had been baptized a 
Lutheran, while his father, Eduard, had also broken from his Jewish heritage 
' Geisteswissenschaften, for which Leck provides the literal translation of "science of spirit or 
intellecf', equates to the discipline recognized in the Anglophone world as "the Humanities" 
(Leck 64). 
9 The locale of Simmel's birth is of notable importance. In explanation Leck writes, 
Simmel's birthplace is illustrative of the experiential wealth that contributed 
to his sociology of modernity. His house was located at the north-west 
comer of Leipzig and Friedrich streets. During Simmel's lifetime, these two 
streets emerged as two of the most important commercial corridors in 
Berlin. This location was also adjacent to the heart of old Berlin or 
Stadtmitte (literally, city-center). [ 
... 
] Furthermore, his home on the comer 
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when he converted, as an adult, to Roman Catholicism (Leck 29). Simmel 
himself was baptized in the adopted faith of his mother. Eduard Simmel's 
lucrative business allowed the family of several children to live quite 
comfortably for a while, but an ill-judged reorganization of his business 
interests began to sap the financial strength of the Simmels; his death in 1874 
only exacerbated the strain. ' 0 Fortunately for all concerned, Flora remarried 
well, and Simmel's stepfather, affectionately known as "Uncle Dol", brought 
financial relief to the family. He, like Eduard, had made his wealth by 
appealing to the epicurean tastes of the Berlin upper classes, as he was the 
founder of a music company named Peters (30). All of these details are 
notable in that they contribute to an understanding of why Simmel's 
scholarship betrays a seemingly all-encompassing knowledge (or at the very 
least experience) of life. 
The Forging of the Metropolitan Psyche 
Simmel's most famous essay is undoubtedly "The Metropolis and 
Mental Life". " An inspired and vivid investigation into urban living and how 
it affects the individual, the essay was first published in 1903, just when many 
of the Dadaists were approaching early or mid-adolescence. The essay begins 
by unequivocally identifying what Simmel imagines to be the origin of "the 
deepest problems of modem life", problems which 
of Leipzig and Friedrich streets placed him within walking distance of most 
of Berlin's cultural meccas. (33-34) 
10 Leck reports that Eduard Simmel, whose own father was a prosperous businessman, 
established himself in Berlin as an importer and distributor of fine French jams (29). In 
addition, he and his partners founded Felix and Sarotti, a chocolate company that gained the 
respect (and official business) of the Prussian royal family (30). 
11 All quotations from this essay refer to the translation provided in Donald Levine's edited 
version of Simmel's On Individuality and Social Forms. 
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flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain the independence 
and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of 
society, against the weight of the historical heritage and the external 
culture and technique of life. This antagonism represents the most 
modem form of the conflict which primitive man must carry on with 
nature for his own bodily existence. (324) 
When we turn our attention to "The Conflict in Modem Culture", we shall see 
how this conflict manifests itself as the struggle between the flux of life and 
the forms it distils. For the time being, let us consider and explore the tenacity 
with which man holds onto his individuality. 12 As he often does in his essays, 
Simmel briefly investigates the history of the issue at hand, and in this case he 
begins with the eighteenth century, which he summarises as a period in which 
the "liberation" of man from political, religious, and historical convention was 
the governing ideal. The nineteenth century, he writes, sought not only to 
sever such ties but also to recognize the individuality of each man (324). 
Simmel refers to the division of labour as society's acknowledgement of every 
man's individual talents, but he also draws attention to the fact that once man 
becomes part of a system to which he is responsible for his own contribution, 
he renders himself dependent once again, this time to the "complementary 
activity of others" (324). In both the Nietzschean and the Socialist 
interpretations of the individual we find, according to the author, "the same 
fundamental motive 
... 
namely the resistance of the individual to being 
12 The vitalist philosophies of Simmel and Bergson proved critical to their contemporaries in 
the (ironically) collective effort of determining individuality. In his essay "Conception of the 
Individual", Matthew Lipman offers a concise summary of how the two differed in the 
"epistemological frameworks" around which they constructed their theories of individuality. 
Lipman suggests that Bergson was much more preoccupied with time and duration, while 
Simmel looked more to the space and the stability of the object (Georg Simmel 1858-1918 
120-12 1). The comparison is somewhat oversimplified, but the main idea behind it is 
justified. 
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levelled, swallowed up in the social-technological mechanism" (324). 13 In 
putting forth his thesis for the essay, Simmel writes the following: 
When one inquires about the products of the specifically modem 
aspects of contemporary life with reference to their inner meaning 
- 
when, so to speak, one examines the body of culture with reference to 
the soul, as I am to do concerning the metropolis today 
- 
the answer 
will require the investigation of the relationship which such a social 
structure promotes between the individual aspects of life and those 
which transcend the existence of single individuals. It will require the 
investigation of the adaptations made by the personality in its 
adjustment to the forces that lie outside of it. (325) 
We have then before us a study which takes into account not just the 
individual's existence as it pertains to his place in society, but also an 
investigation into the impressions the metropolis stamps onto the collectivity. 
As a philosopher who tends increasingly towards vitalist metaphysics, Simmel 
often concerns himself with the reciprocal nature of man's relationship to his 
society, perceiving as he does in that relationship a dynamic which embraces 
both society and its constituents. In the case of this essay, the "adaptations" 
under investigation lead the author to a socio-psychological examination of the 
unique mental faculties that evolve in the citizen of the metropolis. 
Simmel observes that man functions by discerning differences in 
stimuli, and these differences are the perceived discrepancies between the 
intensities and frequencies of those stimuli (325). Furthermore, the memory 
of past impressions influences the perception of present impressions. 14 
Simmel distinguishes between "lasting impressions" which "consume 
... 
less 
mental energy" and impressions which abruptly and "violently" make 
themselves known to the senses (325). The former occur at a much slower 
13 In Simmel's estimation, Nietzsche envisioned the individual's struggle "as the prerequisite 
for his full development. " Eventually, Socialism "found the same thing in the suppression of 
all competition" (324). 
14 We shall return to the importance of memory and sensory perception in the next chapter, as 
it is one of the seminal points of Bergson's philosophy. 
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pace, and so the mind, in whose domain the perceptions are interpreted, has 
more time to ascertain the nature of those perceptions and to prepare itself for 
what it anticipates may be a series of similar or identical impressions. If, for 
example, we consider the ringing of a telephone, we find that we may, in a 
state of rest, be jolted by the first ring. By the time we hear the second and 
third rings, however, we have already formed a hypothesis based on the 
evidence our senses have gathered from the first ring. We expect to hear a 
series of rings similar if not identical to the first, separated by equal intervals. 
Hence, we quickly acclimatize and do not start at each successive ring, and 
overall we have spent only a modicum of mental energy. Reflect then on 
another series of rings in which each ring differs from the preceding one, not 
only in volume and frequency but also in the length of the intervals. With 
such a series, the mind has only just begun to interpret the first ring when the 
second, with entirely different tonal properties, breaks in with its impression. 
The individual, confronted with what may be more appropriately termed a 
cacophony rather than a series, is forced to invest much more mental energy in 
attempting to understand the nature of the sounds, and to be sure there is no 
time for his mind to acclimatize to the noises. Consequently, each ring startles 
him. The model provided is admittedly a gross simplification of Simmel's 
theory, but what I wish to illustrate is the profound difference in perceptual 
reception between stimuli occurring in regular intervals and frequencies, and 
those which are discontinuous and dissimilar. The crux of the matter, as 
Simmel points Out is how much energy must be expended in the perception 
and mental interpretation of the StiMUli. 
15 As we soon learn with regards to 
15 There is much to be said for contemporary theories of sound perception, particularly 
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the metropolitan, the mind cannot continuously be subjected to such over- 
exertion, and no individual's mind is more focused on stimuli than that of the 
urban dweller: 
To the extent that the metropolis creates these psychological 
conditions 
- 
with every crossing of the street, with the tempo and 
multiplicity of economic, occupational and social life 
- 
it creates in 
the sensory foundations of mental life, and in the degree of awareness 
necessitated by our organization as creatures dependent on 
differences, a deep contrast with the slower, more habitual, more 
smoothly flowing rhythm of the sensory-mental phase of small town 
and rural experience. (325) 
Carefully distinguishing as he does between the ruralist and the urbanite, the 
author characterizes the former as being more reliant on "feelings and 
emotional relationships", by virtue of the fact that the "latter are rooted in the 
unconscious levels of the mind and develop most readily in the steady 
equilibrium of unbroken customs" (325). 
In contrast, Simmel presents the "locus of reason", which he identifies 
as residing in "the lucid, conscious upper strata of the mind" (325). The 
faculty of reason, he observes, "is the most adaptable of our inner forces" 
(325), and for this reason it is rather impervious to shocks and disruptions. 16 
Consequently, in order to endure the barrage of stimuli that assaults the mind 
of the metropolitan, a "protective organ" has been created, behind which the 
Simmel's, and how they relate to the bruitist poems being composed and recited around the 
same time. Ball, commenting upon Huelsenbeck's sound poetry as it was being delivered in 
the early days of the Cabaret Voltaire, writes, "His poetry is an attempt to capture in a clear 
melody the totality of this unutterable age, with all is cracks and fissures, with all its wicked 
and lunatic genialities, with all its noise and hollow din" (I LIM 1916, Flight Out of Time 56). 
Some Dadaists (like Huelsenbeck) seemed to welcome that metropolitan din, while others 
(like Ball) found in it "The Gorgon's head of a boundless terror [smiling] out of the fantastic 
destruction" (56). 
16 At the same time, however, its malleability renders it less than the ideal faculty for those 
who must be sensitive to their environs, i. e. artists. Bergson seemed to recognize what was 
becoming, for the metropolitan, the dominance of reason, and in response he offered the 
faculty of intuition. In spite of this significant contribution to modem thought, Bergson has 
since come to be criticized for attempting to eradicate rationality from human judgment. Such 
an interpretation is entirely false, as Bergson himself concluded that the two must work 
Reynaga 29 
mind may continue to function without being worn down or desensitised. 
That protective organ is, ironically, developed through the same 
"intensification of consciousness" in which it results; there is here a positive 
feedback mechanism at work. The continuous influx of stimuli heightens the 
consciousness of the metropolitan, for that individual must (initially) invest 
more mental energy in perception and interpretation. However, because the 
faculty of reason is highly adaptable, the metropolitan soon learns to employ 
that "inner force" as his first line of defence against the onslaught of stimuli. 
In doing so he begins to react "rationally", "thus creating a mental 
predominance" which aids him in his battle to maintain composure in the face 
of such over-stimulation (326): "'Thus the reaction of the metropolitan person 
to those events is moved to a sphere of mental activity which is least sensitive 
and which is furthest removed from the depths of the personality" (326). 
Before the author defines this "protective organ7', he proposes that the 
"intellectualistic quality" of the metropolitan mind is influenced by the 
dominance of the money economy. The connection between this economy 
and the city is based upon commercial exchange: 
The metropolis has always been the seat of money economy because 
the many-sidedness and concentration of commercial activity have 
given the medium of exchange an importance which it could not have 
acquired in the commercial aspects of rural life. But money economy 
and the domination of the intellect stand in the closest relationship to 
one another. (326) 
There is a "purely matter-of-fact attitude" which manifests itself in both the 
intellectual approach to city living and the money economy, and Simmel 
argues that such an approach (and the "protective organ" which develops as a 
result) is inspired by the exchange of money and its value. "Money is 
together, not in opposition, if modem man is to negotiate his modem life as productively and 
Dp 
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concerned only with what is common to all, i. e., with the exchange value 
which reduces all quality and individuality to a purely quantitative level" 
(326), and therefore those accustomed to handling money on a regular basis 
begin to adopt that levelling effect in their interactions as well. 17 Simmel 
argues that the metropolitan, who "is thrown into obligatory association" (326- 
327) with so many others, begins to interact with his fellow man the same way 
he interacts with money, that is, he ignores what is unique in the individual 
and focuses instead on how that individual is but "one of many": 
All emotional relationships between persons rest on their 
individuality, whereas intellectual relationships deal with persons as 
with numbers, that is, as with elements which, in themselves, are 
indifferent, but which are of interest only insofar as they offer 
something objectively perceivable. (326)" 
In contrast there is the ruralist, the man who has the luxury of relying more on 
his emotional perceptions than on his intellectual ones. 19 Simmel 
characterizes the social sphere of the ruralist as comparatively small and thus 
bound by familiarity rather than by impersonal relationships. In such a 
fully as possible. 
" Language, in so much as it is composed of "signifiers" which on their own hold no tangible 
value, is similar in that it seeks to generalize and reduce complex thoughts to readymade 
phrases which can be easily uttered and comprehended. The primary difference to note here, 
however, is that the value of a given word is much more mutable, while one hundred pence 
will always constitute a pound. Still, when thinking of abstract value, money and words 
remain, perhaps uncomfortably, similar: 
And if we say we exchange the things for each other because they are 
equally valuable, it is only that frequent inversion of thought and speech by 
which we also say that things pleased us because they were beautiful, 
whereas, in reality, they are beautiful because they please us. (Simmel in 
"A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value", The Conflict in Modem Culture 
and Other Essays 6 1) 
Again, a discussion on the enumeration of individuals and the contradiction which arises out 
of such a practice is discussed in the next chapter with regards to Bergson's theories. 
19 Not all metropolitans pined for the relaxed atmosphere of the rural area, however. The 
Dadaists welcomed the urban fever of their metropolises, although even they on occasion 
organized retreats into more pastoral areas such as the Tyrol region. Joris-Karl Huysman's 
novel, En Rade (Becalmed, 1887), is an astoundingly poignant book about the true 
deracination of modem man; the city is oppressive, but the countryside is uninhabitable. The 
protagonist, Jacques Marles, and his wife Louise leave their severe Parisian difficulties behind 
them only to fmd that the country is "a haemorrhage of ordure", where the company of 
peasants is even more intolerable than the press of the crowd. 
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reduced arena of interaction, the customer engages with the producer and is, 
by virtue of that familiarity, emotionally tied to him (327). In contrast, 
citizens in the metropolis exchange payment for goods usually through the 
medium of at least one "middle man", thus creating a network of impersonal 
relationships strung together simply on the exchange of goods. 
"Furthermore, " Simmel writes, "this psychological intellectualistic attitude 
and the money economy are in such close integration that no one is able to say 
whether it was the former that effected the latter or vice versa" (327). He 
continues: "What is certain is only that the fonn of life in the metroPolis is the 
soil which nourishes this interaction most fruitfully... " (327) 
. 
20 The 
penetrating effect of this economically induced psychology is primarily that 
"the modem mind has become more and more a calculating one" (327). 21 The 
seemingly endless proliferation of impersonal relationships in the metropolis 
requires a hitherto unknown level of punctuality and exactitude, by which the 
slightest aberration leads to the collapse of the entire system. 22 The 
observations made here are entirely within the realm of a sociologically 
minded economist, but what distinguishes Simmel's thought is the fact that he 
perceives beneath the impersonality, exactitude, and punctuality of 
metropolitan living a highly vital force which is moulded, but not suppressed 
by, the rigid demands of the city: 
But here too emerge those conclusions which are in general the 
whole task of this discussion, namely, that every event, however 
20 Simmel elucidates this point by remarking how London has never been "the heart of 
England" but rather "its intellect" and "money bag" (327). 
21 The author adds, "The calculating exactness of practical life which has resulted from a 
money economy corresponds to the ideal of natural science, namely that of transforming the 
world into an arithmetical problem and of fixing every one of its parts in a mathematical 
formula" (327). It is precisely this rigid scientific approach to life which Bergson's 
philosophy seeks to redress. 
Simmel illustrates the point by musing on the chaos that would ensue if "all the watches in 
Berlin" simultaneously malfunctioned (328). 
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restricted to this superficial level it may appear, comes immediately 
into contact with the depths of the soul, and that the most banal 
externalities are, in the last analysis, bound up with the final 
decisions concerning the meaning and the style of life. Punctuality, 
calculability, and exactness, which are required by the complications 
and extensiveness of metropolitan life are not only most intimately 
connected with its capitalistic and intellectualistic character but also 
color the content of life and are conducive to the exclusion of those 
irrational, instinctive, sovereign human traits and impulses which 
originally seek to determine the form of life from within instead of 
receiving it from the outside in a general, schematically precise form. 
Even though those lives which are autonomous and characterised by 
these vital impulses are not entirely impossible in the city, they are, 
none the less, opposed to it in abstracto. (328-329) 
There is then a conflict which emerges between the internal, "vital" force of 
life, which strives to interpret perceptions and direct action from some inner 
knowledge and/or impulse, and the external form which attempts to assert 
itself over that vitality. 
23 
The Introspective Character of the Blase Outlook 
The "impersonality" of metropolitan life impresses itself upon the 
metropolitan's mind as "an influence in a highly personal direction" (329). 
Simmel presents the concept of the blase "outlook" as "the consequence of 
those rapidly shifting stimulations of the nerves which are thrown together in 
all their contrasts and from which it seems to us the intensification of 
metropolitan intellectuality seems to be derived" (329). The unending influx 
of new sensory information overexerts the nerves, and the metropolitan finds 
himself unable "to react to new stimulations with the required amount of 
energy" (329). In combination with this desensitisation is "an indifference 
toward the distinctions between things", a condition deriving in no small part 
from the highly developed money economy that flourishes in the metropolis 
23 The conflict between the vitality of life and the rigid forms in which life manifests itself is 
addressed in "The Conflict of Modem Culture", to which we shall soon turn our attention. 
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(329). As already discussed, the levelling effect required in monetary 
transactions informs the commercial interactions of metropolitan citizens, so 
much so that they eventually disregard one another's individuality and focus 
instead on what they have in common. Simmel theorizes that the 
"concentration of purchasable things", to be found in the complex nexus of 
metropolitan commercialism, "stimulates the individual to the highest degree 
of nervous energy" (329). In order to elucidate the author's theory, let us turn 
briefly to The Philosophy of Money, which contains a chapter entitled "Money 
in the Sequence of Purposes". 24 Simmel writes, "As a rule, the blase attitude 
is rightly attributed to satiated enjoyment because too strong a stimulus 
25 destroys the nervous ability to respond to it" (256). The mind is stimulated 
not only by desire for the object, but also by the mental investment required to 
procure it. The act of acquiring the object, which always involves some effort, 
serves as further stimulation. Yet the repeated acquisition of objects through 
the impersonal exchange of money, or "the more the acquisition is carried out 
in a mechanical and indifferent way", the more the mind is stimulated to the 
point where it reacts indifferently to all exchanges (256-257). Simmel 
describes this enantiodromic process as follows: 
Through the mere quantitative intensification of the same conditions 
this achievement is transformed into its opposite, into this peculiar 
adaptive phenomenon 
- 
the blase attitude 
- 
in which the nerves 
reveal their final possibility of adjusting themselves to the content 
and the form of metropolitan life by renouncing the response to them. (330) 
24 Section II of said chapter contains the passage of interest, "The blas6 attitude" (located in 
what is termed the "Analytical Part" of the book). 
25 Simmel goes on to explain how the subjective value of an object is coloured by the methods 
by which it is attained: "The attraction of things is not the only cause of practical activity 
intent on gaining them; on the contrary, the kind and amount of practically necessary 
endeavors to acquire them often determines the depth and liveliness of their attraction for us" 
(256). 
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A given phenomenon, in this case the stimulation and over-stimulation 
suffered by the senses of the metropolitan man, collapses into its opposite 
when pushed to an irreconcilable extreme. Those senses are toned down in the 
interest of not having to devote so much mental energy to the conscious 
perception of the surrounding stimuli. 
According to Simmel, the adoption of the blase outlook is an act of 
unwitting self-preservation. It is at this point in his essay, when he begins to 
contextualize the blase individual in the social milieu of the metropolis, that 
he addresses what is for our purposes the salient point of the work: how the 
metropolitan individual becomes an increasingly introspective figure. The 
citizen of the metropolis is governed (again unwittingly) by his reserved 
attitude vis-a-vis other metropolitans. Simmel explains that this attitude is as 
necessary as the blase' outlook,, for the city dweller encounters thousands of his 
fellow citizens every day, and if he were to interact with them with the same 
amount of attention as the ruralist devotes to his neighbours, then he "would 
be completely atornised internally and would fall into an unthinkable mental 
condition" (33 1). 26 It is, however, this very peculiar form of interaction with 
one Is peers that provides the individual with "a type and degree of personal 
freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances" (332). In 
Simmel's estimation, the basic unity of all social groups, the small but well- 
defined "circle" of like-minded individuals, evolved in an effort to keep 
"antagonistic groups" at bay. The dynamic which directs the interactions 
within such a small group is influenced by that same "distanciation" effect the 
individual employs against his peers. Once that small society begins to grow, 
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however, that "first jealous delimitation" is softened by repeated interaction, 
and the natural hostility between individuals is softened (332). At the same 
time, the individual gains a freedom hitherto unknown to him, and thus he is 
given much more leave to develop himself according to his whim: 27 
so today in an intellectualized and refined sense the citizen of the 
metropolis is "free" in contrast with the trivialities and prejudices 
which bind the small town person. The mutual reserve and 
indifference, and the intellectual conditions of life in large social 
units are never more sharply appreciated in their significance for the 
independence of the individual than in the dense crowds of the 
metropolis because the bodily closeness and lack of space make 
intellectual distance really perceivable for the first time. (334) 21 
It remains somewhat unclear how Simmel envisioned the connection between 
"bodily closeness" and a heightened awareness of one's individuality. The 
link is most likely based on that "distanciation" effect introduced and 
discussed just prior to the above quotation. In order to tolerate the existence 
of others (a concession made in the interest of social cohesion, from which the 
individual stands to benefit), the metropolitan becomes increasingly reserved 
and intellectually distant from his peers; the constant flow of cash in the 
metropolitan money economy conditions him further in that reserve. His blase 
outlook, which helps him to carry out his quotidian affairs with the utmost 
economy of mental energy, distances him from his peers. However it does 
not, as Simmel is careful to note, result in mental hebetude, for he is still 
impacted, physically and mentally, by those who surround him. The more the 
26 The author further qualifies the urbanite's relationship to his peers by observing that there is 
for him "a slight aversion, a mutual strangeness and repulsion", which functions as a 
"distanciation and deflection", without which society could not be maintained (33 1). 
27 Simmel illustrates this development in human society by looking at "small town life in 
antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages". He sees in the ancient polis the crucible in which 
repressive "de-individualizing" factors warred against "incomparably individualized 
personalities". In this crucible was forged the ancestor of the modem metropolitan individual (333-334). 
28 Simmel at this point addresses the commonplace that one never feels so alone as one does 
amidst the thronging crowd of the metropolis. He observes that this truism is simply the 
obverse of that same freedom which liberated man from the confines of the small social circle. 
D- 
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urbanite is immersed in the metropolitan crowd, the more his "protective 
organ" (his blase outlook) must labour to conserve his energy and insulate his 
nerves against the storm of stimulatory impulses assaulting his senses. In this 
way he is said to be reacting "intellectually" rather than "emotionally", and 
thus the physical proximity to which the urbanite is subjected results in an 
intellectual distance. Only in the modem metropolis does that intellectual 
distance coalesce with the blase outlook, with the result that the new modem 
man is truly an individual, both unique and free. 
Simmel ascribes to the metropolis a momentum of its own, a 
momentum responsible for the development of "cosmopolitanism". The 
metropolis, unlike the small town, exerts its influence far beyond its borders, 
and it attains a level of existence which supersedes the summation of all of its 
great individuals. The individual's influence, Simmel observes, is not bound 
by the physicality of the body, for one's influence extends far beyond one's 
person. Likewise, "the city exists only in the totality of the effects which 
transcend their immediate sphere" (335). The essence of freedom, therefore, 
is more than "mere freedom of movement and emancipation from prejudices 
and philistinism" (335). Rather, the measure of such liberation should be 
sought in the expression of one's "particularity and incomparability": 
That we follow the laws of our inner nature 
- 
and this is what 
freedom is 
- 
becomes perceptible and convincing to us and to others 
only when the expressions of this nature distinguish themselves from 
others; it is our irreplaceability by others which shows that our mode 
of existence is not imposed upon us from the outside. (335) 
If the metropolis extends beyond itself to impact the international arena, and if 
man in his strident individuality contributes to the vitality of the metropolis in 
which he lives, then by transitive law the modem individual is capable, more 
than ever, of making his impact on the world, and thus he is truly a 
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cosmopolite. This formula is also useful in constructing theories concerning 
the division of labour which, Simmel notes, reaches its fruition in the modem 
metropolis (335-336). Furthermore, the author does not simply address the 
division of labour as individuals performing specialized tasks according to 
their talents. Rather, he suggests that competition for customers hones the 
individuality of the citizen who needs to distinguish himself from his peers 
(336). Even then, it is not enough to create for oneself a niche in which one 
may cultivate his individuality for commercial reasons. The true metropolitan 
"must seek to produce in the person to whom he wishes to sell ever new and 
unique needs" (336) 
. 
29 The countless fleeting encounters which occur every 
second in the metropolis lead the citizen seeking distinction to develop 
improved methods of seizing attention. Due to the fact that the average 
encounter is so brief, there is no time for an emotionally informed exchange, 
and so the urbanite must "appear to-the-point, clear-cut and individual" (337). 
The necessity of going to great lengths to ensure one's individuality is 
emphasized by the fact that one's peers have also succumbed to the blase 
outlook. It is this need to "sell one's self'that strikes Simmel as "the most 
profound cause of the fact that the metropolis places emphasis on striving for 
the most individual fonns of personal existence 
- 
regardless of whether it is 
always correct or always successful" (337). 
It is in the final paragraphs of the essay that we encounter the vitalist 
thrust which characterizes the author's later work. He posits, as in other 
" We recall then the beginning of this chapter, in which it was observed that the modernist 
cult of the self became the postmodernist commercialism of arL On page 336, Simmel notes 
the tendency of the modem urbanite to distinguish himself by adopting increasingly bizarre 
"eccentricities". 
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pieces, the struggle between the objective and subjective spirit, and he sees in 
modem culture the "predominance" of the former over the latter (337): 
in language as well as in law, in the technique of production as well 
as in art, in science as well as in the objects of domestic environment, 
there is embodied a sort of spirit [Geist], the daily growth of which is 
followed only imperfectly and with an even greater lag by the 
intellectual development of the individual. (337) 
He finds in the case of the nineteenth century ("at least in the upper classes") a 
"regression of the culture of the individual with reference to spirituality, 
delicacy and idealism" (337). This regression, he suggests, is inversely 
proportionate to the "vast culture" which "has been embodied in things and in 
knowledge, in institutions and comforts", and the increasing discrepancy is 
attributed by the author to the "success of the growing division of labor" 
(337). The over-extension of one side of the personality results in the atrophy 
of all the other sides, for the individual must repress (or at the very least 
neglect) the divergent facets of his personality not immediately employed in 
the task assigned to him by the division of labour. He is rendered "a single 
cog as over against the vast overwhelming organization of things and forces", 
and he has become, for Simmel, evidence of modem society's tendency 
towards the objective over the subjective: "In any case this overgrowth of 
objective culture has been less and less satisfactory for the individual" (337). 
Of course, nowhere is this cultural development as readily apparent as in the 
modem metropolis (338). For the conglomeration of "concrete institutions" to 
flourish in the super-society that is the metropolis, it is necessary that the 
needs of the masses, not the individuals, be addressed; thus the subjectively- 
minded individual is relegated to the recesses of the objectively-prone society 
of which he is but a "negligible quantity" (337). The irony of the 
metropolitan's situation is to be found in the fact that the same social 
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machinery which looms over him at a safe enough distance to allow for the 
unique expression of his individuality is the same machinery that ignores his 
proclamations that he is indeed an indispensable member of society. Even the 
individual is in danger of losing sight of his own individuality: "extremities 
and peculiarities and individualizations must be produced and they must be 
over-exaggerated merely to be brought into the awareness even of the 
individual himself' (33 8). In the modem metropolis we find, then, the product 
of the eighteenth century's demand for liberation and the nineteenth century's 
search for individuality. It is the tension between these two aspiring ideals of 
the individual that informs social life in the metropolis, the "function" of 
which is 
to make a place for the conflict and for the attempts at unification of 
both of these in the sense that its own peculiar conditions have been 
revealed to us as the occasion and the stimulus for the development 
of both. Thereby they attain a quite unique place, fruitful with an 
inexhaustible richness of meaning in the development of the mental 
life. They reveal themselves as one of those great historical 
structures with equal legitimacy. (33 9)30 
In summation then we may conclude the following. The modem 
urbanite, by virtue of his metropolitan surroundings, is subjected to thousands 
of extemal pressures which place themselves at odds with his desire to assert 
not just his freedom, but his individuality as well. The capitalist money 
economy, which finds its fulfilment in the metropolis, accustoms the urbanite 
to quantitative,, as opposed to qualitative, exchanges. Under the influence of 
financial exchange, he begins to look upon his peers not as the individuals 
they are but rather as members of a social organization which transcends the 
30 Kurt H. Wolff s translation of "The Metropolis and Mental Life", which appears in Fris y 
and Featherstone's Simmel on Culture, renders the final sentence of this quotation thusly: 
"Ibe metropolis reveals itself as one of those great historical formations in which opposing 
streams which enclose life unfold, as well as join one another with equal righf' (185). Itis 
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individual existences of which it is comprised. At the same time, the endless 
influx of stimuli which assaults his senses alters his mental life in that he 
forms, in a self-preserving gesture, the "protective organ" known as the blase 
outlook. This development works on an enantiodromic principle, as the 
urbanite is initially much more sensitive to the stimuli he absorbs from his 
surroundings. Ultimately, the blase urbanite is not impervious to sensation, 
but his ability to recognize "the value of the distinctions between things, and 
therewith 
... 
the things themselves" is greatly reduced, if not nearly eradicated 
(330). At the same time, the natural aversion with which men react 
reciprocally in a small social circle is lessened in the metropolis. The 
quotidian contact between individuals in a large society softens that initial 
aversion, and the blase outlook provides a much needed buffer that nourishes 
indifference rather than hostility. All of these factors grant the individual the 
space in which to cultivate his freedom and singularity, and so only in the 
metropolis do we find the greatest eccentricities and peculiarities of character 
unknown (or, more properly, not tolerated) in the small town or rural area. 
However, Simmel is quick to point out that such hitherto unexperienced 
freedom is not entirely positive. 31 The division of labour increasingly 
demands that individuals utilize only one feature of their personalities, and so 
the rest is left behind to wither. In this way objective culture has triumphed 
worth noting this alternative translation, for it makes use of the vitalist terms Simmel utilized 
with increasing frequency in his final years. 
31 Huysmans' Jacques Marles, upon leaving the disaster of his country retreat for the imminent 
disaster of Paris, speaks to the negative aspect of metropolitan life which Simmel surely had 
in mind: 
He was heading into the unknown; the only step that could be reasonably 
foreseen was this: as soon as he arrived, he would have to get cracking, 
renewing contact with all the people he despised, visiting one, waiting for 
another, in the hope of procuring a decentjob or a position. What snubs and 
humiliations I shall be subjecting myself to, he thought; ah! atonement for 
my disdain of utilitarianism is nigh! (Becalmed 15 1) 
D'a 
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over subjective culture. Yet the victory is far from secure, because the 
individual, sensing no doubt the pressures which threaten his newly found 
freedom, battles fiercely for the individuality which took him centuries to 
achieve. A financial impetus further informs his struggle, for it is clear to him 
that if he is to prove a success in the metropolis (and success so often is 
measured in the acquisition of wealth), he must overcome that same blase 
outlook which has enveloped his peers. We are left, in the final analysis, with 
a kind of shifting enantiodromia, which defines the dynamic between the 
individual and the expansive social sphere that is the modem metropolis. The 
urban man, having finally earned the rights to a free and individualized life, 
truly is, as Sartre famously stated, condemned to be free, for now an enormous 
effort must be made daily if he is to hold out against the objectifying forces 
which relentlessly press against him in the city. When we consider these 
conclusions in light of the modernist artist, we can understand how it is that 
such enthusiastic and voluble declarations of individuality adumbrate the 
postmodernist commercialism which continues to exact conformity just as 
much (if not more) than any of the institutions to which artists had previously 
been enslaved. 
32 
The Conflict Inherent in Cultivation 
The struggle of the subjective against the objective is viewed from 
another angle in "The Conflict and Modem Culture", an essay written in 1914 
but unpublished until Simmel's death in 1918 (Davis 321). In keeping with 
32 Artists like Salvador Dali perhaps came to realize that the influence and power of the new 
academy of commercialism could not be shaken off the way other institutions, such as the 
Church, had been. Dali's adoption of the anagrammatic pseudonym "Avida Dollars" testifies 
to his surrender and subsequent embrace of such brazen commercialism. 
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his trend towards a more pronounced vitalist philosophy, the piece is an 
investigation into the dynamic between the life force and the objects it 
produces. 33 Through the medium of the subjective/objective dialectic, Simmel 
discovers what constitutes culture, and how it is that cultural forms generate 
cultural history. The essay begins with a brief commentary on how cultural 
forms distil from life and how they come to stand in opposition to the life (and 
culture) which created them. Before we delve into this crucial work, let us 
first turn to Simmel's "On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture", an earlier 
essay which prefigures "The Conflict in Modem Culture". 34 The author 
commences with what he identifies as the dualism between man and "the 
naturally given order of the world" (27) 
. 
35 There is, as a result of the 
oppositional stance man adopts, the eruption of a "never-ending contest 
between subject and object, which finds its second round within the realm of 
spirit itself' (27). It is the spirit which continuously engages itself in the 
production of "innumerable structures", structures which break free from their 
spiritual origin and demand autonomy. 36 It is the nature of the spirit, which is 
recognized as the embodiment of the subjective world, to give rise to objects 
which coalesce into an objective uprising with which the subjective (as we 
33 In his outstanding article "Georg Simmel and the Aesthetics of Social Reality", Murray 
Davis observes, "One of Simmel's most important contributions to social thought is his 
discovery of the-growing autonomy of all social forms" (324). According to Davis, Simmel's 
emphasis on these independent social forms is in keeping with the contemporary view that 
"cultural forms", like art, existed independently of the society which produced them. 
Furthermore, Davis writes that Simmel is "generalizing Karl Marx's assertion of the growing 
autonomy of economic processes, to all social and cultural processes" (324). 
34 Davis comments that this essay is "crucial and brilliant, but unfortunately difficult and 
neglected" (322). It would seem that at least some of the ideas posited in the piece were 
polished and presented in final form in the complementary later essay. I propose that an 
extensive comparison of the two essays would go a long way towards revealing the extent to 
which Simmel's later work was informed by his increasing tendencies towards metaphysical 
vitalism. 
35 Quotations from these essays derive from K. Peter Etzkorn's book Georg Simmel: The 
Conflict in Modem Culture and Other Essays (1968). 
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learned in the conclusion to "The Metropolis and Mental Life") constantly 
battles. The crux of the struggle is to be found in the fact that the spirit is 
fluidity itself, and the objects it produces become fixed at the moment of their 
distillation: 
Spirit, most deeply tied to spirit, for this very reason experiences 
innumerable tragedies over this radical contrast: between subjective 
life, which is restless but finite in time, and its contents, which, once 
they are created, are fixed but timelessly valid. (27) 
Simmel unfortunately does not explain what he means by the finitude of the 
spirit and the infinitude of its contents, but I would argue that he is drawing 
attention to the fact that contents, in spite of the distance they achieve from the 
spirit which produced them, forever bear the mark of that spirit. They remain 
"timelessly valid" because they will forever be recognizable as products of the 
subjective spirit (27). We may, for example, scoff at what we perceive to be 
the impracticability or unattractiveness of an ancient art form, but we 
nevertheless are forced to acknowledge that the creator, at least at one point, 
deemed it an endeavour worthy of his effort. The subjective life (on the 
individual level at least), as far as it is capable of engendering said contents, is 
only as finite as the lifespan to which it is bound. Perhaps it is the desire to 
promote itself beyond its demise that prompts the spirit to generate social 
forms. 
Although he does not employ the term, it is a self-reflexive act which 
governs this complex dualism, in the middle of which Simmel finds his titular 
concept of culture (27). The soul for Simmel "is never only what it represents 
at a given moment, [but rather] it is always 'more', a higher and more perfect 
manifestation of itself, unreal, and yet somehow eternally present" (27-28). 
" The structures which Simmel envisions as distilling from the flow of life fall under the 
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He analogises that culture is the medium through which the soul travels "to 
itself' (27). 37 Unlike inorganic objects, the organic being holds within itself 
its history, and it is this past which "circumscribes" the future of the organism 
(28). In L'Evolution Creatrice (Creative Evolution, 1907), Bergson (to whom 
the concept of memory proved essential in his philosophy) similarly states, 
"the very basis of our conscious existence is memory, that is to say, the 
prolongation of the past into the present, or, in a word, duration, acting and 
irreversible" (20). Simmel goes as far as to write that life's "fundamental 
destiny" is to "contain its future in its present in a special form which exists 
only in the life process" (28). There is, in his estimation, a vital impulse 
which compels life to distil itself into forms, and rather than one particular 
avenue of development taking precedence over the others, it is instead the 
unification of the all the potential directions which constitutes cultivation: 
But man does not cultivate himself through their isolated perfections, 
but only insofar as they help to develop his indefinable personal 
unity. In other words: Culture is the way that leads from the closed 
unity through the unfolded multiplicity to the unfolded unity. (29)38 
The closed unity to which Simmel refers is the unity of those potential 
directions, which may be characterized as closed in that it has yet to be 
realized inaction (here understood as form). Once life embarks on the journey 
to self-realization/actualisation, the possible avenues unfold before the vital 
impulse. They do not yet, however, exist as a unity for the very reason that at 
rubrics of art, law, religion, technology, science, and custom (27). 
37 Simmel at this point addresses the concept of neotony: "The later form of an organism 
which is capable of growth and procreation is contained in every single phase of organic life". 
At the same time, he discredits the common belief that "organic evolution" is merely potential 
energy unfolding into kinetic energy: "The inner necessity 
... 
is far profounder than the 
necessity that a wound-up spring will be released" (28). Bergson's influence, particularly as 
derived from Creative Evolution, is clearly evident. 
3' These lines are absolutely critical not only to Simmel's philosophy of culture, but also to 
our interpretive investigation of Schwitters' Hanover Merzbau. Thus, we shall return to them 
in the final chapter. 
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this stage they are divergent. Man, or life in general, is incapable of tracing 
every path, and therefore certain avenues become preferable to others. In the 
final stage of cultivation, man collects what was formerly the "unfolded 
multiplicity" under the umbrella of his personality, and thus he achieves a 
unity, informed by his individuality. In order to illustrate and elucidate these 
difficult concepts, Simmel cites a more typical example of cultivation. A 
fruit-bearing tree producing unpalatable fruit may be recast by man's 
ingenuity into a garden tree yielding esculent treats. In this case the wild 
specimen has become cultivated (29). Conversely, if a sail mast were to be 
fashioned from the same tree, one would not speak of the tree as having been 
cultivated into a mast. Deductively, we may conclude that the wild type fruit 
tree was cultivatable because it already contained, in potentia, the garden 
variety; the operative concept here is that the potential it held was naturally 
occurring, whereas the same tree could never spontaneously transform into a 
sail mast. 
It is in this sense that we will not credit a man with genuine culture 
on the basis of knowledge, virtuosity, or refinements which only act 
as additives which come to his personality from an external realm of 
value. In such a case, then, man is the possessor of traits of culture, 
but he is not cultivated. A man becomes cultivated only when 
cultural traits develop that aspect of his soul which exists as its most 
indigenous drive and as the inner predetermination of its subjective 
perfection. (29) 
There exists, of course, the possibility for the soul to negotiate the chasm 
between itself and intrinsic self-knowledge, and Simmel suggests as much 
when he writes that "a multitude of movements can lead the soul to itself' 
(29) 
. 
39 However, one may not speak of cultivation in the true sense of the 
39 The author specifies some of the ways in which the soul may reach such a condition: 
"religious ecstasies, moral self-devotion, dominating intellectuality, and harmony of total life" 
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word unless the soul reaches beyond itself and generates forms which then 
impact the soul on its journey to self-knowledge: "from the highest 
perspective these processes of perfection are perhaps the most valuable" (29- 
30). The conclusion he draws is that "culture is not the only value for the 
soul" (30). The crux of Sinunel's conception of culture is to be found in these 
passages, for cultural forms are the means by which man arrives at cultivated 
individuality, and culture thus defined is the synthesis of "the sub ective soul j 
and the objective spiritual product" (3 0). 40 He does stipulate, however, that 
such forms must retain their spirituality (for they originate with the spirit) if 
they are to hold any significant import for the life which generated them. 
Likewise, the "subjective spirit", although compelled to depart briefly from its 
subjectivity, must not forego its own spirituality (30). 
Towards Metaphysical Unity in the Tragedy of Culture 
In the opening paragraphs of both "On the Concept and the Tragedy of 
Culture" and "The Conflict in Modem Culture", Simmel addresses the tension 
that exists between life and the forms it engenders. 41 A cursory reading of his 
introductory statements would lead one to the opinion that the forms, or 
cultural objects, which life produces aggressively vie for eminence against the 
originating force. However, as already proven, these forms are essential to 
(29). In other words, the methods yielding the most immediate results are with little exception 
beyond the reach of the average man. 
40 Simmel observes that the "paradox of culture" rests with this immutable fact: "the 
subjective life which we feel in its continuous stream and which drives itself towards inner 
perfection cannot by itself reach the perfection of culture" (30). 
41 tt Frequently it appears as if the creative movement of the soul was dying from its own 
product" ("On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture" 27). Compare this statement to that 
contained in the only footnote to "The Conflict in Modem Culture": "Since life is the 
antithesis of form, and since only that which is somehow formed can be conceptually 
described, the concept of life cannot be freed from logical imprecision" (26). In the latter 
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life, for they are the means by which it comes to realize itself in an ultimate 
gesture of self-reflexivity. Davis speaks to this shifting condition in the 
following lines: 
Throughout Simmel's thinking runs an ambiguous 
- 
sometimes 
tragically ambiguous 
- 
conception of the human predicament: at 
times Simmel sees man as the creator of the forms of culture and of 
society 
- 
forms man creates in order to satisfy his needs and serve his 
purposes; at other times Simmel sees man as having to endure those 
forms which he had previously made 
- 
forms which now neither 
serve nor satisfy, but which now master him. (321) 
"On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture" addresses this dilemma by 
specifying the real problem as being not one between life and forms, but 
between forms and the way in which man perceives them: 
The discrepancy which exists between the normal states of our inner 
life and its contents becomes rationalized and somewhat less palpable 
whenever man, through his theoretical or practical work, confronts 
himself with these spiritual products, and views them as a sphere of 
the internal, independent cosmos of the objective spirit. (3 1) 
It is only by virtue of the "stable substantive order of values" that the forms 
maintain a connection to the life which produced them (3 1). 42 Although not 
explicitly stated in this essay, it would seem that the values function as 
intermediaries between objective forms and subjective life in that they more 
closely follow the flux of life (and more specifically that of social culture). In 
support of this conclusion is the fact that values are commonly held to be 
subjective. Still, they articulate with objects or social forms only through the 
intercession of man. Simmel is cautious, however, in characterizing these 
values as positive or negative, for what matters is "that the subject has 
produced something objective, that its life has become embodied from itself' 
(30). He takes the example of the work of art, which impresses and delights 
quotation it is clear that Simmel's theory has matured significantly, to the point where he even 
questions the legitimacy of theorizing about life at all. 
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us because we recognize in its form a "vessel" into which life has briefly 
poured but a drop of its total vitality (32). It is, furthermore, a form which is 
particularly poignant because the creative forces of the artist are more readily 
apparent in it; it would prove, for example, much more difficult to uncover 
the creative spirit which informed the development and institution of a law. 
With great insight, Simmel distinguishes between the impressions made on a 
spectator by a work of art and by natural phenomena (32-33). The latter 
44appears as a continuous contiguous whole, whose undifferentiated character 
denies its individual parts any special emphasis, any existence which is 
objectively delimited from others" (33). In contrast, "it is only human 
categories, that cut out individual parts, to which we ascribe meaning and 
value" (33). Nature, he writes, "has no other holiness than the one which it 
evokes in us", and it is only when we isolate certain features and construct 
around them "poetic fictions" that we arrive at "meaning and value" (33) 
. 
43 It 
is only when "the human soul, the source of all value" invests itself in the 
objective world that we perceive the relevant objects as having enriched our 
existence (33). 
Here is the second method by which the creative spirit self-reflexively 
expresses itself. According to Simmel, the "spectrum" is as follows. On one 
side we find that "all meaning and value" derive from that "purely subjective 
life" that has been the basis of these investigations, and on the other side value 
42 The values of which Simmel writes are tethered to various categories, namely, the "logical 
or moral, religious or artistic, [and] technical or legal" (3 1). 
43 Simmel provides the example of a sunrise, which stands outside "categories of value" 
because it "does not increase the value of this world or make it more sublime" (33). However, 
when the same sunrise is artistically interpreted by a painter, it is infused with his unique 
perceptions, and thus it may become a valuable piece of artistry which promotes "an increase 
in the value of existence as a whole" (33). The fact that the individual's eye has fallen upon 
this otherwise neutral natural phenomenon, and that the creative force of the human mind has 
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becomes equated with "objectification" (33). The latter position points to the 
necessity for the human soul to produce forms by which it manifests its 
significance: "Even sentiments and the personality obtain their significance, 
in a good or a bad sense, by belonging to a realm of the super-personal" (34). 
The path from the self to the self, in either case, is forged through "objectively 
spiritual realities", the spiritually infused forms which distil from life (34). 
Once again, the emphasis lies with the observation that the soul must move 
outside of itself and travel through its products before it can attain the 
heightened state of cultivation (34). Just as forms must be qualified by value 
if they are to retain their connection to the spirit that created them, value 
likewise must be "a value within some other context, promoting some interest 
or some capacity of our being" (34). Returning to the issue of a metaphysical 
unity, Simmel stipulates that the "total self' must come "one step closer to its 
perfected unity" if the value under consideration is to be termed "cultural" 
44 (34). In seeming anticipation of what would have been a worthy modernist 
(and even more so, postmodernist) objection to this theory, the author 
acknowledges that in certain epochs, some phenomena may undeservingly be 
classified as cultural values. In his estimation, it is when life is rendered 
refashioned it into a "vessel" of the spirit, leads one to conclude that indeed it is man's 
interpretive power that ascribes a value not naturally given. 
"For all of its contradictory protestations, Dada was preoccupied with the struggle to uncover 
(or forge) a unity out of the mire of modem life. For this reason, among others, vitalism found 
a ready audience in many of the satellite Dada groups, particularly those which inherited the 
neo-Romantic proclivities of German Expressionism. Ball testifies, in his diary entry for 12 
June 1916, that the Dadaist does not naYvely seek a conventional panacean unity, but rather 
one that admits of the fragmentation and disintegration which suffuses modem culture: 
He no longer believes in the comprehension of things from one point of 
view, and yet he is still so convinced of the unity of all beings, of the totality 
of all things, that he suffers from the dissonances to the point of self- 
disintegration. (Flight Out of Time 66) 
Elsewhere he cites the necessary invocation of a "creative force" to "solve" the "oppositions" 
of life (23. VI. 1916,70). The influences of Bergson and Simmel are clear. 
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devoid of meaning that resulting forms are transitively disconnected; they 
44are merely schematic", and so cannot perform their required function: 
In such a case individual development is capable of deriving from 
social norms only the socially correct form of conduct, from the arts 
only unproductive passive pleasures, and from technological progress 
only the negative aspect of the reduction of effort and the smoothness 
of daily conduct. The sort of culture that develops is formally 
subjective, but devoid of inter-weaving with those substantive 
elements so essential to culture. (34-35) 
In such periods, an overwrought emphasis is placed on social manners and 
other "refinements" which really do not possess any "transformative potential" 
(Hubbard 56). 
With regards to the artist qua creator, Sinimel identifies "a twofold 
force 
... 
at work" (35). On one side we find "the expression of his essential 
powers", and the delight he derives from channelling his life into the objective 
forms he moulds into existence. The other side is predicated upon his 
"passionate dedication to the cause", according to which he feverishly labours 
on the details of the objective form; in the process he loses himself in his 
work. Only in the figure of the genius are these complementary sides unified: 
"To the genius, the development of the subjective spirit for its own sake and 
compelled by its own forces is indistinguishable from the completely self- 
negating devotion to an objective task" (35). At this point Simmel elucidates 
the distinction between synthesis and unity. Culture, he writes, "is always a 
synthesis", but that synthesis is to be distinguished from unity, for it 
"presupposes the divisibility of elements as an antecedent or as a correlative" 
(35). 45 In order for the unity of the creative genius to be recognized as 
" With characteristic perspicacity, Simmel observes that only an age as "analytical" as his 
would see synthesis as "the most sublime of formal relationships between spirit and world" 
(35). Bergson, at around the same time, was levying the same critique against modem 
analytical programs of thought. 
D- 
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cultivation, the constituent subjective and objective realities must be "divided 
[so as] to be resuscitated in synthetic form" (36). It is this small but critical 
distinction which explains for Simmel why an "interest in culture" is not 
commensurate with "pure self-development of the subjective spirit or with 
pure dedication to a cause" (36). We are reminded here of what Simmel 
suggests on page 29, which is that the soul may reach itself through such 
profound experiences as "religious ecstasies" without attaining cultivation. 46 
The titular tragedy is explained at length when Simmel identifies and 
analyses the "paradox" inherent in the "subject-object-synthesis" of culture 
(39). In the life of the form or object, internal laws evolve which refuse to 
yield to the purposes and intentions of their creators (39). It is often the case, 
particularly with such cultural forms as language and religion, that the logic 
inherent in them develops its own momentum which carries the form further 
and further from the spiritual impulse which bore it: 
Indeed, everything objective possesses its own individual logic. 
Once certain themes of law, of art, of morals have been created - 
even if they have been created by most individual and innermost 
spontaneity 
- 
we cannot control the directions in which they will 
develop. Although we generate them, they must follow the 
guidelines of their own inner necessity, which is no more concerned 
with our individuality than are physical forces and their laws. (39) 
The tragedy extends, however, beyond that between the forms and their 
spiritual origin. The soul inclines towards a unified organization which grows 
outward from a central point, and this esemplastic model forms the basis of the 
soul's tireless endeavours to arrange the "contents" it encounters in the same 
4' As already proposed and explained, culture works through the institution of value to achieve 
a synthesis between the subjective world and the fonns it creates. A subject can engender an 
inestimable amount of forms, and it is also capable of identifying and responding to objects 
created by other subjects. Thus, "to be cultivated becomes a task of infinite dimensions" (38). 
There is a danger, however, when such an overabundance of forms makes itself available. 
"Over-specialization" marks the academic as the possessor of knowledge and skill, but it does 
not render him cultivated (39). 
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fashion. This organizational model was instituted, according to Simmel, at 
maW s first instance of self-consciousness, for it was then, when he "began to 
say T to himself and became an object beyond and in comparison with 
himself', that "the contents of the soul" aggregated around the self-conscious 
germ. 47 However, 
the contents with which the "I" must organize itself into its own 
unified world do not belong to it alone. They are given to it from 
some spatially, temporarily idealized realm outside; they are 
simultaneously the contents of different social and metaphysical, 
conceptual and ethical worlds. (40) 
Herein we find the intractable will of forms to dominate life. As Simmel puts 
it, "They aim to break up the centralization of cultural contents around the 'F 
and reconstitute them according to their demands" (40). He resorts once again 
to the example of religion as a cultural form, for in spite of the fact that 
religion derives from seminal vital impulses, it has asserted itself to the point 
where man often feels himself torn between "freedom" and "subordination 
under divine order": "we are entangled because our life ideals are inevitably 
subsumed under other circles than those of our own T" (40). In an attempt to 
maintain his primacy, man envisions himself as the locus through which 
"objective forces and values" pass, and in his estimation he selects and 
organizes these otherwise conflicting spheres of existence (the subjective, the 
objective, and the values of the latter) around himself in accordance with "the 
logic of his personality" (40). 48 It is still the responsibility of culture, 
however, to keep these spheres in "extremely close contact" so that "the 
development of the subject" remains "conditional on the assimilation of 
47 The model is redolent of pearl formation, for both processes begin with a central entity 
around which secondary layers concretise. Of course, in the case of the pearl the initial irritant 
is external to the animal, while the soul's impulse is entirely its own. 
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objective material" (40). What initially appeared to be a resolution between 
the subject-object dualism (the synthesis offered by culture) is but a mirage, 
because on an even more profound level there rises in place of the initial 
conflict one "between subjective and objective developments" (40). As 
previously observed, the synthesis given by culture is relatively futile when 
what is really required for the transcendence of the dualism is a unity. 49 
Simmel's belief in the dominance of objects admits, in his own words, 
of Marx's concept of fetishism (42). He contextualizes his theories in the 
examples of technology and the development of the fine arts, and in the latter 
he finds that 
technical skills have developed to such an extent that they are 
emancipated from serving the cultural total purpose of art. By 
obeying only the indigenous material logic, the technique at this 
point develops refinement after refinement. However, these 
refinements represent only its perfection, no longer the cultural 
meaning of art. (43) 
A similar case has, we are told, unfolded in the technological world, and each 
example serves to demonstrate the immutable truth uncovered herein. Forms 
may (and with increasing frequency do) dissociate themselves from the 
spiritual impulse which begot them, and over-specialization irrefutably attests 
48 Schwitters is precisely this sort of creator, and we shall soon see to what extent he fulfils the 
9 eneral characterization offered here. 
9 At this point in the essay, Simmel cites the division of labour as evidence that "the object 
can step outside its mediating role 
... 
and break up the bridges over which the course of 
cultivation has been leading" (40). The interpretation of objects may be made on a "scale" 
which measures the degree to which the "unity" of the object "stems from the unified 
intellectual intention of one person", or from many (4 1). Simmel considers the case of the 
city, which comes into existence not through a concerted effort of thousands of individuals, 
but rather through "accidental needs and desires" (41). A factory, he writes, has localized 
areas of production overseen by a limited number of individuals, but there is a central 
organization, ultimately a single will, which dictates the products to be manufactured and the 
means by which they are. He gives the example of a newspaper as an intermediate between 
the two, for one "leading personality" presides as the director of "mutually accidental 
contributions of the most diverse form and of diverse individuals who are complete strangers 
to one another" (41). These cases, and others given on pages 41 and 42, prove that the 
"objective spirit" often transcends individual wills, and that it even contains within it "an 
independent chance of becoming re-subjectivized after 
... 
successful objectification, even when 
it was created by a subjective spirit" (42). 
PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL 
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to "this very general cultural predicament" (43). The tragedy of culture, then, 
rests with the fact that man becomes subjected to objects initially intended as 
markers on the path leading back to the subjective life. Simmel tells us that 
this wayward process is similar to the one by which man becomes enslaved to 
logic with the result that "our thoughts are led into theoretical consequences 
which are far removed from those originally intended" (43). 50 The situation is 
much more than unfortunate or sad, he writes, because the destruction is 
enacted by the self against the self. The entire process is set in motion by a 
well meaning but perhaps misguided creative spirit (43). We may surmise, as 
Simmel does, that the predicament would not prove so dire if it were localized 
to one individual. Perhaps the spirit would be able to find itself again, for 
there would be only the fonns to which it gave rise, and it is possible to 
imagine that the ratio of subject to objects would remain manageable. 
However, when millions of subjects are producing trillions of objects, 
"without any consideration for other contributors", cultural development soon 
enough overwhelms the individual (44): 
There is no reason why it should not be multiplied in the direction of 
the infinite, why not book should be added to book, work of art to 
work of art, or invention to invention. The form of objectivity as 
such possesses a boundless capacity for fulfilment. This voracious 
capacity for accumulation is most deeply incompatible with the 
forins of personal life. (44) 
The soul, centred on the notion of self-consciousness, organizes all it 
encounters according to a centripetal force, as evidenced by the fact that we 
always interpret objects and concepts in tenns of how they serve us. For the 
simple reason that the multiplicity of objects is too expansive to be 
50 Bergson's pejorative view of an excessive reliance on concepts and logical analysis entirely 
concurs with what Simmel concludes. We shall, in the next chapter, follow Bergson's 
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An investigation into what was then the burgeoning culture of youth is 
not, however, the primary focus of "The Conflict in Modem Culture". The 
little Simmel does write about the vitality of youth is meant to complement his 
conclusions about vitality in general, and the shying away from formal 
constrictions is most evident in the young. The same holds for Ortega y 
Gasset, who writes about youth culture in order to underline his concerns 
n 
. 
'bout the violence inherent in modem society (140). (Simmel refrains from 
infusing his essays with such emotive language, but he does put forth 
conclusions that would later be corroborated by those of Ortega y Gasset. ) 
Concemed as he is with the subject/object dualism of modem life, Simmel 
focuses his attention on the issue of originality, and it is at this point in the 
essay that he pauses to digress, in typical Simmelian fashion, upon a tangential 
matter. He finds in the philosophy of Pragmatism, particularly the American 
version, substantiation of that doctrine of originality so critical in modem 
culture. What Simmel takes away from Pragmatism is its refusal to recognize 
the "independence of truth, which has been presupposed throughout history" 
(19). He is not interested in supporting or denying its claims, but rather he 
wishes to note that the philosophy arose at a "particular stage in history": 
Pragmatism, as we have seen, deprives truth (Erkennen) of its old 
claim to be a free-floating domain ruled by independent and ideal 
laws. Truth has now become interwoven with life, nourished by this 
source, guided by the totality of its directions and purposes, 
legitimised through its basic values. Life has thus reclaimed its 
sovereignty over a previously autonomous province. (20) 
The emphasis here is clearly on life and its transformative potential. 
Following this passage, Simmel writes that in the past, truth functioned as one 
of those cultural fonns described at length in his essay "On the Concept and 
Tragedy of Culture". It "provided a fixed frame 
... 
for the total world of our 
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thoughts and feelings", and in this way it claimed triumph over the 
subjectivity of life (20). The salient difference in modem philosophy rests 
with the reversal of the primacy of truth over life, for now "thought and 
feeling are being dissolved in and by the stream of life", and each object is 
interpreted in terms of the spirit which gave rise to it (20). Such conclusions 
are but a short step away from Bergson's metaphysical philosophy, as 
evidenced by Simmel's suggestion that once intuition is employed over "logic 
and rational intelligibility", we arrive at a point where "only life is capable of 
understanding life" (20). 65 Life becomes the referent that informs the 
interpretation of all objects, and thus form is dissolved in spirit, object in 
subject. These tenets are consistent with the doctrine of Lebensphilosophie 
(2 1), and they herald the conquest of classicism and its emphasis on formal 
constrictions. 
66 
Lebensphilosophie, Simmel tells us, is predicated upon two basic 
principles: the eschewal of "mechanics as a universal principle", and the 
rejection of "the claim of ideas to a metaphysical independence and primacy" 
(21). Ruminating upon these conditions, one soon arrives at the issue of self- 
contemplation. If life refuses domination by ideas, then how legitimate are 
notions of self-consciousness, which are by necessity postulated in concepts 
and ideas? In his only footnote to the essay, Simmel addresses the logical 
impossibility of absolute self-consciousness, an exalted state of self-awareness 
and self-knowledge unperturbed by the rigidity of conceptual thought. Having 
already established that life and form exist in opposition to one another (but 
nevertheless are mutually dependent), Simmel posits that "the concept of life 
65 The passage is entirely redolent of Bergson. 
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cannot be freed from logical imprecision", precisely because "only thaf which 
is somehow formed can be conceptually described" (26). He continues, 
The essence of life would be denied if one tried to form an 
exhaustive conceptual definition. In order for conscious life to be 
fully self-conscious, it would have to do without concepts altogether, 
for conceptualization inevitably brings on the reign of forms; yet 
concepts are essential to self-consciousness. The fact that the 
possibilities of expression are so limited by the essence of life does 
not diminish its momentum as an idea. (26) 
The tragedy inherent in life's self-expression is, in Simmel's estimation, 
unavoidable, but life continues to aspire to that initial unity which is the 
fountainhead of self-consciousness. In addition, the "internal opposition" 
between life and its primary method of realization, the generation of forms, 
66gets more noticeable the more self-conscious life becomes" (21). Simmel 
understands the modem age to be highly analytical, as evidenced by his 
conclusions in "On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture", and he also 
characterizes it as an epoch abounding in forms, both commercial and cultural. 
The burden of all these forms (and attendant concepts, which at least in this 
case may be interpreted as a different species of form) prompts life to struggle 
more than ever in the interest of maintaining its independence and importance. 
At the same time, the more strenuously life asserts itself, the more apparent 
the obduracy of forms becomes. More profoundly, Simmel may be referring 
to what is in essence the positive feedback mechanism by which life seeks to 
assert itself over and beyond the forms that mediate that process of self- 
assertion. 67 As he expressed in an earlier passage, tragedies are tragic because 
66 As defined by Simmel, "Classicism 
... 
is the ideology of form, which regards itself as the 
ultimate norm for life and creation" (2 1). 67 Fortunately, positive feedback mechanisms are, physiologically speaking, rather rare. The 
self-regulating clotting of blood is a common example of a positive feedback mechanism, and 
the danger inherent in such a process is obvious. 
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they are self-begetting, and this is no less the case than with the tragedy of 
modem culture. 
Conclusion 
So it is then that Simmel was, in the final analysis, a philosopher of 
life, and only in this capacity can his sociological contributions be fully 
understood and appreciated. 68 It becomes clear through even a cursory 
comparison of his earlier and his later essays that he moved towards a 
philosophy that proposed the vitality of life above all other considerations. 
His writings on culture carne to be coextensive with his Lebensphilosophie, 
and Frisby cites as an example of this progression the fact that in The 
Philosophy of Money, Simmel interprets the social fragmentation 
symptomatic of the money economy "as a consequence of the division of 
labour". He would later come to view the matter "as part of the general 
human predicament" (27) 
. 
69 For this reason among others, "The Metropolis 
and Mental Life" is an intriguing essay in which the theory of the individual 
Simmel proposes straddles economic considerations as well as vitalist ones. 
What begins as the struggle of the individual to resist the social tide in which 
he finds himself immersed, ends with the more critical struggle between his 
inner self and the self he must put forward in the context of the metropolis. 
The blase outlook is the precursor of the positive feedback mechanism we 
identified in Simmel's essays on the conflict of culture. It is a development of 
life for the preservation of life, but like the tragedy of culture it turns upon its 
" Weingartner: "Upon his philosophy of life and experience, Simmel builds his philosophy of 
culture" (55). 
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origin and cannot help but undermine it. Otto Gross, who like Simmel served 
as an alternative to Marxist readings of contemporary society, arrived at a 
theory of the individual that closely resembled that formulated by Simmel six 
years earlier in "The Metropolis and Mental Life". Summarized by Arthur 
Mitzman in "Anarchism, Expressionism and Psychoanalysis", Gross' theory is 
as follows: 
The inevitable conflict between society and the inborn 
predispositions of the individual, he argued, results in pathogenic 
injury to the individual. Since individuals internalize the standards of 
society, conflict does not, in general, occur openly between the 
individual and society, but rather within the individual psyche. (9 1- 
92)70 
The perception of the metropolis as a Sodomic wasteland was hardly anything 
new by the time the German Expressionists were in their ascendancy, but 
when the carnage of World War I was factored in, it came to be, more than 
ever before, a parable for the condition described above. The new 
battleground on which the modem individual had to fight was sprawled out in 
his own mind, particularly as he strenuously tried to assert his individuality in 
the increasingly depersonalized milieu of the metropolis. Elderfield expands 
upon this common distinction between the inner life of the metropolitan and 
the brash external world with which it conflicts, and finds somewhere between 
69 Frisby attributes this trend to Simmel's "growing interest in Bergson's philosophy", and 
proceeds to note how "after the Soziologie of 1908 and until 1914 all Simmel's volumes of 
published work are upon philosophy and aesthetics" (27). 
70 Gross and Simmel's conclusions are pictorially realized in many Expressionist paintings of 
the period, particularly in the metropolis paintings of Georg Grosz in which the fetid city 
assails the anaemic and frail citizen. The greatest of these works is undoubtedly "Widmung 
an Oskar Panizza" ("To Oskar Panizza", 1917-1918). Grosz's commentary on the piece 
emphasizes the rupturing chaos of the city that the Berlin Dadaists were soon to exploit in 
their aesthetically political agenda: 
At night, down a strange street, a diabolical procession of inhuman figures 
parade by, their faces eloquent of alcohol, syphilis, plague. One is blowing 
a trumpet, another yelling hurrah. Death rides among this multitude, in a 
black coffin, symbolized straightforwardly as a skeleton. (Kranzfelder 24) 
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the two a working resolution that the most successful of the Expressionists 
(with Schwitters being perhaps the most successful in this regard) explored: 
More relevant and important, however, to that sense of opposition 
between a public and a private world, which is central to Schwitters' 
art and psychology, and a more basic link between Schwitters and his 
contemporary Expressionist background, is his ambivalence towards 
his immediate environment and to its urban bourgeois culture. [ 
... 
] 
As the literary historian Richard Sheppard well puts it, the most 
striking Expressionist literature emerges when the writer is 
sufficiently within the city to appreciate its forms yet sufficiently 
detached so as not to be overwhelmed by them. (169)" 
Upon reading "On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture", we find 
that Simmel abstracts this struggle further and takes it from the domain of the 
individual to that of a cosmic, Manichean conflict between the subjective vital 
force, which he simply calls "life", and the forms and objects it begets. These 
forms sustain the legacy of the life that engendered them, but they also, by 
virtue of their rigidity, erode its potency and the very vitality that defines it. 72 
In A View of Life: Four Meta-physical Chapters, Simmel encapsulates his 
Lebensphilosophie in the terms "Mehr-Leben" ("more-life") and "Mehr-als- 
71 In this regard, the work of the Expressionist August Macke offers an intriguing and 
unexplored parallel to Schwitters' position vis-A-vis Hanover. Schwitters had a difficult time 
waging war against his beloved city, but Berlin Dadaists like Huelsenbeck found it 
irretrievably provincial and employed its petty bourgeois reputation in the charges against 
Schwitters. His response, which was far more measured (but hardly indifferent), was similar 
in effect to Macke's: 
The chaos and scintillating attractions of the city, which stimulated and 
agitated so many of his contemporaries, do not appear to have interested 
Macke as much. His descriptions are always limited to his own, ordered, 
middle-class surroundings; beyond that, sociological analysis is a topic 
which evidently remained foreign to him. Macke's towns and their 
inhabitants tend to be more provincial in character 
- 
not loud and 
uncontainable, but contemplative and self-contained. (Meseure 61) 
72 Again, Frisby points out how far Simmel streamed towards Bergsonian metaphysics, 
departing as he did so from his former sociological standpoint. He cites Kracauer's comment 
that "the affmity between Simmel's doctrine and that of Bergson is unmistakeable" as further 
proof that Simmel finished as a vitalist (Sociological Impressionism 28). The fact that his 
vitalist years coincide with the advent of Dada, particularly the German Dada phenomenon, 
would lead one to believe that his aesthetics would be plumbed for the contemporary insight 
they would contribute to theories of Dada. Strangely enough this is not the case, and more 
often than not Simmel is cited sparingly in books on German Expressionism and only 
footnoted in books on Dada. Sheppard is the most notable exception in this regard, of course. 
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Leben" ("more-than-life"), and it is on these tenns that I wish to conclude this 
chapter. Weingartner summarizes "more-life" as follows: 
By saying that life is more-life, Simmel declares life to be a process. 
Life is a motion; specifically, it is a motion which constantly 
reproduces itself, pushes beyond itself. Unlike mechanical changes, 
life is truly continuous; it "is an irreversible current in which every 
moment dissolves in the next. " In contrast with the mechanical 
motions of inorganic things, life is fully temporal. (36) 
"More-life" is a "self-perpetuating process" in that it begets vitality (it creates 
more life), and it is very close conceptually to Bergson's duration (53,36), 
which will be explored in the next chapter. It refuses temporal and even 
spatial partitioning, for it constantly "transcends its present". Only life can 
sympathize with true temporality, that is, time as it truly exists in endless 
protraction, where the present moment is founded on the past and converges 
with the future. As we now know, however, life also coalesces into fonns that 
challenge its vitality, and in this sense life is also "more-than-life". 
Weingartner writes that Simmel's theory of experience is what links life and 
the fonns to 
-which it gives rise, as experience is structural but is capable of 
structuring at the same time: "In their being experienced in some mode, 
contents are formed in one of many possible ways. In being fonned, they 
become objects and independent of the process of life itself' (54). This notion 
of experience is seminal, for "if life is an experiential process, it cannot help 
but be creative" (54). 
It is, furthermore, in the realm of creation that the articulation between 
these two species of life is exposed, and more directly we may witness the 
application of Simmel's theory in Schwitters' linked concepts of 
"Entformung", "Eigengift", "konsequent", and "Urbegriff '. The first term, 
"Entformung ý% is one of those Schwittersian neologisms that echoes a familiar 
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word but is transposed slightly and thus given a new meaning. Elderfield 
suggests the possible translations of "metamorphosis" and/or "dissociation", 
but admits that exact translation is impossible. "Formung" corresponds to the 
English "forming", and the prefix "ent-" is akin to the prefix "un-" (237). The 
term was applied by Schwitters to characterize the mysterious process his 
found objects underwent when they were exported into his collages (237). 
The emphasis here is not so much on a reassignment of objects than on a 
deconstructive purification: 73 
It meant, then, making something timeless and primeval 
- 
art, that is 
to say 
- 
from something temporal and modem, from the perishable 
fragments of the present. And in order to achieve this esthetic 
transubstantiation, the materials and fragments that Schwitters used 
needed to be purged of what he called their Eigengift, their inherent 
vice or personality poison. The image is of esthetic cleansing. (237) 
"Eigengift" embodies an idea similar to the one Duchamp worked against, 
"taste", and in both cases the artist proved intent on erasing this "poison" from 
his work. It was perhaps not so much an exercise in "cleansing", for plenty of 
the items found in Schwitters' collages and assemblages remain in "rough" 
form, but it was more an exercise in imposing his design, his creative spirit, on 
an object that fonnerly served another (and another's) purpose. Elderfield 
relates that Schwitters considered art (read: Merz) to be "the antidote to the 
"Eigengift" that the world's objects contained", and it was, in his estimation, 
the reason why Schwitters produced abstract art, for "abstractness and purity 
73 Harold Rosenberg's observation, "the unity of collage lies in the metaphysics of mixing 
formal and material realities through introducing the concreteness of the paste-in", points the 
way to another possible metaphysical interpretation of collage (6 1). There is a restless 
exchange, as already indicated, between life and its forms as well as between multiplicity and 
unity, although in the case of the latter dualism the arrows of the equation flow more towards 
unity. Within the collage work there is evidence of the vital flux, not only in the forms that 
have been selected, but also in the very process of assembling those forms. That "paste-in" 
process is, ultimately, "concrete" in that the final work is finished, static, and thus, in its 
rigidity, like the forms it originally resurrected ("Collage: Philosophy of Put-Togethers", in 
Collage: Critical Views 
. 
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were one and the same thing" (237). From "Eigengift" we move to 
"konsequent" ("consistent, rigorous, logical"), and here we encounter, in the 
most definite terms thus far, the self-reflexive crux of Schwitters' art. The 
selection and subsequent resurrection of objects, following a necessary period 
of purgation, had to be executed in the context of an art that was "subject only 
to its own autonomous laws" (237): 74 
Moreover, since the "laws" of art were in fact the invention of the 
artist 
- 
since "the artist has his laws within himself, and this is why 
he can be so consistent" 
- 
to "dissociate" materials from the external 
world was also to associate them with a world of the artist's own 
making. (237) 
Finally, the result of the "Entformung" process, the effacement of the 
"Eigengift", and the "konsequent" application of the purged object in the 
artwork result in the triumph of "Urbegriff ', defined by Elderfield thusly: 
Art was a "spiritual function of man, which aims at freeing him from 
life's chaos (tragedy). " This was what Schwitters called an 
Urbegriff, a primeval concept, not a modem one; and the creation of 
art was the creation of timeless order out of temporal chaos, and the 
creation of a private retreat from the remains of the outside world. 
(238) 
The struggle the individual faced against the collectivity of the metropolis, a 
struggle that Gross and Simmel tell us was relocated to the inner domain of the 
individual, was a struggle that became increasingly apparent in the aesthetic 
realm. After all, it was in this realm that self-consciousness, which had 
contemplated and sympathized with "more-life" and "more-than-life", became 
(through the concepts and processes of "Entformung", "Eigengift", 
"konsequent", and "Urbegriff ') the self-reflexivity of Merz. 
74 And as one of life's forms, art naturally developed its own laws, placing it in the perilous 
position of losing its connection to its original vitality. Dada art in general, and Schwitters' 
art in particular, may be read as a grand modernist project of straining to reconnect art with 
life, a project that had its earlier (although less successful) champions. The ironic thing was, 
however, that many Dada artworks pursued this ideal by cloaking themselves in banality 
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rather than inventiveness, but then again that irony was part of the methodology to which 
Dada subscribed. 
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Chapter 11 
Intuition, Duration, and the Manifestation of the Elan Vital: The 
Self-Reflexive Metaphysics of Bergson 
"In Bergson Ps philosophy, every expressive medium, whether it be plastic, 
literary, or musical, is the end of a process whereby the inner, manifold setf becomes 
spatialized through the process ofsetf-representation. "' 
Introduction 
Scholars familiar with Simmel's oeuvre consistently acknowledge that 
his later work, particularly A View of Life: Four Metaphysical Chapters, was 
heavily informed by contemporary vitalist philosophy. 2 Bergson was the most 
influential vitalist of the modernist period, and his significant contributions to 
philosophy were already in wide circulation prior to Simmel's death in 1918. 
As Frisby notes in Sociological Impressionism, 
Simmel, who was sometimes termed 'the German Bergson' and who 
encouraged the translation of Bergson's work (Evolution creatrice 
was translated by his close friend Gertrud Kantorowicz), would have 
readily concurred with Bergson's characterization of 'the rare 
moments of artistic creation' that signify 'this supra- individual life, 
this supra-consciousness of the elan vital'. (159) 
Besides publishing his Bergson essay in 1914, Simmel recommended the 
3 
philosopher's work to Edmund Husserl. Sheppard suggests it was his 
ultimate propensity towards metaphysics that relegated Simmel to the recesses 
of the twentieth century academic canon (22), an accurate but somewhat ironic 
conclusion considering that the source of that brand of metaphysics, Bergson 
1 The quotation appears in Mark Antliff s book Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the 
Parisian Avant-Garde (48). 
2 In "Form and Content' ', Weingartner notes that although Bergson is never mentioned in 
Simmel's final book, the author was certainly guided by his influence. The link is proven by 
the fact that Simmel composed an essay entitled "Henri Bergson", which was included in the 
posthumously published book Zur Philosophie der Kunst. Philosophische und 
Kunstphilosophische AufsAtze [On the Philosophy of Art. Essays on Philosonhy and 
Philosophy of A edited by Simmel's friend Gertrud Simmel (Georg Simmel 1858-1918 55). 
31 am indebted to Professor David Frisby (University of Glasgow), who has kindly provided 
me with information on the scholarly connections between Simmel and Bergson. 
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4 himself, enjoyed a great deal of popularity 
- 
at least during his lifetime. In 
this chapter, Bergson's theories concerning the role of metaphysics, the value 
of intuition over conceptual thought, the quintessence of duration, and the 
function of the comic will be probed with the aim of understanding the 
importance of introspection in the creative act and how it elucidates the 
question of self-reflexivity in the art of Schwitters. 
Cultural History of Bergson's Influence: Problematic Popularity 
In his highly infonnative study, Antliff vividly illustrates the 
contemporary popularity of Bergson, whose 
fame as a speaker was matched by his eminence as a writer 
- 
all his 
major works had been translated into English, German, Polish and 
Russian by 1914. At its height, the Bergsonian vogue even led to 
what the historian R. C. Grogin has called "mystical pilgrimages" to 
Bergson's summer home in Switzerland where "locks of his hair at 
the local barber's were treated as holy relics. " (4) 
This fanatical devotion to Bergson, which extended beyond academic circles 
to the general public, made his philosophical treatises highly accessible to 
contemporary artists within and beyond the bounds of Paris. Following his 
1910 preface to the authorized translation of Essai sur les donnees immediates 
de la conscience Time and Free Will 
- 
An Essgy on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness, 1889), F. L. Pogson lists in his bibliography twenty-one 
German, thirty-one English, and fourteen Italian publications concerning 
4Leck provides an appraisal of Simmel's academic career and suggests in his first chapter, 
"T'he Avant-Garde Origins of Sociology", what factors were responsible for the antagonism 
levied against Simmel by his peers. Pages 35-38 in particular examine that same antagonism, 
which Leck holds responsible for Simmel's lacklustre academic career. 
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Bergson's philosophy. 5 Ball, in his diary entry for 9 September 1917, ties 
Bergson to Zurich Dada with the following entry: 
In Die Weissen Matter [The White Leaves] there is an essay "Das 
Erlebnis der Zeit und die Willensfreiheit" ("The Experience of Time 
and Free Will"). The essay is on Bergson. [ 
... 
] At the time of the 
cabaret we were very interested in Bergson, and in his simultaneity. 
The result was a purely associative art. (Flight Out of Time 134) 
And in his Memoirs of a Dada Drummer, 6 Richard Huelsenbeck recalls: 
ever since Bergson made us aware of the creative nature of our era, 
we have regarded (for the first time in history) simultaneity as 
creative, a simultaneity encompassing both man as a whole and the 
totality of milieu. A poem thus becomes something total or 
universal. [ 
... 
] When I wrote Phantastiche Gebete [Fantastic 
Prayers], I knew nothing about his modem problem of simultaneity, 
which plays such an important part in physics now. But poetry and 
art did anticipate the scientific rejection of cause-and-effect logic. (168) 
Huelsenbeck's quotation corroborates Sheppard's conclusions regarding the 
relationship between the arts and sciences in the immediately pre-modernist 
and modernist periods. Sheppard cites Ernst Mach as having acknowledged 
"the extent to which disciplines other than physics had moved from an 
objective to an energetic view of reality within a general climate of 
interdisciplinary e ment" (36). Throughout Modernism 
- 
Dada 
- 
fl r 
Postmodernism he draws attention to the general conclusion, reached by many 
contemporary philosophers and physicists alike, that there was a non- 
Newtonian "metaworld" or "fourth dimension" where the traditional laws of 
cause and effect did not necessarily apply. According to Sheppard, "one of 
the central ideas of Mach's physical theory was that isolated things do not 
' Of course, the polyglot capabilities of most Dadaists would have allowed them to read 
Bergson's works in the original French. The primary point here is the readiness with which 
contemporary artists took to Bergsonian philosophy. 
' The majority of this book was originally published as Mit Witz, Licht und Griltze. Auf den 
Spuren des Dadaismus (1957). It was later translated by Joachim Neugroschel and published 
in English as a volume of Motherwell's Documents of Twentieth-Century Art (1974). The 
edition consulted in this thesis is edited by Hans J. Kleinschmidt and includes a foreword by 
Rudolf E. Kuenzli (199 1). 
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7 
exist" (36). Huelsenbeck's quotation cited above supports this conclusion 
from the vantage point of the poet. In his introduction to Huelsenbeck's 
Memoirs of a Dada Drummer, Kleinschmidt writes, "Bergson's philosophy 
emphasized the irrational intuitive aspects of mental functioning. We are, 
therefore, not surprised to find in Huelsenbeck a lifelong fascination with 
creative irrationality... " (Kleinschmidt xlii). What is said here of 
Huelsenbeck applies equally well to most of the Dadaists and particularly to 
Schwitters. 
The Dadaists, however, were far from alone in their appreciation and 
fascination with Bergson. Undoubtedly, he was a philosopher who sincerely 
understood the modernist condition. His vitalist theories were related to the 
scientific advances being made during the time immediately preceding and 
contemporaneous with the modernist era, advances Sheppard would describe 
as having opened the window of consciousness onto the fourth dimension: 
But advances made in the areas of subatomic and astrophysics during 
the high modernist period by Mach, Max Planck, Albert Einstein, 
Louis de Broglie, Niels Bohr, Erwin Sch6dinger, and Paul Dirac 
(which almost certainly owed something to the more global cultural 
and sociopolitical upheavals that were taking place as well as the 
impact of vitalism, especially in its Bergsonian form) showed that, 
beyond the apparently stable and harmonious world of classical 
physics, there lay a "metaworld" or "fourth dimension" that was not 
describable in Newtonian terms. (3 6 and passim) 
While physicists and biologists were probing the depths of the "fourth 
dimension" in their respective disciplines, contemporary artists like Duchamp 
were exploring the "metaworld" in the newly unfolded realm of the psyche, 
7 Such a position is absolutist, and so it partakes of the belief that "if we knew all about 
anything, we would know all about everything" (Baylis 13). In practice, this theory prompted 
many avant-gardists, particularly the Futurists and Dadaists, to pursue bruitist, simultaneous, 
and static poetry. The Atlas Press editors of Huelsenbeck's Dada Almanach (Dada Almanac, 
1920) provide an excellent summary of these three poetic modes (47). Charles Baylis' chapter 
on absolutism in his edition of Metaphysics challenges some aspects of this metaphysical 
doctrine, if only in an attempt to reconcile it with idealism. 
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which in turn was continuing to come unravelled in the work of Sigmund 
Freud and his fellow psychoanalysts. In The Private Worlds of Marcel 
Duchamp, Jerrold Seigel relates the blossoming studies of motion in science 
and technology to 
the world human beings carried inside them, the vital and fluid world 
of the mind. [ 
... 
] Bergson's attention to such transforming events 
made his philosophy appeal both to traditionalists interested in 
upholding the independent power of the soul or spirit and to radicals 
in search of human powers capable of bringing about fundamental 
change. (56)8 
Tisdall and Bozzolla's Futurism makes frequent reference to the impact 
Bergson's vitalism had on the Italian Futurists, particularly Marinetti and 
Boccioni. The authors state that "in Bergson, Marinetti recognized an anti- 
determinist philosopher proposing a future formed not by the unchangeable 
forces of the past, but by the action of men in the here and now: a voluntarist 
philosophy as expressed in Creative Evolution" (2 1). Also, "The notion of 
6 states of mind', like 'universal dynamism', reached Boccioni by way of 
Bergson's Matter and Memoll [Mati6re et memoire, 1896], and was another 
shared theme among the Futurist painters and many others of their generation" 
(43). Bergson's influence, as suggested in Futurism, may have found its most 
dedicated pictorial representation in the paintings of the Futurists, but it must 
be noted that his theories were so readily absorbed by modernist artists that 
traces of Bergsonian philosophy are detectable in nearly every modernist 
movement. 9 Should we begin now to pursue those traces of Bergson's 
theories, whether in pure or digested form, or even in just the major art 
' In the fourth chapter of Seigel's book, there is an extensive discussion of the critical role the 
fourth dimension played in Duchamp's "La Maride mis A nu par ses c6libataires, m8me" ("The 
Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even", 1912,1915-1923). It suffices to note for our 
purposes that "Duchamp's fourth dimension is a kind of utopia of aesthetic existence, where 
imagination never has to give way to the conditions and limits of real life" (105). 
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movements of this period, we are in danger of dedicating volumes to the topic. 
Let us then return to Antliff s book, which not only presents an exhaustive 
study on the role Bergson played in the evolution of the Cubist movement and 
in particular his reception by the Puteaux Cubists, but also explores the 
political atmosphere of the period between the turn of the century and World 
War II. 
As has been noted and thoroughly analysed in many secondary texts on 
modernism, the period was particularly rife with struggle in Europe and many 
temporary alliances were forged and ruptured, contributing to the turbidity of 
the modernist experience. Antliff provides a detailed account of the various 
I 
political and accompanying literary factions operating in France during the 
early 1900s, and because his description is so thorough it would be pointless to 
reproduce it here in, its entirety; rather, I refer the reader to its location. " It is 
necessary, however, to provide a cursory assessment of the political 
environment during the era immediately preceding the first World War in 
France, as it is coextensive with Bergson's most active and influential years as 
well as with the fon-native years of many Dadaists such as Duchamp and 
Breton. Firstly, we encounter on both sides of the political spectrum an 
antipathy to the French Republic (6). Those on the right aligned themselves 
more or less with the highly conservative monarchist Charles Maurras, who 
founded the Action Frangaise in 1899. Martin Conway, in Catholic Politics in 
Europe: 1918-1945, identifies the Action Frangaise as one of several groups 
"representative both of the increased engagement of intellectuals with politics 
9 Christopher Butler's Early Modernism: Literature, Music, and Painting in Eurove 1900- 
1916 is an excellent source of information for those inclined to further pursue this point. 
'0 The account is to be found in the introductory chapter of Inventing Bergson: Cultural 
Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde, pages 3-15. 
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and of the renewed interest in Catholicism in French intellectual circles during 
the pre- 1914 era" (25). Working strenuously on the left were the "anarcho- 
individualists, anarcho-communists, and anarcho-syndicalists", the last of 
whom "founded the Conf6deration Generale du Travail (C. G. T. ) in 1895 in 
order to organize labor in strike actions against the Republic" (Antliff 6). 
Some of the main figures on this side were "the socialist Gustave Herve, editor 
of the incendiary La Guerre social (1906-1915), and the anarcho-syndicalist 
theoretician Georges Sorel; who celebrated the violence entailed in class 
struggle, [both of whom] led autonomous factions within the anti-republican 
movement" (6). What complicates the matter further is that several ephemeral 
allegiances were forged when the self-interest of the various group leaders 
could be served by aligning with the opposition. There were, then, transitory 
pacts made between Sorel and the Action Frangaise, as well as between Herve 
and the same. Threading through all of these bonds was an anti-Semitism 
directed not only against large Jewish business establishments like the 
Rothschilds, but also against Jewish culture in general. The formation of the 
Camelots du Roi, "a gang of militant thugs whose direct-action tactics against 
state institutions, parades, and individuals initiated a series of public 
scandals", elicited some unlikely support from Maurras, who is quoted in 
Antliff as saying that working-class militancy was less of a threat to France 
and French interests than a government sympathetic with "Jewish big 
business" (8). Eventually, however, the outrageous attacks by the Camelots 
du Roi Prompted Herve and Maurras to put greater and greater distance 
between their respective groups and the violently racist Camelots. Herve was 
becoming increasingly concerned that he was alienating valuable support from 
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the Left, while Maurras feared driving away Catholics and his fellow royalists. 
Philosophical rumination was not far from all of this turbulence, for "Sorel's 
antirationalist theory of class consciousness 
... 
was particularly abhorrent to 
Maurras 
... 
who founded his philosophy on the rationalist tenets of the French 
positivist Auguste Comte" (9). In contrast to Maurras' philosophy, 
"Bergsonian ideas were at the heart of Sorel's revolutionary doctrine" (10). 
The differences extended into the realm of aesthetics as well: 
Such conflict also led to disagreement among literary exponents of 
Maurras's ideology. Although united in their condemnation of the 
Symbolist movement because of its "anarchic" individualism, 
Maurras's literary interpreters differed in their judgment of what 
exactly constituted Symbolism's anarchic component. More 
doctrinaire followers, such as Lasserre and Jean-Marc Bernard, the 
founder of Les Gu6pes [The Wasps] (1909-1913), supported 
Maurras's association of French art with a rationalist tradition rooted 
in the Cartesianism of the seventeenth century and the Greco-Roman 
culture of classical antiquity. They pitted their neoclassicism against 
the anti-intellectual and Bergsonian tenets of the neo-Symbolist 
movement [ 
... 
]. (10) 
Bergsonian philosophy, as Antliff reports, was contorted to fit the agenda of 
the party at hand, a tendency that has marred Bergson's legacy to this day. 
Nearly every secondary account of Bergson and his work is now mindful to 
distinguish between the carefully posited tenets of the philosopher and the 
distortions that have occurred since they were formulated. " It was, perhaps, 
the appropriation of Bergson's vitalism by Sorel and the militant Left that 
contributed, more than anything, to Bergson falling into disrepute after such a 
11 For example, Alexander's first words of Bergson: Philosopher of Reflection are dedicated 
to this issue of severe misinterpretation. The stakes are high, to be sure, as Bergson's vitalism 
came to be unfairly linked to Fascist irrationalist thought: 
On the one hand, in the process of penetration and diffusion, his thought has 
been altered beyond recognition; between 'Bergsonism' and the actual 
philosophy there is often but a mere nominal link. On the other hand, this 
power of renewal is of the very essence of a philosophy that claims above 
all to be 'open'. (7) 
In the article "Bergson and the Politics of Vitalism", Sanford Schwartz addresses the issue of 
the charge of irrationalism on pages 290-291 (The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the 
Vitalist Controversy). 
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sustained popularity. His vitalist philosophy has, in the past, been linked to 
Nietzschean vitalism, and both have been accused of spurring on and 
reinforcing twentieth century fascism. 12 Bergson moulded his theories out of 
the same milieu that informed the artwork of the Parisian avant-garde, and 
Antliff has already explored the profound influence his philosophy held over 
the Fauves and the Cubists. Considering that each segment of Dada 
- 
Zurich, 
Berlin, New York, Paris, et cetera 
- 
incorporated, or at the very least revolted 
against tenets of the preceding avant-garde movements, it is fair to suggest 
that when it comes to Bergson's influence, what impacted the Fauves and the 
Cubists impacted the Dadaists. We need not rely on this observation, 
however, to justify our examination; the testimony of individual Dadaists 
(some of which has already been given) and the salient vitalist tendencies of 
many Dadaist artworks proves the links are there, awaiting critical exploration. 
The Terms of Bergson's PhilosoPhy: The Intuition of Duration 
Before we continue with our investigative attempts to link Bergson's 
theories with our theory of self-reflexivity, let us take some time to define 
some of his most frequently employed philosophical terms. The logical place 
to begin a survey of his philosophy is with Introduction a la meta-physique n 
Introduction to Metaphysics, 1903), which concisely puts forth some of the 
signature theories of intuition, duration, memory, and mobility. The book 
begins by identifYing two different ways of "knowing a thing": the first by 
way of moving around it and observing it from the outside, the second (and 
12 Like Simmel, however, Bergson is currently enjoying a comeback, and pioneering works 
like The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy offer insightful re- 
examinations of his contributions to the diverse fields of philosophy, aesthetics, and even 
physics. 
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the one favoured by Bergson) by way of entering into it, and thus observing it 
from the inside out. 13 For Bergson, the first method does not move beyond the 
64 relative", while the second is capable of "attaining the absolute" (1). As is 
his habit (a predilection incidentally that makes his work highly accessible and 
enjoyable), he proceeds to illustrate his point with vivid examples. The first is 
the case of an object travelling through space: 
But when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing to the 
moving object an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also 
imply that I am in sympathy with those states, and that I insert myself 
in them by an effort of imagination. [ 
... 
] In short, I shall no longer 
grasp the movement from without, remaining where I am, but from 
where it is, from within, as it is in itself. I shall possess an absolute. 
(2) 14 
The second example suggests that a reader presented with the character of a 
novel cannot hope to reconstitute an actual Personage from the fragmentary 
views offered by the author, even if those views are reminiscent of an 
historical person. Descriptions, whether elementary and non-fictional (such as 
a news journalist's account) or complex and abstract (as with a painter's 
depiction of an event composed from memory), fall miserably short of the 
actual experiences because they seek to equate the perceptions and resulting 
mental impressions with others already known and understood by the audience 
(6). Hence the nearly unavoidable peppering of eyewitness accounts with 
13 For simplicity's sake I shall refer to this work as a book, for this is how it has been 
published in English since T. E. Hulme's authorized translation of 1910. According to both 
Pogson's bibliography at the beginning of Essai sur les donndes immddiates de la conscience 
(Time and Free Will, 1889) and the list of English translations of Bergson's works referred to 
in Burwick's and Douglass' The Crisis in Modernism, it originally appeared as a long essay in 
the Revue de mitaphysique et de morale as "Introduction A la mdtaphysique" (1903). It was 
later reprinted as the sixth chapter in La Pensde et le mouvant (1934), translated in 1946 as his 
autobiography, The Creative Mind. 
" Already, it is tempting to make connections between the above quotation and the works, 
both literary and visual, of Dada. We may draw a parallel with Schwitters, who did not paint 
cityscapes depicting the ever-evolving heaps of urban rubbish, but chose instead to collect this 
very refuse and tack it onto his canvases. In this creative act, he was displaying the city with 
its defmite and identifiable by-products, and thus was employing his intuition not just to 
Da 
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similes, which serve to provide the hearer with links to familiar memories or 
concepts already mastered. Metaphor, although by its nature more abstract 
and creative, still works to the same end. Obfuscating the initial impression 
even further is the habit or taste of the j ournalist, storyteller, or artist; there 
are, in truth, no objective accounts. As Bergson explains, 
A representation taken from a certain point of view, a translation 
made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect in 
comparison with the object of which a view has to be taken, or which 
the symbols seek to express. (5) 
Such a collection of representations, along with the accompanying symbols, 
constitutes an analysis. Our convention of fragmenting the absolute into 
familiar elements and our inability to explicate what is unique about it 
condemns us to multiply our initial error. Thus, the further we carry the 
analysis the greater the distance we put between the absolute and our 
knowledge of it: 
In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which 
it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of 
its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete 
representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect 
the always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. 
(6) 
There is one method Bergson proposes of gaining intellectual access to an 
external object or phenomenon. It is the invocation of intuition, and it is one 
of the comerstones of his philosophy. To gain knowledge of the absolute, 
which is "perfect by being perfectly what it is" (5), one must be prepared to 
sympathize intellectually with the object or phenomenon at hand, and to "place 
oneself within" (6) so that no translating medium is required. Once we align 
ourselves with the subject and investigate its unique qualities from within, we 
represent the city but also to present it in a much purer and more immediate form than any 
painting could. 
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may grasp it "without any expression, translation or symbolic representation" 
"Metaphysics", the discipline that strives to employ intuition over 
analysis, "is the science which claims to dispense with symbols" (7, author's 
italics). " 
From his theory of intuition, we move swiftly to Bergson's theory of 
duration, which itself is invaluable in an investigation into the intricacies of 
the introspective act: 
There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by 
intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its 
flowing through time 
- 
our self which endures. We may sympathise 
intellectually with nothing else, but we certainly sympathise with our 
own selves. (8) 
In this quotation, we find the basis of the self-reflexive act as it relates to self- 
consciousness. Bergson begins by building his case for pure duration by 
carefully distinguishing between time as it is measured by the physicists and 
time as it is lived by consciousness (Alexander 8). Time as measured and 
utilized by science is understood to be homogenous, and likewise it is 
contained in homogeneous space. In Time and Free Will, Bergson debunks 
the theories of homogeneous space and time when he observes that we 
frequently mistake qualitative differences in sensations as quantitative ones. 
The example of how we instinctively recognize the difference between left 
and right is given: "we ourselves distinguish our right from our left by a 
natural feeling, and that these two parts of our own extensity do then appear to 
15 Either the modernist Zeitgeist suggested this theory to Bergson, or the theory he formulated 
led to parallel conclusions reached by contemporary artists such as the Dadaists; the point of 
exchange probably lies somewhere in between. In his introduction to The Creative Mind, 
Bergson acknowledges Spencer as having been a major influence with regards to a theory of 
intuition (11). At the same time, Ball anticipates what was to be one of the main challenges to 
Bergson's theory. He writes, "Intuition, however, is also fantastic. It comes from the five 
senses and will offer the artist only transformed facts of experience, but not elements of form" 
(6. VIII. 1916, Flight Out of Time 73). Bergson stressed frequently that intuition was not to be 
the only means of attaining knowledge, but its invocation did require greater effort. 
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us as if they bore a different quality; in fact, this is the very reason why we I 
cannot give a proper definition of right and left" (97). 16 There are, then, 
qualitative differences "everywhere in nature" (97), but our geometrically 
inclined minds, in a never ending endeavour to economize action in the world 
of solids, are content with conceiving of space as homogeneous. Such an 
active (mis)conception "enables us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to 
abstract, and perhaps also to speak" (97). Nevertheless, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that our consciousness is not "clean-cut", and it certainly cannot 
be divided into autonomous mental states that remain external to one another. 
As Ian Alexander explains, duration is an "ever-changing multiplicity 
of interlocking states" (21). It'is necessary then to discover what Bergsonian 
multiplicity is before we continue with duration. The second chapter of Time 
and Free Will begins with a discussion of "numerical multiplicity and space". 
Number, Bergson writes, is both unity and multiplicity (76). It is unity 
because "it is brought before the mind by a simple intuition and is given a 
name", but it is also multiplicity because each number is composed of others, 
which are in turn composed of yet more numbers (76). Thus, there enters into 
the picture the question of whether or not those composite units are identical, 
as we assume them to be, or whether we attempt to overlook the individual 
object in the counted total in order to arrive expeditiously at a final figure: 
16 The first chapter of Time and Free Will is primarily concerned with how we are to 
distinguish quantitative differences in sensation and emotion from qualitative differences. We 
are accustomed, Bergson states, to ascribing quantitative differences to our emotions: we are 
more or less angry, we are more or less in love, etcetera. However, Bergson disproves this 
idea: 
an obscure desire gradually becomes a deep passion. Now, you will see that 
the feeble intensity of this desire consisted at first in its appearing to be 
isolated and, as it were, foreign to the remainder of your inner life. But little 
by little it permeates a larger number of psychic elements, tingeing them, so 
to speak, with its own colour: and lo! your outlook on the whole of your 
surroundings seems now to have changed radically. (8) 
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We place ourselves at these two very different points of view when 
we count the soldiers in a battalion and when we call the roll. Hence 
we may conclude that the idea of number implies the simple intuition 
of a multiplicity of parts or units, which are absolutely alike. (76) 
"And yet they must be somehow distinct from one another, since otherwise 
they would merge into a single unit", Bergson continues. He gives us the 
model of a flock of sheep, and asks us to consider how individuals may still be 
"enumerated" even though their individuality precludes us from arriving at a 
"total" at which we would arrive if we were to add integers to achieve the 
sum. He suggests that if we were to dispense with the actual animals and rely 
instead on a mental image of them, we arrive before two possibilities: "Either 
we include them all in the same image, and it follows as a necessary 
consequence that we place them side by side in an ideal space, or else we 
repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one" (77). So that we 
may mentally come to rest at the final number, fifty, we are obliged to "retain 
the successive images which we picture to ourselves" (77). Although we 
begin, as children, to count by physically noting individual objects (the 
example provided is a row of balls), we soon move away from our reliance on 
the objects themselves to a much less cumbersome mental image. Soon after 
that point we are left with an "abstract number", and eventually we come to 
work only with symbols and words. "Quick calculation" demands that we 
become adept at mentally manipulating those abstract numbers; otherwise we 
should constantly have before us the exact objects which are to be counted. 
We vacillate then between unity and multiPlicity. Furthermore, Bergson 
proposes that what we understand as unit and unity is more complex than it 
first appears: 
When we assert that number is a unit, we understand by this that we 
master the whole of it by a simple and indivisible intuition of the 
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mind; this unity thus includes a multiplicity, since it is the unity of a 
whole. But when we speak of the units which go to form number, we 
no longer think of these units as sums, but as pure, simple, 
irreducible units, intended to yield the natural series of numbers by 
an indefinitely continued process of accumulation. It seems, then, 
that there are two kinds of units, the one ultimate, out of which a 
number is formed by a process of addition, and the other provisional, 
the number so formed, which is multiple in itself, and owes its unity 
to the simplicity of the act by which the mind perceives it. (80)" 
There are also, according to Bergson, "two very different kinds of 
multiplicity" (85), and it is at this point that we may re-approach the question 
of duration and how it is that we so commonly misrepresent our states of 
consciousness. 
To "speak of material objects" is to "localize them in space"; we 
imagine seeing them, touching them, and perhaps manipulating them (85). To 
count them is easy in this case, for we only need to fix them mentally in the 
space in which they were initially encountered: "no effort of the inventive 
faculty or of symbolical representation is necessary" (85). The same does not 
hold, however, for states of consciousness, or to be more precise, "purely 
affective psychic states" or "mental images other than those built up by means 
of sight and touch" (86). We are obliged to invoke symbols when we 
endeavour to count such abstract impressions, and the medium in which we 
count them is space. 18 Bergson observes that "impenetrability of matter" and 
"number" suggest one another, for objects must be distinct and isolated in 
17 As with Simmel, concerns of "multiplicity" and "unity" occupy much of Bergson's work. 
Throughout many primary and retrospective Dada accounts, we find very similar concerns 
being voiced (see Motherwell's anthology, Memoirs of a Dada Drummer, and Flight Out of 
Time 
. 18 Bergson, on pages 86 and 87 of Time and Free Will, invokes the example of a distant bell, 
whose tolls are counted by an attentive listener. The person may opt to collect the successive 
sounds reaching him and assemble them into a single impression, or he may actively commit 
himself to totalling the chimes. Should he decide on the latter option, he must acknowledge 
the interval between each toll. If he does not, the distinction between the tolls is effaced, and 
the sounds in merging defy enumeration. Bergson concludes that because the intervals remain 
even when the sounds fade, it is in space that we count them, and not in pure duration (87). 
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space in order for us to count them. States of consciousness, "feelings, 
sensations, [and] ideas", cannot be counted because it is their nature to 
penetrate and colour the states that came before them and those that follow. 
Should we attempt to isolate and count them, we should then render them 
precisely what they are not 
- 
impenetrable to one another (89). When we 
refrain, however, from our vain attempts to dissect and count our sensations 
and emotions, we absorb their totality and allow ourselves a glimpse of the 
profundity that endures beneath the shallow, geometrically organized surface. 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson produces a schematic map that 
posits the layers we encounter when we turn our gaze inwards. 19 The first 
layer is comprised of perceptions that are related to us by our senses and 
originate in the "material world". Beneath this layer, we have all of the 
memories that have associated themselves with similar perceptions from the 
time of our birth and which serve to "interpret them". The "tendencies and 
motor habits" follow (8). Progressing further, there appears 
beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a 
continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. 
There is a succession of states, each of which announces that which 
follows and contains that which precedes it. (9) 
Consciousness, for Bergson, cannot be isolated from memory for the reason 
that every sensation, as soon as it makes its impact on the person, is swept up 
Pure duration does not admit of intervals, as it is an "organic whole" which cannot be divided 
into discrete and thus enumerable units. 
'9 The objection may be raised that such a partitioning contradicts what Bergson has thus far 
propounded, namely the impossibility of dividing states of consciousness into tidy, 
manageable segments. It must be remembered that Bergson frequently acknowledged the fact 
that we are most comfortable in the world of solids and geometry, and that analysis, concepts, 
and the language we employ to arrive at such concepts cannot be easily transcended. Bergson 
would have been aware of the necessity to make at least some concessions to a more common 
discourse, if only to elucidate the shortcomings of said method. Furthermore, he says 
elsewhere that the use of imagery serves to draw the reader to a point where he may then 
launch his own investigations. It is his belief in that inner duration which every man 
possesses that allows Bergson the confidence to make such seemingly contradictory 
concessions. 
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in that "continuous flux", the successive moments of which build on those that 
came before and influence all the others that will follow (9). In fact, 
unconsciousness is the only result possible when we eliminate memory, for 
then each moment would truly be independent of its predecessors and 
successors; "it would die and be bom again continually" (10). 20 The flux of 
duration is, for Bergson, reminiscent of a "myriad-tinted spectrum" (11), 
although he is careful to admit that this comparison is flawed. As with a 
spectrum, there is a series of colours and tints that follow one another but 
remain distinct from their neighbours. Each shade contains within it the 
preceding one and the one that follows it in the series. Duration differs from 
this model in several significant ways, which Bergson duly notes. First of all, 
a spectrum is afait accompli, while duration is constantly evolving. It is, as 
the philosopher states in Creative Evolution, "the continuous progress of the 
past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances" (! ýreative 
Evolution 4). The incorporation of the past and its influence on the future are 
the signature properties of duration, without which "there would never be 
anything but the present 
- 
no prolonging of the past into the actual, no 
evolution... "(4-5). The second way in which duration differs from the 
spectrum model is that in the latter, each shade is distinct from the ones 
immediately surrounding it, no matter how fine the gradation, while duration 
" And just as critical as memory, at least in Schopenhauer's estimation, is a "known" for the 
"knower": 
For consciousness consists in knowing; but knowing requires a knower and 
a known; hence self-consciousness could not come about if there were not 
in it also an element which vis-A-vis the knower is both known and distinctly 
different. [ 
... 
] Hence a consciousness which would be, completely and 
utterly, pure intelligence cannot possibly exist. ("On the Primary of the Will 
in Self-Consciousness", The World as Will and Idea 88) 
Years later, Bergson would arrive at a conclusion that also challenges the supremacy of 
intelligence. Schopenhauer finds that the germ from which self-consciousness springs is "the 
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is seamless. Alexander observes that "psychic duration 
... 
is a fusion of 
heterogeneous parts so structured that each moment is absorbed into the 
following one, transforming it and being transformed by it, with the 
consequent transformation of the whole" (11). Yet even such a seemingly 
accurate statement is slightly flawed, for it suggests that "heterogeneous parts" 
lie beneath the "whole", which is so thorough in its unity that it is fallacious to 
even speak of "parts". Finally duration, which manifests itself in "the inner 
life", demonstrates without effort a "variety of qualities, continuity of 
progress, and unity of direction" (An Introduction to Metaphysics 13). It is 
not representable by images, and concepts are even less likely to render a 
proper picture of duration (13). How then is he justified in, attempting to 
convey the essence of duration, and how is it that he can produce significant 
philosophical works that employ models and images purporting to explain its 
intricacies? Is it not possible that the generation of multiple analyses may 
actually hann the reader's endeavours to grasp and intemalise the theory he 
propounds? Does the proliferation of such analyses obscure the original 
object and create dead-end diversions that the mind cannot help but frantically 
explore (6)? 
Thankfully, Bergson identifies this concern, and his resolution points 
the way to the integration of self-reflexivity and intuition. Bergson's method 
throughout An Introduction to Metaphysics, among other works of his, is to 
try and impart working definitions through examples. He realizes, as 
evidenced by various disclaimers, that a philosopher can only lead the reader 
towards an understanding of duration, but that the reader must then gaze 
1 
will", while Bergson would promote the elan vital as the original force behind self- 
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introspectively and establish for himself 
- 
using his own intuition 
- 
what the 
essence of duration is. He suggests 
No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse 
images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the 
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to be seized. (14)21 
He remains vague as to how exactly a consciousness that is tailored "to a 
particular and clearly-defined disposition" (14) then assimilates the examples 
provided and comes to its own personal conclusions regarding the matter. 
Perhaps his reluctance to define an exact method is in keeping with his 
insistence that the student of metaphysics can only ever master his own 
intuition, and that he can only be nudged, not escorted, in the direction of a 
complete understanding: 
We do penetrate into it, however, and that can only be by an effort of 
intuition. In this sense, an inner, absolute knowledge of the duration 
of the self by the self is possible. (20) 
Through his constant use of simple but effective examples, Bergson presents 
46various images" that only hint at the complexity of duration. The 
dissimilarity of the examples ensures that the reader will not focus excessively 
on one image, but attempt to piece all of them together and thus prompt his 
own consciousness towards understanding. The onus remains on the 
individual to employ his own unique intuition; the only way by which he may 
discover duration is through introspection, or more specifically, a self- 
reflexive introspection. Once he has grasped it, his own duration then informs 
consciousness. Differences in terminology aside, the two concepts are remarkably similar. 
21 These lines are of great import to our theory of self-reflexive art, for just as the artist 
dissolves his presence in his work (if only to recover it in a more significant way), the work 
itself is subject to dissolution. Dissolution and fragmentation are not, in this regard, 
necessarily negative, for at least with some artists, the fragmentation of the pictorial space or 
the dissolution of conventional dimensions was a positive subversion of the fragmentary 
nature of the modernist experience. We shall return to the issue of "diverse images" when we 
enter into our discussion of Merz collage and assemblage. 
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his judgments about all the observations his senses relay to him. He has 
achieved a self-reflexive condition which shall permit him to perceive reality 
- 
and himself 
- 
"without any veil" (14). This process is, however, not an easy 
one to employ, for it calls us to set aside familiar ways of assessing realities 
both exterior and interior to us. We are, Bergson repeatedly tells us, 
accustomed to mistaking "the elements of a translation as if they were parts of 
the original" (3 1). 22 Some psychologists succumb to the same errors, as they 
feverishly endeavour to reconstruct the personality from a collection of 
observed psychic states (25). Any given personality is so fluid, so variable, 
and so permutational that it can never be properly represented by something as 
comparatively staid as a concept. Furthermore, the initial error is even more 
pernicious, as we frequently concern ourselves not "with fragments of the 
thing, but only, as it were, with fragments of its symbol" (25). As he 
emphasizes so many times in this study, one must commit oneself to reaching 
an understanding by seizing the object using its own terms, that is to say by 
employing one's own intuition: 
a true empiricism is that which proposes to get as near to the original 
itself as possible, to search deeply into its life, and so, by a kind of 
intellectual auscultation, to feel the throbbings of its soul; and this 
true empiricism is the true metaphysics. It is true that the task is an 
extremely difficult one, for none of the ready-made conceptions 
which thought employs in its daily operations can be of any use. (3 1) 
Let us pause and consider the example of our emotions, and how our meagre 
(mis)representations of such emotions actually depreciate the feelings we 
intuitively understand to be profound and unique. 23 Most often when we 
speak of love, we overlook its complexity and ignore the psychic history 
22 Such a flawed "method" is, in his opinion, what Hippolyte Taine and "certain German 
pantheists" have in common (3 1). 
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which has made love possible in the first place. An emotion, or any psychic 
state for that matter, brings with it the memory of those that preceded it, and is 
coloured by the current state of mind and the unique circumstances in which 
that mind finds itself at that moment. Thus "love" is, strictly speaking, never 
the same emotion twice, and the same may be said for any emotion one wishes 
to suggest. It would be impractical, however, to denote each of these singular 
states with its own narne, for their generation is exponential, and we would 
never be able to hint succinctly at what we mean to convey. It is for this 
reason that we generalize greatly by using the word "love", which 
encapsulates an idea with which the world is familiar. The sacrifices we 
make, however, in the name of facilitated communication, hinder our efforts 
when we attempt to describe the singularity of an object or emotion: 
This substitution is necessary to common-sense, to language, to 
practical life, and even, in a certain degree, which we shall endeavour 
to determine, to positive science. Our intellect, when itfollows its 
natural bent, proceeds on the one hand by solidperceptions, and on 
the other by stable conceptions. It starts from the immobile, and only 
conceives and expresses movement as a function of immobility. [ 
... 
] 
But, in doing that, it lets that which is its very essence, escape from 
the real. ý(56) 
In Bergson's view we must overcome our natural tendency to generalize, and 
leave behind us the impulse to draw comparisons where very few, if any, 
exist; we must rely upon a self-reflexive methodology to lead our own 
consciousness to a more insightful understanding. This conclusion applies not 
only to the individual, but as Bergson states, to philosophy as well: 
What is really important for philosophy is to know exactly what 
unity, what multiplicity, and what reality superior both to abstract 
unity and multiplicity the multiple unity of the self actually is. Now 
23 Again, I refer the reader to Time and Free Will (pages 8-11), in which Bergson writes of the 
impossibility of partitioning emotions into intensities of greater or lesser value. 
Reynaga 102 
philosophy will only know this when it recovers possession of the 
simple intuition of the self by the self. (33 )24 
His critique of concepts and traditional modes of analysis extends to Hegelian 
dialectics. He explains that concepts, which often can be reduced to a thesis 
and an antithesis, are difficult to reconcile when an object is analysed. 
However, should one engage the same object through one's intuition, then the 
thesis and the antithesis easily follow, and their reconciliation is a fluid one 
(34). The intuitive mind understands that two diverging concepts exist both in 
opposition and in harmony, and that apparently irreconcilable states are simply 
different facets of the object's unique interior life (34). Intuition 
acknowledges the "variability" of its accompanying duration, and in doing so 
quickly recognizes the variability of all realities: 
there is no state of mind, however simple, which does not change 
every moment, since there is no consciousness without memory, and 
no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling, 
of the memory of past moments. It is this which constitutes duration. 
Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the 
past into the present, the present either containing within it in a 
distinct fonn the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more 
probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and 
still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this 
survival of the past into the present there would be no duration, but 
only instantaneity. (38) 
It is critical to note that in Bergson's philosophy, all realities reverberate with 
an underlying vitality. Intuition "Places itself in mobility" (40) and accounts 
for these reverberations, no matter how subtle or imperceptible to the senses 
they are. Analysis, meanwhile, fixes itself and attempts a photographic 
snapshot of a single moment. Intuition seeks the "real parts" of an object, 
reality, or phenomenon, while analysis is content to deal with "partial 
24 This passage is Very much redolent of the passage we investigated in Simmel's "On the 
Concept and the Tragedy of Culture": "Culture is the way that leads from the closed unity 
through the unfolded multiplicity to the unfolded unity" (29). The "superior reality" on which 
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expressions" (24). If an overall intuition of that same object has already been 
attained, then a reconstruction of that object from "real parts" is possible. 
Without that original intuitive response, however, an analytic approach can 
never hope to assemble the "expressions" into the whole. Simply put, an 
intuitive approach can lead one to analysis, but "the inverse operation is 
impossible" (25). Bergson's illustrative example for this case runs as follows. 
Should I attempt to "reconstitute" a poem, unknown to me, by assembling the 
letters of all the poem's words, I should soon 
- 
if not immediately 
- 
assess the 
task as impossible for the reason that "the letters are not componentparts, but 
only partial expressions". If, however, I knew the poem beforehand, I could 
"at once put each of the letters in its proper place and join them up without 
difficulty by a continuous connection" (24), although the operation would 
require a great deal of attention and patience to see it through to its successful 
completion. 
Following this discussion, Bergson addresses another seeming 
contradiction in his proposed philosophy: "But if metaphysics is to proceed 
by intuition, if intuition has the mobility of duration as its object, and if 
duration is of a psychical nature, shall we not be confining the philosopher to 
the exclusive contemplation of himself? " (47). The answer, which is a 
resounding no, is based on the fact that duration is forever unique, not even in 
spite of its unity but because of it, and intuition is "violently" variable. He 
invites his audience to explore the multifarious nature of intuition, which, as 
he states, "is not a single act, but an indefinite series of acts, all doubtless of 
the same kind, but each of a very particular species 
... 
this diversity of acts 
Bergson ruminates is equivalent more or less to Simmel's "unfolded unity". The seminal 
D- 
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corresponds to all the degrees of being" (47). The conscious invocation of 
intuition in the attempt to uncover duration 
permits us, to go beyond idealism as well as realism to affirm the 
existence of objects inferior and superior (though in a certain sense 
interior) to us, to make them co-exist together without difficulty, and 
to dissipate gradually the obscurities that analysis accumulates round 
these great problems. (47) 
Such co-existence is akin to the reconciliation of the traditional thesis and 
antithesis, and may be seen as a negation of philosophies concerned with 
dualistic distinctions. 25 For the very reason that the present state contains 
within it the memory of all those which preceded it, and because duration is 
irreversible, intuition will never tire of uncovering new realities, for they are 
always there, awaiting discovery. This realisation is especially true in the case 
of the introspective gaze, for while one may ponder a solid, inanimate object 
and be struck occasionally with new impressions, the mind is, by necessity, 
consistently active. No sooner does it lay itself bare to the intuitive spectator 
than it has encountered some new experience and taken with it a new set of 
impressions and perhaps even profound emotions that will define and colour 
the next moment of consciousness. The temptation may arise, then, to 
conceive of duration as a "multiplicity of moments bound to each other by a 
unity which goes through them like a thread" (50), but in doing so we are 
repeating the fundamental error of denying the intrinsic flow of duration. As 
we imagine the moments of duration strung together on the thread of unity, we 
condition ourselves to believe that no matter how brief the segment 
considered, we are still encountering "mathematical points" that extend 
onwards towards infinity: "looked at from the point of view of multiplicity 
importance of the self-conscious self is clear in both passages. 
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then, duration disintegrates into a powder of moments, none of which endures, 
each being an instantaneity" (50). If we opt instead to focus on the unity 
which binds the moments, we err then by ascribing to the unity the property of 
immobility; it becomes "an eternity of death, since it is nothing else than the 
movement emptied of the mobility which made its life" (50). According to 
Bergson, the difference in the various schools of metaphysics is that some 
concentrate more on the multiplicity of the moments that constitute duration, 
and others make more use of the "intemporal" version of unity (50). Both 
models approach the issue from the wrong perspective 
- 
they fail by 
endeavouring to reduce duration to concepts borrowed from other (fictitious) 
realities. Bergson offers a more logically tenable model in the following 
pages. He proposes that placing oneself in "the concrete flow of duration" 
(and here "concrete" can only mean definite, not predictable and regulated) 
will immediately lead the mind to accept that all other durations are really just 
a natural continuation of one's own, or rather that one's own duration is at 
once the encapsulation of all others as well as a "real parf 'of duration proper. 
He elucidates the point with the example of a hypothetical consciousness 
based on colour. This consciousness may only intuitively know orange, but if 
it were to "sympathize intemally" with the colour rather than simply analyse it 
extemally, it 
would feel itself held between red and yellow, would even perhaps 
suspect beyond this last colour a complete spectrum into which the 
continuity from red to yellow might expand naturally, so the intuition 
of our duration, far from leaving us suspended in the void as pure 
analysis would do, brings us into contact with a whole continuity of 
durations which we must try to follow, whether downwards or 
upwards; in both cases we can extend ourselves indefinitely by an 
25 It is, however, more profound than traditional synthesis, for the unity of which Bergson 
writes cannot be dissociated into its philosophical constituents. 
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increasingly violent effort, in both cases we transcend ourselves. (53) 
This is how a self-reflecting consciousness that diligently employs its intuition 
is able to at once comprehend its own duration and the duration of all objects 
external to it; the comprehension of external durations can lead it to ever 
greater understandings of its own interior psychic life. For this reason the 
invocation of intuition, or the giving over to "intellectual auscultation", is the 
most profound self-reflexive gesture of all. It not only articulates with the 
interior life obfuscated by the predisposition to practical generalisations, but it 
also allows for a sympathetic comprehension of the duration of the universe, 
which itself endures (Creative Evolution 11). 26 It thus addresses both the 
individual and his place in the universal collectivity in which he finds himself: 
"to know a living being or natural system is to get at the very interval of 
duration... " (24). 27 
An Intuition Sympathetic with Mohility 
The reality that suffuses Bergson's intuition and duration is mobility, 
and the importance it holds in his philosophy cannot be underestimated. He 
stresses time and again that all things seen and unseen are mobile and are in a 
constant state of flux; only in death, when the equilibrium of a body's 
molecular activity has been reached, is rest eternal. In life, absolute rest is 
26 These conclusions may sound rather pantheistic in conception, but they are in reality far 
from such a philosophy. In The Creative Mind, Bergson clearly demarcates his invocation of 
intuition from pantheistic philosophy. The latter, he writes, fails when it attempts to move 
from the intuition "into the eternal" in one great step: "For the concepts which the intelligence 
furnishes, the intuition simply substitutes one single concept which includes them all and 
which consequently is always the same, by whatever name it is called: Substance, Ego, Idea, 
Will". He calls instead for "a truly intuitive metaphysics, which would follow the undulations 
of the real" (3 1). 
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only an illusion, and what we perceive as absolute rest is really just a relative 
slowing down of movement (An Introduction to Metaphysics 55). Mobility is 
the significant reality of life, 28 and because our own consciousness is itself a 
thing of flux, constantly reworking itself and never resting except in the 
eternity of death, we naturally sympathize with mobility (55). More 
importantly, the self-awareness our consciousness practises with regards to the 
"continual flux" in which we exist "introduces us to the interior of a reality, on 
the model of which we must represent other realities" (55). Flux, for Bergson, 
is an unending "change of direction", and because reality itself is constantly in 
flux, then it too is marked by this eternal shift in direction. Whether or not a 
reality commits itself fully to a new direction is irrelevant; these shifts in 
direction may remain "incipient", but the immutable fact remains that 
everything is bound up in mobility. Indeed, because Bergson often imagines 
vitality as an aggressive and even violent condition, it is easy to see why his 
emphasis remains on changes and not finalities. With regards to the 
incipience that marks all change, Bergson states, "All reality, therefore, is 
tendenc if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction" Y, 
(55). The self-reflexive mind will be at home with the notion of reality as 
tendency, as it sympathizes with mobility and understands how it is that all 
reality is mobile. It is the non-introspective mind, the one that traffics in 
quotidian affairs, that has difficulty with that notion. 29 It is that superficial 
consciousness to which Bergson refers when he writes: 
27 Bergson continues with the observation that "knowledge" purportedly gained by "an 
artificial or mathematical system 
... 
applies only to the extremity" of the system (Creative 
Evolution 24). 
28 It "is a reality that is external andyet given immediately to the mind' (5 5, author's italics). 
29 We should go even further and say that the self-reflexive mind is mohility, and it explicitly 
operates in concert with that mohility in that it shuttles back and forth between the self and the 
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Our mind, which seeks for solid points of support, has for its main function in the ordinary course of life that of representing states and 
things. It takes, at long intervals, almost instantaneous views of the 
undivided mobility of the real. It thus obtains sensations and ideas. In this way, it substitutes for the continuous the discontinuous, for 
motion stability, for tendency in process of change, fixed points 
marking a direction of change and tendency. (56) 
The perennial urgency with which we anchor ourselves conceptually to "solid 
points of support" originates in the comfort we derive from immersing 
ourselves in the world of "solids": 
We shall see that the human intellect feels at home among inanimate 
objects, more especially among solids, where our action finds its 
fulcrum and our industry its tools; that our concepts have been 
formed on the model of solids; that our logic is, pre-eminently, the 
logic of solids; that, consequently, our intellect triumphs in geometry [... ]. (Creative Evolution ix) 
For it is in the world of "solids", where we stand armed with our numerous 
"tools", that we enact practical "work" An Introduction to Metaphysics 56, 
Creative Evolution 5). 
If we are, then, to seize with our intuition the mobility of the duration 
of life, how can we extend ourselves beyond what is natural and practical to 
us, and think outside our geometry? "As well contend that the part is equal to 
the whole, that the effect can reabsorb its cause, or that the pebble left on the 
beach displays the form of the wave that brought it there" Creative Evolution 
x). Tethered as we are to the world of solids, we busy ourselves with 
"forc[ing] the living into this or that one of our moulds", but we soon find that 
"all the moulds crack. They are too narrow, above all too rigid, for what we 
try to put into them" (X). 
30 
"Evolutionist philosophy", Bergson maintains, errs 
form it has begotten (for our purposes, the work of art). The various poles between which this 
self-reflexive mobility unfolds are detailed in the introductory chapter to this thesis. 
3' The notion of restrictive moulds is echoed in Simmel's essays "On the Concept and the 
Tragedy of Culture" and "The Conflict in Modem Culture". In the first piece, Simmel writes 
of the dualism that arises between subject and object because "man, unlike the animals, does 
not allow himself simply to be absorbed by the naturally given order of the world" (27). 
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along these lines in that it attempts to reconstruct "all things", even life, by 
focusing on "a local effect of evolution" and using it to explicate the 
intricacies of all evolutionary phenomena (xx-xxi). The moulds, or forms, that 
life constantly produces in its wake become the parameters by which we 
define our own existence, even though it should be self-evident that the 
vitality of any given organism is far from being entirely mechanical or 
mechanistically determined. Adhering as we do to these moulds, we 
consistently overlook the singular quintessence of the living being that makes 
it impervious to such dissection. As Simmel notes in "On the Concept and 
Tragedy of Culture", the synthesis at which we arrive after such analysis is 
quite distinct from the unity that is the reality; the latter, when dissociated, 
does not exactly yield the components that fed into it (35-36). The intellect 
that searches not for constituent parts to the aim of constructing a synthesis, 
but rather grasps the unity by "feeling its object so as to get its mobile 
impression at every instant" is infinitely preferable in that "it touches 
something of the absolute" (Creative Evolution xxi). We run aground when 
we strain to comprehend and explain the vital in terms of the mechanical: 
Intellectual knowledge, in so far as it relates to a certain aspect of 
inert matter, ought, on the contrary, to give us a faithful imprint of it, 
having been stereotyped on this particular object. It becomes relative 
only if it claims, such as it is, to present to us life - that is to say, the 
maker of the stereotype-plate. (xxii) 
So how do we, then, think outside of these moulds? It is, Bergson maintains, 
the fact that "other forms of consciousness have been developed" that proves 
Rather, he "places himself in opposition to it, making demands of it, overpowering it, then 
[being) overpowered by it" (27). Soon enough, that same dualism between man and his 
products enters the "realm of spirit itself', where it becomes a struggle between the soul and 
the "innumerable structures" it creates (27). In the second essay, we learn of "certain forms" 
("works of art, religions, sciences, technologies, laws, and innumerable others") that distil 
from life and in which life "expresses and realizes itself' (11). These forms are soon 
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to us that we need not remain tethered to geometrical thought. These 
divergent results of evolution, in spite of their shortcomings vis-a-vis our own 
intellect, are able to "express something that is immanent and essential in the 
evolutionary movement" (xxii). If these other forms of consciousness allied 
themselves with the intellect and its faculties, "the result [would] be a 
consciousness as wide as life". 31 In these lines we find proof that Bergson was 
not, as his detractors charged, an irrationalist who sought to undermine the 
necessity of the intellectual faculty; he would later come to decry these 
unreasonable misinterpretations in his autobiography The Creative Mind (77- 
78). Instead, he looked towards the possibility of conditioning a 
consciousness that would admit of the elan vital as much as scientific 
reasoning had structured itself upon the intellect: "And such a consciousness, 
turning around suddenly against the push of life which it feels behind, would 
have a vision of life complete 
- 
would it not? 
- 
even though the vision were 
fleeting" (xxiii). Acknowledging as he does the objection that we can only 
meditate upon these other forms of consciousness with our intellect, and that 
we therefore still remain subject to its myopic view, Bergson proposes that it 
is because we are not completely intellectual that we can step outside our 
intellect. The conclusion he reaches 
- 
that there resides "around our 
conceptual and logical thought, a vague nebulosity, made of the very 
substance out of which has been formed the luminous nucleus that we call the 
transcended by the life which created them, for they "do not share the restless rhythm of life, 
its ascent and descent, its constant renewal, its incessant divisions and reunifications" (11). 
" Baylis, in his previously cited introduction, observes that absolutists, diverse as they may 
be, have often rallied behind the philosophy of absolute idealism, of which the idea Bergson 
proposes here is an example: "Many idealists have combined the absolutistic motif with their 
idealism and have concluded that reality is both mental and an absolute unity, either an 
absolute idea or an absolute mind" (13). This hypothetical consciousness, "wide as life", 
suggests an absolute idealism predicated on the conception of an "absolute mind". 
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intellect" 
- 
forms the basis of his greatest vitalist treatise, Creative Evolution 
(xxiii). That nebulosity, vague as it is and thus resistant to analysis, is where 
we encounter our duration at its most profound, and because all living beings 
have that nebulosity in common, we can progress to a true "theory of life" 
only when we grasp our own duration. In a very telling line that is redolent of 
certain modernist manifestos, Bergson affirms the following: 
The mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of 
the operation by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, 
or rather to recast, all its categories. But in this way it will attain to 
fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of 
adopting the very movement of the inward life of things. Only thus 
will a progressive philosophy be built up, freed from the disputes 
which arise between the various schools, and able to solve its 
problems naturally, because it will be released from the artificial 
expression in terms of which such problems are poised. To 
philosophise, therefore, is to invert the habitual direction of the work 
of thought. (An Introduction to Metaphysics 59, author's italics) 
The heightened activity, indeed the "violence" inherent in all gestures of self- 
reflexivity, appears here to no small degree. 32 The effort involved in such an 
act is too strenuous, perhaps, to be continuously sustained, and even if it could 
be, the call to practical work would render such ambitions impractical. 
Nevertheless, the value of metaphysics is that it reverses traditional modes of 
thought because it remains unconcerned with practical applications. For that 
reason "it will indefinitely enlarge the domain of its investigations" (60). 
The final pages of An Introduction to Metaphysics explore the 
relationship between the physical sciences and metaphysics and present a 
critique of Kant's conception of the latter. According to Bergson, "science 
and metaphysics come together in intuition" (63), and he cites the case of 
32 Paul Douglass, in "Deleuze's Bergson", states that Deleuze (in Berjzsonism) acknowledges 
"Bergson's definition of intuition 
... 
as an act of willed self-consciousness" (The Crisis in 
Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy 374). The implications of this "willed self- 
consciousness99 are significant, for they corroborate the observation that self-reflexive art 
44problematizes" itself, or at the very least is the result of aesthetic problematization. 
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Galileo as the first instance in which scientists attempted to study motion as 
mobility, rather than falling back on Aristotelian principles which worked 
through "immobilities" (64). He likens reality to a "moving stream of things" 
which is traversed above by "an elegant bridge", which he labels modem 
science, and below by "a deep tunnel", labelled metaphysics (68). Both 
64artificial. constructions" fail to make contact with the true reality of life, but 
Bergson's brand of metaphysics comes closer than any previous attempts by 
virtue of its reliance on intuition and the eternal pursuit of duration. He 
criticizes Kant for having ignored the role intuition plays both in modem 
science and metaphysics. The result, Bergson opines, of such an extended 
oversight was that science became entirely "relative" and metaphysics 
"artificial" (69). Bergson does acknowledge that such relativity is valid when 
the metaphysics or science being discussed is one that hopes to present "a 
single and completed system of things". If metaphysics and science seek to 
grasp intuition and enclose it in a system "prepared in advance, it becomes a 
knowledge purely relative to human understanding" (70-71). For Bergson, 
this is exactly the kind of science Kant envisioned ("universal mathematic"), 
and for him, metaphysics was "practically unaltered Platonism". Once again, 
the reader is reminded that it is the invaluable experience of intuition and 
"intellectual sympathy" that allows him to discard the traditional thesis and 
antithesis employed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
The example of literary composition illustrates again the inestimable 
necessity of constantly consulting one's intuition. All the books on a given 
subject might have been carefully studied, and all the notes might have 
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assimilated, but no literary integration of ideas can occur without an impulse 
to fuel the writer's creativity. 33 Furthermore, 
This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it 
rediscovers all the inforination it had collected, and'a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyses itself into terms which 
could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more tenns 
we discover; we shall never say all that could be said, and yet, if we 
turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we feel behind us, and try 
to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a 
movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely simple. 
Metaphysical intuition seems to be something of the same kind. (76) 
In the final paragraphs Bergson does conclude that there is a remote possibility 
of "obtain[ing] an intuition from reality", but the only instance in which this 
possibility is realized is when numerous "superficial manifestations" of reality 
have been collected and studieO. Yet even then, just as in the example cited 
above, a final impulse, a final act of "intellectual sympathy" is required to 
assimilate all the data (77,78). "Metaphysical intuition" is altogether 
different, because any knowledge gained through it is much more than the 
mere summation of singular experiences or, sensations interpreted. 
It is distinct from these, we repeat, as the motor impulse is distinct 
from the path traversed by the moving body, as the tension of the 
spring is distinct from the visible movements of the pendulum. In 
this sense metaphysics has nothing in common with a generalisation 
of facts; and nevertheless it might be defined as integral experience. 
(78) 
The Social Manifestation of Bergson's Philosophy: The Vitalist Theory of 
Laughter 
Having considered Bergson's theories of intuition, duration, and 
mobility, let us now turn to another of his works: Le Rire, Essai sur la 
33 A parallel may be drawn here with Simmel's writings about the attainment of cultivation. 
We recall from the last chapter that the voracious acquisition of knowledge hardly results in a 
cultivated individual: "A man becomes cultivated only when cultural traits develop that 
aspect of his soul which exists as its most indigenous drive and as the inner predetermination 
of its subjective perfection" (29). 
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signification du comique (Laughter: An Essqy on the Meaning of the Comic, 
1900). So many works of Dada are suffused with a curious brand of humour 
which is intrinsically tied to the regular occurrence and unique function of 
self-reflexivity in the movement. This proposed argument is corroborated by 
Bergson's theory of laughter, which is closely aligned with his vitalist 
philosophy. 
He begins this treatise by stating that laughter is a living thing, and 
only when it is treated as such can it be accurately studied (7). He identifies 
three conditions that must be satisfied in order for it to develop freely. The 
first is the recognition that laughter is strictly associated with human activity 
or activities redolent of humanit y (9). 
34 Also, we must consider "the absence 
offeeling which usually accompanies laughter": "It seems as though the vý 
comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the 
surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled" (9). "Indifference", 
which is a necessary ingredient in the cultivation of laughter ("for laughter has 
no greater foe than emotion"), leads us to the second condition: "the comic 
demands something like a momentary anaesthesia of the heart" (11). The 
comic poet or artist is responsible for "anaesthetising" the emotions of his 
audience before he introduces his comedy. Thirdly, laughter requires the 
presence of an audience to "echo" it (11). Throughout the book, Bergson 
restates his proposition that laughter is itself alive, much in the same way 
language may be perceived as a living entity existing symbiotically with 
34 Baudelaire, in his essay "On the Essence of Laughter", also begins with the premise that 
laughter is confined to the human sphere of existence. For him, it is a postlapsarian condition 
which is predicated upon "the idea of one's own superiority" (152), and his conviction that it 
is "linked with the accident of an ancient Fall, of a debasement both physical and moral" (149) 
is not too distant from Bergson's own theory. 
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humanity (109). 35 Therefore, for a study on laughter to approach an 
understanding of the subject, laughter must be examined from its "natural 
environment", which Bergson specifies is human society. It "must answer to 
certain requirements of life in common. It must have a social signification" 
(13). 
Before we can begin to understand this "social signification", we must 
grasp what for Bergson is the impetus behind laughter and how it is that it 
comes to occupy such a critical space in society. The basis of laughter, as 
strenuously emphasized throughout the work, is the Manichean struggle 
between the mechanical and the living, an endless conflict which extends 
beyond the individual to society at large. Early on in the book, the reader is 
introduced to the all-important phrase "mechanical inelasticity", by which the 
author intends to convey the frequent inability of the body (or spirit) to keep 
pace with the endless flux of life. "Mechanical inelasticity" often manifests 
itself in man as "absentmindedness", and while Bergson admits that 
Unt)-sentmindedness "is not perhaps the actual fountainhead of the comic 
... 
it is 
contiguous to a certain stream of facts and fancies which flows straight from 
the fountainhead" (16). 36 He illustrates mechanical elasticity with the example 
of a man running down the street who suddenly trips and falls. Provided he is 
not seriously injured (the audience would hardly be able to restrain their 
sympathy if he were), the man's accident is comic because the stone in his 
way or the gap in the pavement called for him to change his pace and/or 
direction, but the tension in his muscles and the rigidity of his attention kept 
35 "But thought, too, is a living thing. And language, the translation of thought, should be just 
as living" (109). 
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him from properly negotiating the obstacle in his path (14). Bergson states 
that the rigidity responsible for the man's fall is also at the root of the 
spectators' laughter.. Yet it is not clear what, as Baudelaire wittily demands, is 
so delightful in the sight of a man falling on the ice or in the street, 
or stumbling at the end of a pavement, that the countenance of his brother in Christ should contract in such an intemperate manner, 
and the muscles of his face should suddenly leap into life like a 
timepiece at midday or a clockwork toy? The poor devil has disfigured himself, at the very least; he may even have broken an 
essential member. Nevertheless the laugh has gone forth, sudden 
and irrepressible. (152) 
In order to comprehend the audience's laughter at the misery of another, we 
must first reach an understanding of what Bergson means by "tension" and 
66 elasticity". These two forces, perhaps more properly recognized respectively 
as sub-forces of the mechanical and the living, govern both our physical and 
mental spheres, and it is the rupturing of the delicate balance between these 
two that engenders the comedy of this situation and comedy in general. 
Tension and elasticity remain in constant flux with one another until the 
equilibrium of death is reached, and slight discrepancies in the dominance of 
one over the other do not result in bodily harm, except when one or both are 
lacking, and then either physical or mental problems develop and fester (22). 37 
Society has a self-motivated interest in keeping its constituent members 
healthy and functional, and so "what life and society require of each of us is a 
36 How crucial "absentmindedness" is to Bergson's theory of laughter is evidenced by his 
observation that "it is situated, so to say, on one of the great natural watersheds of laughter" 
(16). 
37 The upset of the balance between tension and elasticity, while usually comic, soon begets 
much more serious consequences. Bergson is clearly very suspicious of the effects of 
absentmindedness, and his seeming over-exaggeration of the effects may be read as the logical 
corroboration of his reliance on vitalist principles. If one indeed believes life to be pure flux 
and mobility to be the most significant reality of all, then surely the antithesis of flux (fixity, 
or in this case automatism) is to be eschewed as inimical and in opposition to life itself. Thus, 
if tension and elasticity "are lacking in the mind, we find every degree of mental deficiency, 
every variety of insanity. Finally, if they are lacking in the character, we have cases of the 
gravest inadaptability to social life, which are the sources of misery and at times the causes of 
crime" (22). 
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constantly alert attention that discerns the outlines of the present situation, 
together with a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adapt 
ourselves in consequence" (23). If we return to the example of the runner who 
trips and falls, we see that the tension he maintains in his leg muscles must be 
alterable and must allow for some elasticity should the need arise to change 
pace and/or direction. The fact that he fails to adapt to a new situation (that of 
a crack in the pavement or a stone in his path) suggests he has lapsed in 
attention and is guilty of absentmindedness. Why the runner's fall is comic is 
explained thusly: 
Society will therefore be suspicious of all inelasticity of character, of 
mind and even of body, because it is the possible sign of a 
slumbering activity as well as of an activity with separatist 
tendencies, that inclines to swerve from the common center round 
which society gravitates: in short, because it is the sign of an 
eccentricity. And yet, society cannot intervene at this stage by 
material repression, since it is not affected in a material fashion. It is 
confronted with something that makes it uneasy, but only as a 
symptom 
- 
scarcely a threat, at the very most a gesture. (23) 
Baudelaire's theory as regards the audience's laughter (for he also uses 
the example of a man tripping on the pavement) is centred on a vicious sort of 
pride and self-entitled superiority, while Bergson's centres on correction 
through humiliation. The former conjectures that the audience's laughter 
amounts to the collective belief that none of them would be so careless or 
clumsy, or at the very least they would manage to negotiate the pavement 
without calamity (152). Freud, without acknowledging the earlier 
observations of Baudelaire, also arrives at the same conclusion, except that he 
imagines it is more the child, or at least the infantile element in the audience 
member, which leads to such supercilious mirth (Wit and its Relation to the 
Unconscious 364). Bergson's theory, however, is more profound and enticing 
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as it looks past the cause and finds the intended effect of such laughter. The 
preceding quotation continues: 
A gesture, therefore, will be its reply. Laughter must be something 
of this kind, a sort of social gesture. By the fear which it inspires, it 
restrains eccentricity, keeps constantly awake and in mutual contact 
certain activities of a secondary order which might retire into their 
shell and go to sleep, and, in short, softens down whatever the 
surface of the social body may retain of mechanical inelasticity. (23) 
Indeed, the fear of being laughed at is potent and frequently crippling, and 
very often it is enough to dissuade the would-be performer from attempting 
anything that leaves him vulnerable to the derision of the audience. There is 
clearly a point, however, at which laughter departs slightly from its corrective 
function and moves closer to an aesthetic one: 
Laughter, then, does not belong to the province of esthetics alone, 
since unconsciously (and even immorally in many particular 
instances) it pursues a utilitarian aim of general improvement. And 
yet there is something esthetic about it, since the comic comes into 
being just when society and the individual, freed from the worry of 
self-preservation, begin to regard themselves as works of art. (23 )38 
This quotation marks the first instance in which the author asserts, albeit 
subtly, a connection between laughter and self-reflexivity. When the mind 
feels itself to be liberated from "utilitarian" pursuits, when it knows it can 
behave unsociably and still remain within society, it relaxes and even seeks to 
encourage laughter by searching introspectively for unsociable elements which 
merit ridicule. It may even be that the individual who no longer fears his 
neighbours' corrections, who is indeed "freed from the worry of self- 
preservation", is now at leisure to make an art out of scrutinizing those same 
elements in his fellow society members. According to Baudelaire, "the man 
" In drawing comparisons between Bergson's theory and DeWitt Parker's The Principles o 
Aesthetics, Kenneth Lash identifies a "higher function of comedy" which he terms 
"sympathetic insight". He finds that humour is not entirely based on the desire to rebuke (as 
satire is), but rather "unites us, through sympathy, with the object of our laughter". His 
D- 
. 
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who trips would be the last to laugh at his own fall, unless he happened to be a 
philosopher, one who had acquired by habit a power of rapid self-division and 
thus of assisting as a disinterested spectator at the phenomenon of his own 
ego" (154) 
. 
39 Baudelaire, Freud, and Bergson all emphasize a strong 
connection between introspection, self-fragmentation, and laughter, and we 
shall return to this point when we investigate the nature of Bergson's figure of 
the humourist. 
Mechanical inelasticity, besides being at the root of laughter 
(particularly in its fimction as a social corrective) also forms the basis for 
comedy predicated upon imitation. Baudelaire and Bergson's theories 
converge as well on this issue, for both see the comic as intrinsically bound to 
what can be imitated (Baudelaire 157, Bergson 27 andpassim) 
. 
40 As we have 
already seen in the. example of the runner, it is muscular and/or mental rigidity 
that precipitates the fall. For Bergson, it is a very small step from mechanical 
rigidity to absentmindedness; it may even be concluded that the latter is the 
mental counterpart to physical rigidity. 41 Consider then, as Bergson does, the 
work of the caricaturist, who through close scrutiny (and no doubt some level 
of intuitional investigation) discerns the natural "inclinations" of a given face, 
observation, "Humor is more contemplative, hence more esthetic", echoes Bergson's 
conclusion above ("Theory of the Comic as Insight" 114-115). 
39 Freud, in his discussion "Elements Favoring the Wit-Process", expounds a similar theory: 
"if I make some one else laugh by imparting my wit to him, I am really using him as a tool in 
order to arouse my own laughter" (Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious 241-242). Rather 
than fragmenting himself and forging an audience within, Freud's comic man seeks an 
audience without, and uses others as the medium by which he may magnify the comic impetus 
and view its projection on the faces of his audience. 
40 Freud also comments on "the comic of imitation" and how it is utilized in Bergson's theory. 
For him, "in imitation the source of comic pleasure is not the comic of situation but that of 
expectation" (338). When we expect to find the fluidity of life in a human face but instead are 
confronted with palsy (or even just a contortion inappropriate to the context) we laugh, for we 
are reminded of the occasional inelasticity or absentmindedness that threatens to seize any of 
us at any time. 
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inclinations that frequently suggest themselves in spite of the mercurial 
essence of the human visage (37). Due to the fact that our own duration, as 
previously explained, is part and parcel of all duration, our "imagination" has 
little difficulty in detecting the liberative efforts of our neighbours' souls: 
in every human form it [our imagination] sees the effort of a soul 
which is shaping matter, a soul which is infinitely supple and 
perpetually in motion, subject to no law of gravitation, for it is not 
the earth that attracts it. This soul imparts a portion of its winged lightness to the body it animates [ 
... 
]. (30) 
It is that immeasurable "gracefulness" of being that constitutes the greatest 
contrast to the comic (3 1), for the comic "partakes rather of the unsprightly 
than of the unsightly, of rigidness rather than of ugliness" (3 1). Let us 
illustrate the point by reflecting momentarily on the humour inherent in the 
machine drawings of Duchamp, who along with Picabia and others took a 
special interest in the juxtaposition of mechanical drawings with human 
portraits. If we consider these works in light of the theory proposed above, we 
arrive at a much more profound understanding of them. For example, 
Duchamp's "Marlee" ("Bride", 1912) is a Cubism-inspired depiction of an 
unrecognisable contraption coloured in delicate hues of beige and brown. 
There is absolutely no discernible representation of a bride or even a woman 
for that matter, but we know from detailed notes contained in The Green Box 
that Duchamp often delighted in envisaging sex and sexual relationships as 
mechanical processes, and his preoccupation with brides found frequent 
expression in such terms. To interpret the painting as a subversive attempt at 
inverting traditional conceptions of beauty and ugliness is too simplistic, 
especially when we recall Duchamp's appreciation of Bergsonian philosophy. 
41 It is crucial when dealing with Bergsonian philosophy that opposing sides are not 
harmoniously reconciled, and so in this case it must be noted that the fluidity of life and a 
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Instead, we may look upon the work as another of Duchamp's "jokes", the 
humour of which stems from the fact that we have before us a portrayal of 
"something mechanical encrusted on the living" (39). The artist has looked 
beyond the conventional beauty versus ugliness dialectic to the more 
substantial philosophical struggle between fixity and fluidity. According to 
what Bergson writes in An Introduction to Meta-physics, it is an effort of 
intuition that would lead one's consciousness, which itself is tossed between 
rigidity and flexibility, to such a profound interpretation of a subject. 
Duchamp, whose own notes go some way towards elucidating his predilection 
for machine-inspired art, actively employed Bergson's theories of intuition 
and duration, and was, consequently, one of the most introspective of the 
Dadaists. If we pay heed to the quotation above, there is no reason to doubt 
that Duchamp's introspective and self-reflexive tendencies are directly related 
to his reputation as a talented wit and comic figure. 
The rigidity of which Bergson writes becomes even more comic when 
addressed by the spectator who seeks to impersonate it: 
gestures, at which we never dreamt of laughing, become laughable 
when imitated by another individual. The most elaborate 
explanations have been offered for this extremely simple fact. A 
little reflection, however, will show that our mental state is ever 
changing, and that if our gestures faithfully followed these inner 
movements, if they were as fully alive as we, they would never repeat 
themselves, and so would keep imitation at bay. We begin, then, to 
become imitable only when we cease to be ourselves. I mean our 
gestures can only be imitated in their mechanical uniformity, and 
therefore exactly in what is alien to our living personality. To imitate 
any one is to bring out the element of automatism he has allowed to 
creep into his person. And as this is the very essence of the 
ludicrous, it is no wonder that imitation gives rise to laughter. (34)" 
certain degree of "mechanical inelasticity" are always at play. 
42 One of the greatest Dada spectacles was also one of the earliest. Ball's Magic Bishop 
episode, performed in June 1916 in his Cabaret Voltaire, is described in the diary entry for 23 
June 1916. The costume Ball devised for the performance vividly exploits the concept of 
44mechanical elasticity" and the laughable essence of the gesture: 
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Here we have before us another instance in which an unconscious self-division 
induces laughter in the audience. Automatic gestures ride parasitically on "our 
living personality", and for this reason they are easily identified and singled 
out for ridicule by the spectator or perhaps even by the individual himself By 
imitating the unsociability of others, the comic employed in the art of 
imitation wilfully adopts foreign gestures and thus subjects himself to ridicule 
two times over; he is comic for the unsociability he mockingly portrays, but 
more importantly he is comic because he has temporarily shed his own nature 
and clothed himself in that of another. His ability to take the mechanical 
inelasticity of his subject and wield it self-reflexively, for the amusement of 
others and for his own entertainment, brands such a comic an artist, for he has 
successfully fragmented himself and fashioned, within his own person, an 
artwork of which he is both the creator and the subject. 
Baudelaire's theory also supposes that the comic is predicated upon 
imitation: "from the artistic point of view, the comic is an imitation, " an 
imitation which for him is "mixed with a certain creative faculty" (15 7). This 
faculty he appositively qualifies as "artistic ideality" (157), and although he 
does not elaborate on the meaning of the phrase, we may surmise the 
following from the context. Firstly, the comic is artistic in that it is creative. 
He who imitates the gestures of another or pokes fun at common social vices 
My legs were in a cylinder of shiny blue cardboard, which came up to my 
hips so that I looked like an obelisk. Over it I wore a huge coat collar cut 
out of cardboard. [ 
... 
] It was fastened at the neck in such a way that I could 
give the impression of winglike movement by raising and lowering my 
elbows. I also wore a high, blue-and-white-striped witch doctor's hat. (Flight Out of Time 70-7 1) 
A photograph from the evening portrays a sombre and awkward Ball ensheathed in a costume 
not unlike that of the Tin Man in "The Wizard of Oz". The rigidity made explicit by the 
bulkiness of the costume contributes to the humour it evokes, but it is also the incongruence 
between the improbable gear and its bearer that draws laughter. 
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adopts for his own means the gestures he observes in his neighbour and is 
wont to embellish his portrayals in order to achieve the maximum comic 
effect. Secondly, there is an element of the comic that aspires to reveal an 
ideal beauty by way of negative reinforcement. As in Bergson's theory, the 
comedy of imitation presented here also articulates with beauty, or at least 
with the idea of it. In his essay "Le Peintre de la Vie Moderne" ("The Painter 
of Modem Life", 1863), Baudelaire reflects upon old fashion-plates and 
arrives at this conclusion: 
The idea of beauty which man creates for himself imprints itself on his whole attire, crumples or stiffens his dress, rounds off or squares his gesture, and in the long run even ends by subtly penetrating the 
very features of his face. Man ends by looking like his ideal seýf [my italics] These engravings can be translated either into beauty or 
ugliness; in one direction they become caricatures, in the other, 
a ntique statues. (2) 
The italicised sentence provides further explication of the phrase "artistic 
ideality". Man's ambitious aspirations to perfection compel him to alter 
himself significantly, and to this end he answers to various and shifting ideas 
of beauty which we recognize as "styles". However, while that yearning for 
perfect beauty captivates his attention and leads him forward, his 
shortcomings attack him from the rear and negatively reinforce his aspirations 
by way of ridicule. Herein lies the reason why the engravings mentioned 
n'k 
above, which in their time were faithful depictions of contemporary beauty, so 
easily appear to modem-day viewers as comic. 43 Thus, we have before us 
43 Bergson also addresses the issue of fashion and out-moded styles. According to him, all 
fashion is laughable in that garments are in direct contrast to the "living suppleness of the 
object covered" (39). Yet because we so quickly grow accustomed to the fashions of the day, 
the comic element of such garments eludes us, that is until styles change and the disjuncture 
between the character and his clothing becomes obvious (39-40). Simmel also attests to this 
conflict in his essay "Philosophie der Mode" ("Fashion", 1905). On one side we have the 
desire to conform to the styles stipulated by society, and on the other side we are confronted 
with the impossibility that arises whenever social forms come up against "the restless 
changing of an individual life" (Levine 294). 
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comedy motivated by the ideal of beauty and governed by the art of imitation. 
If we combine what Baudelaire concludes with what Bergson writes about 
imitation, we can understand how it is that beauty (or the attempted depiction 
of it) so frequently borders on the comic. It is the "ideality" of the comic act 
that weds it to that reprimanding social gesture dubbed by Bergson as 
laughter. This most common species of the comic, which exists to tame the 
unsociable elements inherent in man and society, is for Baudelaire 
44significative", that is it "is a clearer language, and one easier for the man in 
the street to understand, and above all easier to analyse, its element being 
visibly double 
- 
art and the moral idea" (157). Comedy of this sort is opposed 
to "the grotesque", or "absolute comic", which "comes much closer to nature, 
[and] emerges as a unity which calls for the intuition to grasp it" (157). 44 The 
salient difference between the two kinds of comedy lies in the question of 
superiority, which in the case of the latter manifests itself in "the expression of 
an idea of superiority 
- 
no longer now of man over man, but of man over 
nature" (157). According to Baudelaire, the grotesque is the result of 
"innocent" comedy being pushed to its extreme, while the significative comic, 
when exaggerated, becomes "savage" comedy. 45 There is also a distinction to 
be made along the lines of the primitive versus the modem: "laughter caused 
44 The language used here is remarkably redolent of that employed by Bergson. Curiously 
enough, there is no mention of Baudelaire in Bergson's Laughte 
, 
although surely he must 
have been familiar with his predecessor's contributions to a theory of the comic. 
45 Baudelaire suggests that some cultures are more predisposed towards the significative 
comic, whereas others are more inclined towards the absolute. For example, France, "the land 
of lucid thought and demonstration, where the natural and direct aim of art is utility", is 
generally preoccupied with the latter (15 8), whereas "Germany, sunk in her dreams, will 
afford us excellent specimens of the absolute comic. There all is weighty, profound and 
excessive. To find true comic savagery, however, you have to cross the Channel and visit the 
foggy realms of spleen. Happy, noisy, carefree Italy abounds in the innocent variety" (159). 
These classifications are perhaps too specious to merit a full investigation. Still, if what 
Baudelaire concludes about his own culture is true, then it is no wonder Bergson dedicates his 
study to the significative rather than the absolute comic. 
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by the grotesque has about it something profound, primitive and axiomatic, 
which is much closer to the innocent life and to absolute joy than is the 
laughter caused by the comic in man's behaviour" (15 7). Unfortunately, 
Baudelaire refrains from further elucidation of the distinctions between the 
significative and the absolute comic. Brief reflection upon the boundaries 
between the two suggests that such distinctions are actually quite nebulous and 
that it would prove impractical, if not impossible, to label a particular work or 
artist fully significative or fully absolute. What we take away, however, from 
the theories Baudelaire proposes is crucial. Firstly, the comedy of imitation, 
the variety that abounds in human society, articulates with ideals of beauty and 
thus firmly places the comic in the sphere of artistic creativity. Secondly, the 
comic artist as such speaks both to "art and the moral idea". Thirdly, the 
absolute comic is concerned more with man's hubristic conception of himself 
as superior to nature, rather than with man's superiority over his fellow man. 
Fourthly, the absolute comic is unique in that it "remains unaware of itself' 
(164). This final point is the most important for our purposes, and will be 
examined closely in our discussion of Bergson's figure of the humourist. For 
the moment, however, let us focus on the significative comic, as it is the brand 
closest to social satire and thus the one most easily understood with regards to 
what we have already learned about Bergsonian comedy. 
Unsociability, Fragmentation, and the Humourist 
We have already seen how the social gesture of laughter aims to rein in 
the mechanical inelasticity of the individual. What is soon revealed once we 
acknowledge the link between such inelasticity and corrective laughter is the 
D- 
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more critical connection between the comic and self-reflexivity. To this end 
we look to Chapter III of Laughter, which begins with a continuation of the 
investigation into the social side of laughter: 
Comedy can only begin at the point where our neighbor's personality 
ceases to affect us. It begins, in fact, with what might be called a 
growing callousness to social life. An individual is comic who 
automatically goes his own way without troubling himself about 
getting into touch with the rest of his fellow-beings. It is the part of laughter to reprove his absentmindedness and wake him out of his 
dream. (121) 
This passage is highly reminiscent of Simmel's theories as expounded in "The 
Metropolis and Mental Life". The "growing callousness to social life" is 
equivalent to Simmel's conception of the blase, which he in turn imagines to 
be a "protective organ" for the metropolitan citizen. In his essay, which is 
discussed extensively in the preceding chapter of this thesis, the 
metropolitan's blase attitude is not looked upon as a source of comedy. 
However, with what has already been explained in Bergson's Laughte 
, 
the 
reader can understand how that "protective organ" has now become the target 
of society's "corrective gesture". We now have before us the same detached 
and introspective metropolitan as was presented in Simmel's essay, except that 
now his very introspection has led to him being ridiculed, for 
each member [of society] must be ever attentive to his social 
surroundings; he must model himself on his environment; in short, 
he must avoid shutting himself up in his own ivory tower. Therefore 
society holds suspended over each individual member, if not the 
threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a snubbing, which, 
although it is slight, is none the less dreaded. Such must be the 
function of laughter. Always rather humiliating for the one against 
whom it is directed, laughter is, really and truly, a kind of social 
4ragging'. (122)46 
46 The Bergsonian version of the blase, which functions as a withdrawal from social life, is 
similar to the absentmindedness which prompts the corrective gesture of laughter. It manifests 
itself as an "incapacity to react to new stimulations with the required amount of energy" 
(Simmel 329), and it derives both from over-stimulation of the nerves and the dominance of 
the money economy. Absentmindedness, akin to mechanical inelasticity, is not so much 
incapability as negligence. Although both forms of inattention differ in their origins, what 
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Bergson writes, "the man who withdraws into himself is liable to ridicule, 
because the comic is largely made up of this very withdrawal" (125). A 
withdrawal, unlike the blase outlook, may be consciously invoked by an artist 
intent on establishing a comic effect. 47 If, as Bergson indicates, a "wet 
blanket" is thrown upon "Sympathy at the very moment it might arise" (126), 
the comic man (or for the purposes of our discussion, the artist) is then in a 
position to usher in the intended joke. Two methods to this end are usually 
employed. The first involves the isolation of the character's flaw, vice, virtue, 
or habit, so as to make it appear as an alien organism distinct from the true 
identity of the character. The second method dovetails with the first and is 
applied in tandem. It involves the creation of a rigid characteristic that refuses 
to integrate itself with the rest of the character's being. 48 To this end, the 
comic seizes upon gestures: 
By gestures we here mean the attitudes, the movements and even the 
language by which a mental state expresses itself outwardly without 
any aim or profit, from no other cause than a kind of inner itching. 
Gesture, thus defined, is profoundly different from action. Action is 
intentional or, at any rate, conscious; gesture slips out unawares, it is 
automatic. In action, the entire person is engaged; in gesture, an 
isolated part of the person is expressed, unknown to, or at least apart 
from, the whole of the personality. (129) 
Whereas "action is in exact proportion to the feeling that inspires it", a gesture 
appears disjointed from the character and betrays the presence of underlying 
mechanical inelasticity; it is executed in absentmindedness. The actions 
performed in a drama present themselves as natural, for they follow directly 
matters here is that both affect the character by decreasing his sociability to the point where he 
incurs the gesture of laughter detailed in the quotation. 
47 The blase outlook may be parodied, but because of the unique confluence of physiological 
and economic influences, it cannot be reproduced synthetically. A withdrawal, on the other 
hand, may be created, for one can opt to make oneself unsociable. 
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from the consciousness of the character. They are "intentional", and in their 
intentionality they "engage" the "entire person". Most importantly, 
action is in exact Proportion to the feeling that inspires it: the one 
gradually passes into the other, so that we may allow our sympathy 
or our aversion to glide along the line running from feeling to action 
and become increasingly interested. About gesture, however, there is 
something explosive, which awakes our sensibility when on the point 
of being lulled to sleep and, by thus rousing us up, prevents our 
taking matters seriously. (13 0) 
Thus, in order to achieve a comic effect, it is necessary to display 
"unsociability in the performer and insensibility in the spectator" (13 1). 
Following these two conditions we arrive at the third, which is a reprisal of 
Bergson's theory of automatism. He reminds us that "absentmindedness is 
comical" (for reasons already discussed at length) and that the "deeper the 
nil... 
absentmindedness the higher the comedy" (13 2). We may infer from this 
conclusion (and the conclusion stated above regarding withdrawal) a more 
crucial one. Due to the fact that it is necessary to delve deeper into the self in 
an effort of intuition in order to uncover the duration against which 
mechanization works, the introspective individual is always in danger of 
becoming comical. While society ridicules the individual for his "separatist 
tendencies", the introspective individual 
-a man who, by virtue of his 
perspicacity and sensitivity perceives most accurately the constant 
encroachment of the mechanical on the fluidity of life 
- 
in turn is in a position 
to ridicule society for its fixed "ideas". 
It is in these final pages of the treatise on laughter that we encounter 
the most convincing evidence of the interdependent relationship between 
comedy, introspection, and self-reflexivity. Considering the importance 
4' Although Bergson seems to suggest that these two methods are distinct, it would appear that 
they are really just two approaches to the same end, that is, the lulling to sleep of the 
Reynaga 129 
Bergson ascribes to the function of absentmindedness in comedy, it should 
come as no surprise that we find at the junction of laughter and self-reflexivity 
that same inattention to the self that we discovered at the outset of this 
investigation. Mechanical inelasticity, which manifests itself in the mental 
realm as absentmindedness and in the physical realm as "something 
mechanical encrusted on the living", is closely aligned with the introspective 
tendencies of the humourist. By virtue of his nature, the humourist concerns 
himself with what is comical about society and himself, and his quarry is any 
gesture, influence, or social code that rides parasitically on his fellow man. He 
makes an art out of closely scrutinizing what people do and say when they 
succumb to inattention, for it is in those moments that the foreign elements of 
a character 
- 
the gestures that result in comedy 
- 
"slip out unaware". Bergson 
equates this sort of inattention to the "unsociability" he has thus far described: 
"The chief cause of rigidity is the neglect to look around 
- 
and more 
especially within oneseýf ' (13 3, my italics). The qualification "and more 
especially within oneself' establishes what for Bergson is the solid 
relationship between inattention to the self and laughter. 49 Likewise, 
Baudelaire acknowledges that in order for "absolute comedy" to take effect, it 
is necessary that it remain "unaware of itself' (164). He approaches the issue 
of the professional humourist from a similar angle as Bergson, and observes 
that although it is usually necessary for at least an audience of one to be 
present, 
an exception must nevertheless be made in connection with the 'law 
of ignorance' for those men who have made a business of developing 
in themselves their feeling for the comic, and of dispensing it for the 
audience's sympathy. 
49 "Rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness and unsociability are all inextricably entwined; 
and all serve as ingredients to the making up of the comic in character" (13 3). 
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amusement of their fellows. This last phenomenon comes into the 
class of all artistic phenomena which indicate the existence of a 
permanent dualism in the human being 
- 
that is, the power of being 
oneself and someone else at one and the same time. (164-165) 
Baudelaire's comic man, once he has fashioned himself an artist, fragments 
himself in the fashion of his artistic peers, and in doing so is capable of 
providing for himself his own audience. For Baudelaire, "artists create the 
comic", and thus they intuitively understand that the comic only may remain 
so "on condition of its being unaware of its nature" (165). This cultivation of 
self-ignorance (or to use Bergson's term, "absentmindedness") is related, 
Baudelaire tell us, to an "inverse law" which stipulates that "an artist is only 
an artist on condition that he is a double man and that there is not one single 
phenomenon of his double nature of which he is ignorant" (165). So whereas 
the comedy of the comic figure is predicated upon the fact that he is 
"unaware" of his own nature, the professional humourist, or in this case the 
artist in tune with the humour inherent in his selected subject, occupies a 
privileged position precisely because he can generate comedy and laugh at it 
concurrently. The profundity of the difference between the two lies with the 
artist's self-pluralization. While he singles out the introspective inattention of 
his subjects and ridicules them for it, he plays a game with himself by which 
he parodies that same unawareness, all the while knowing that he is the most 
aware and self-knowing of all. This self-reflexive strategy makes it possible 
for the humourist to identify those same rigid elements that lie just as much in 
him as they do in others. It also allows him to reconcile being a comic and the 
source of comedy at the same time. 
From Romantic Angoisse to Black Humour 
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Bergson's conclusions on the self-fragmentation of the humourist are 
strikingly similar to Baudelaire's: 
When the humorist laughs at himself, he is really acting a double 
part; the self who laughs is indeed conscious, but not the self who is laughed at. (Laughter 132) 
What is the social origin of such fragmentation, commonly identified as 
having originated with the Romantics and so enthusiastically adopted by many 
of the avant-garde, in particular the Dadaists? It may be read as a response to 
the perceived shattering of the cohesive semblance of order put forth by 
society. Consider theflaneur, who loiters through the chthonic morass of the 
city and is confronted by chaos and disorder, elements that society, by 
necessity, must repress if it is to function progressively at all. 50 The same 
social chaos impresses itself upon the artist, who is both mesmerized and 
actively hostile to its influence. There exists, however, the possibility that the 
fragmentation of the artist qua humourist is a determined exercise in self- 
reflexivity, devised as a survival mechanism in a technologically minded 
world forever bearing down on the individual. We are here drawn to reflect 
upon the theories of Alfred de Musset, who suggests in his work that there are 
two distinct methods of confronting the Romantic angoisse. The first is 
predicated upon a revolt against that pernicious malaise which is forever 
threatening the artist. The second calls for the artist to envelop himself in his 
melancholia, to arrogate wilfully his angoisse, with the result that he may now 
" Various paintings of the Dada period and other contemporaneous movements brazenly 
illustrate this underworld. What many of these paintings share, particularly those executed by 
the German Expressionists/early Dadaists, is the employment of Cubist or Futurist technique 
to portray, in graphic detail, the fragmentary nature of the chaotic metropolis. Such pervasive 
fragmentation, so easily discernible in the modem metropolis, could not be stopped from 
impressing itself upon the artistic milieu. The cultivation of alter-egos, such as Duchamp's 
Rrose Sdlavy, is one way in which said fragmentation played itself out amongst the artists of 
the period. Another is the proliferation of self-portraits which relied heavily upon 
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draw creative inspiration from what was once a black hole of despair. Richard 
Cardwell writes in his introduction to Ricardo Gil, La Caj a de MUsica: 
The doctrine of creative despair becomes an ultimate and valid vital 
attitude characteristic of the superior artist. Insight, though tragic, 
differentiates the few, the hypersensitive minority, from the mass. Its 
value lies in the fact that when the resolution of the underlying 
problem is left open, despair becomes a posture which dissociates the 
artist from thought and turns malaise into an art in itself. Gide aptly 
summed this response in 1891 in Les Cahiers d'Andre Walter in the 
following terms: "se regarder en souffir sans penser que c'est soi qui 
souffre. " The self becomes the object rather than the subject of their 
creativity. (xiii) 
What is indicated here about the fragmentation of the self describes equally 
well what happens to the artist who doubles as an humourist. The chaos that 
envelopes him is too great to be directly confronted, so instead he accepts it by 
way of self-polarization. While one half is embroiled in angst, the other half 
plays at desperation. Yet no matter how well nurtured the mock despair may 
be, it will always remain manufactured and foreign to the true self, and for this 
reason such despair becomes comic. The artist may in turn choose to put that 
comic element to work for him, as he did with his desPair, because it too will 
serve to distance him even further from that initial angoisse to which he is 
always in danger of succumbing. 
In The Theory of the Avant-Garde, Poggioli corroborates Cardwell's 
claims when he proposes that the avant-garde cult of laughter, which he terms 
"humourism", derives from the influence of the technological on modem art 
and is directly related to the Romantic irony (140). According to Poggioli, 
one of the peculiar or dominant forms of antiscientific humourism is 
black humour or, to use an epithet dear to Andre Breton, black bile. 
Breton preferred to define this species with the arbitrary term of 
umour (without the initial "h") to underline how new or rare it was, 
and to separate it from the innocent British humour. This pathetic, 
grotesque, and absurd type of humourism favoured by certain avant- 
photomontage and/or collage, such as Johannes T. Baargeld's Seýf-Portrait (1920) or Max 
Ernst's self-portrait of the same title and year. 
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garde currents has an obvious kinship with romantic irony and also 
with the spleen of Baudelaire and the decadents. (141)51 
The aggressive posture described here is simply another affectation adopted by 
the artist who wishes to distance himself from the melancholia that surrounds 
him. Black humour, therefore, may be seen as a more highly evolved form of 
"creative despair", a development which lends a confrontational element to the 
more introspective despondency exemplified by creative despair. In Breton's 
Anthologie de Mumour Noir Anthology of Black Humor, 1966 edition) 
there appears a prefatory essay entitled "Lightning Rod", 52 composed in 1939, 
which assembles for brief presentation some of Breton's observations on the 
nature of black humour and the history of its study. The importance black 
humour held for many members of the modernist avant-garde, particularly 
those of the Dada and Surrealist movements, is underlined by the following 
quotation: 
Given the specific requirements of the modern sensibility, it is 
increasingly doubtful that any poetic, artistic, or scientific work, any 
philosophical or social system that does not contain this kind of 
humor will not leave a great deal to be desired, will not be 
condemned more or less rapidly to perish. The value we are dealing 
with here is not only in ascendancy over all others, but is even 
capable of subsuming them, to the point where a great number of 
these values will lose the universal respect they now enjoy. We are 
touching upon a burning subject; we are headed straight into a land 
of fire: the gale winds of passion are alternately with us and against 
us from the moment we consider lifting the veil from this type of 
humor, whose manifest products we have nonetheless managed to 
isolate, with a unique satisfaction, in literature, art, and life. (xiv) 
Bergson stops short of annunciating this particular "species" of humour, but 
surely he was aware of it and the importance it held in modem aesthetic 
" Poggioli misattributes 'umour to Breton, when in fact it was Jacques Vachd, to whose work 
we shall presently turn, who is responsible for the enigmatic neologism. 
52 The titular "lightning rod" may very well allude to the dual nature of black humour, for like 
that particular species of the comic it strikes out of darkness, all the while possessing an 
unearthly elucidative capability. Like lightning, black humour is dangerous and destructive, 
but at the same time its beauty rivals all other natural phenomena. The caustic nature of both 
D- 
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culture. Earlier on in Laujzhte 
, 
he carefully distinguishes between irony and 
humour, an investigation which may be the source from which Poggioli drew 
inspiration. Bergson writes that irony is achieved when "we state what ought 
to be done, and pretend to believe that this is just what is actually being done", 
whereas humour arises contrarily when "we describe with scrupulous 
minuteness what is being done, and pretend to believe that this is just what 
ought to be done" (116). Defining humour as the "counterpart of irony", 
Bergson proceeds by linking irony with the "oratorical" and humour with the 
"scientific". No doubt his characterization of humour as scientific is 
predicated on his belief that only through exacting and objective scrutiny can 
the source of comedy be revealed for what it truly is 
-a deviation from the 
fluidity of life. 53 When Poggioli classifies black humour as "antiscientific 
humourism ". he means to say that it is a brand of humour that aims to 
unden-nine the cult of technology and the pernicious hold it has on modem 
society; he is not arguing against Bergson's theory that humour employs 
scientific methods in its investigation. Black humour as defined by Poggioli is 
"pathetic, grotesque, and absurd", and "works, above all, on the fon-nal 
mechanism of modem life which it serves to annihilate or exhaust, following 
the usual paradox of comedy" (141). With Bergson, "irony is emphasized the 
higher we allow ourselves to be uplifted by the idea of the good that ought to 
be: thus irony may grow so hot within us that it becomes a kind of high- 
pressure eloquence" (116). Poggioli's definition fits well with the fact that the 
lightning and black humour, as well as the tendency for both to leave "scars", further links the 
two. 
53 It is in this vein then that Bergson characterizes the figure of the humourist thusly: "A 
humorist is a moralist disguised as a scientist, something like an anatomist who practices 
dissection with the sole object of filling us with disgust" (117). This qualification leads him to 
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Dadaists frequently sought out the public and the media they so ruthlessly 
eschewed in their work. The black humourist, operating within the "usual 
paradox of comedy", is in a position to make more use of introspection than 
the standard humourist exactly because he manipulates the oratorical and in 
doing so uncovers the elements of language, including his own lexical choices, 
which are foreign to the human vitality they aspire to express. Thus, 
Bergson's irony is really black humour, albeit in a rudimentary form. 
On the Interdependence of Self-Reflexivity and Black Humour: The War 
Letters of Jacques Vache 
In order to elucidate the theories posited above, let us turn to a 
particularly fine example of black humour associated with Dada 
- 
the war 
letters of Jacques Vache. 54 Firstly, I should note that Vache's case was one 
more of affinity rather than influence. None of his fifteen "war letters" 
(published by Andre Breton after Vache's death in January 1919) mention the 
activities of the Dadaists, either in Zurich, New York, Berlin, or any other 
known site of activity. Nevertheless, Vache encapsulates in his letters to 
Breton, Louis Aragon, and Theodore Fraenkel that disillusiomnent which 
shook the modernists of the Great War period, and he unabashedly puts forth 
that nihilistic laughter so characteristic of Dada. Thus, although he was not a 
"card-carrying member" of any of the Dada satellite groups, he was celebrated 
by many, such as Breton and Duchamp, as an iconic precursor and a rara avis 
conclude that humour, "in the restricted sense in which we are here regarding the word, is 
really a transposition from the moral to the scientific" (117). 
54 All citations herein refer to the letters reproduced in the book by Atlas Press, Four Dada 
Suicides (209-235). 
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who championed, albeit unwittingly, the doctrine of Dada. 55 In the war letters 
and the accompanying sketches, the distinctive qualities which recur 
- 
identified succinctly as self-denying nihilistic tendencies, trenchant wit, 
iconoclastic irreverence, affected or exaggerated indifference, self- 
pluralization in the vein of play-acting, and a studied self-reflexive approach 
to aesthetics 
- 
are all to be found, in various combinations and to varying 
degrees, in Dada. 
Motherwell's anthology includes, in the introduction, a description of 
Vache composed by Emile Bouvier which merits full quotation: 
the Dadaists 
- 
and the Surrealistes as well, as a matter of fact 
- 
may 
trace their descent from the picturesque Jacques Vache.... His sole 
concern seemed to be to introduce into real life a little of that 
humorous fantasy which ordinarily is only to be found in Mark 
Twain's stories or in insane asylums.... This phenomenal being was 
very well informed on everything pertaining to contemporary 
literature; but he was long past the stage of art-for- art's- sake, and 
preferred to such pretentious and frivolous pastimes the satisfaction 
that he found in shaping his own existence to suit his fancy.... Little 
by little, he imparted his secret to his new friends. The secret was 
nothing more than a definition of humor, carried to its furtherest 
consequences, to the point of abolishing even the feeling that life was 
worthwhile. Jacques Vache's philosophy rested on three principles: 
First: "Humor is a sense of the theatric and joyless futility of 
everything, when one is enlightened.... " Second: "It is of the 
essence of symbols to be symbolic 
...... 
Finally, Vache held that there 
entered into humor a good deal of a "formidable ubique" that is to 
say, of an element of stupid surprise that is comical and, at the same 
time, disconcerting by reason of its destructive potentialities, an 
element which Jarry had illustrated in Ubu Roi. (Motherwell XXX)56 
As evidenced by this quotation, Vache's legacy rested upon his discenu-nent of 
the "frivolity" of bourgeois approaches to art. His commitment to art was 
incidental, as his primary concern was to fashion himself into a sort of anti- 
dandy, and the various testimonials provided by those who knew him or knew 
of him attest to the fact that his personality took precedence over his writings. 
" Of course it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascribe any definite "doctrine" to any of the 
Dada groups; only for simplicity's sake do I make mention of it here. 
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In this way he strongly resembled his hero Alfred Jarry, who also utilised the 
vehicle of humour as the means by which he melded his existence with that of 
his grotesque theatrical creation, Pere Ubu. As for Vache's specialised 
concept of humour and its "ubique" elements, we shall examine them shortly. 
I wish in the meantime to mention that his suicide (or unintentional opium 
overdose to some) enshrouded his character in an aura of mystery and legend 
that has yet to dissipate. The Parisian Dadaists, and primarily Breton, were 
keen to conclude that Vache's death was no accident. It was, rather, the only 
viable option left for a man who fought so strenuously to free himself from all 
things, including his own life. Breton went so far as to write that "his death 
was admirable in that it could pass for accidental" (in the essay "Disdainful 
Confession". 1924), an interpretation that is more credible than one may 
imagine considering the character of Vache as evidenced by friends' reports 
and his own writings. His contributions, both to painting and literature, were 
expectedly minimal due to the time he spent in the service and to his early 
death (he died at the age of twenty-four). In spite of this unfortunate dearth of 
material, most accounts of the history of the Dada movement cite Vache as 
one of the founding fathers, a curious conclusion when one considers that 
none of his writings even mention Dada. Still, Breton's fascination with 
Vache led him to compose eulogies that found a wide audience in the circles 
of Dada and beyond. Likewise, his publication of the war letters in the same 
year of Vache's death brought the characteristic indifference and, more 
importantly, the concept of 'umour to the world. Reflecting upon the Paris 
sector of Dada, Georges Hugnet, in his retrospective account entitled "The 
56 The numerous ellipses in this passage are found in Motherwell's quoted text. 
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Dada Spirit in Painting", 57 writes: 64Jacques Vache, had already accustomed 
the group, by his personal and dangerous brand of humor, disintegrating and 
lucid, to a sort of disorganization of thought, logic and life" (Motherwell 165- 
58 166). Drafted in 1914 and serving between the years of 1915 and 1918, 
Vachd met Breton at a hospital in Nantes in 1916, while the former was being 
treated for a leg wound (Lenti 20 1). The two found that they were of equal 
minds, and they began a correspondence that ceased shortly before Vache's 
death on 6 January 1919 (205). Paul Lenti, in his introduction entitled "Is 
Suicide 'Umorous? ", observes that for Vache, 
life itself becomes a game to be played, shaped by chaos, confusion, 
and carnage, leading to the unasked and unanswerable question 
"Why. " His response was 'umour, a word he coined to describe his 
own removed attitude to life and a response to the future one which 
also included suicide. (204) 
Before we investigate the significance of the war letters in our theory of self- 
reflexivity, let us examine Vache's expression of military experience and how 
it is that he arrived at the concept of 'umour. 
The ironic persiflage of the letters is difficult to penetrate, but there are 
salient themes that indicate the mood and, more importantly, the 
preoccupations of the author. Vache often draws attention, for example, to his 
irrepressible boredom with the war. The first mention of this pernicious ennui 
comes in the second letter, in which Vache relates to Breton his role as an 
interpreter for the British troops. In spite of the amenities granted him for his 
position, he remains "horribly isolated" (210): 
The text appears in Motherwell's anthology, pages 123-165. 
In the same vein, Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, in his "History of Dada", summarizes the 
importance of Vachd to his posthumous following of Dadaists: "Dandy, anglomaniac and 
opium addict, a young man who rejected life, he exerted a great influence on Andrd Breton". 
Likewise, Gabrielle Buffet-Picabia recalls in her memoirs of New York Dada that Duchamp 
was particularly influenced by Vachd (Motherwell 105 and 260). 
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Over all, once again a horrible boredom has descended on me... 
am bored by uninteresting things 
- 
And for fun 
-I imagine that the English are in reality the Germans and that I am with them, and for 
them, at the front. (211)" 
Vache thus establishes the following equation: isolation 
- 
which in this case 
is more akin to anomie than loneliness 
- 
gives way to profound boredom, 
which in turn engenders the play-acting described above. The author's 
predilection for uniforms and costumes is but another facet of his play- 
acting. 60 His adoption of various pseudonyms and his penchant for costuming 
himself in the uniforms of other military branches reinforces the observation 
that he is a man who epitomizes Musset's call to creative despair; he draws 
creative inspiration from the desperation he experiences during his service. 
He writes in his third letter to Breton, 
I'm the English interpreter, a position to which I bring a total 
indifference decorated with a quiet farce 
- 
such as I like to bring to 
official things 
-I take my Crystal monocle and a theory for troubling 
paintings for a walk around villages in ruins 
... 
And furthermore, I 
imagine I'm in the German Army and I've succeeded 
- 
Things 
change, how I truly believe I serve against the allied armies 
- 
What 
do you expect?... (213) 
The phrase "a total indifference decorated with a quiet farce" exemplifies a 
typical Dadaist reaction to life, and applies particularly well to the 
comportment of Duchamp and even of Schwitters, to a degree. 61 Vache's 
phrase is felicitously insightful in that it exposes the hypocrisy of affected 
indifference. The mere suggestion that one would ornament "total 
59 Vach6 peppered his accounts with ellipses and strained punctuation, which has for the most 
part been reproduced by the editors at Atlas Press. 
60 This equation is of course equally applicable to a large number of modernist artists and 
writers. For example, we are immediately reminded of Duchamp's cultivation of Rrose 
Sdlavy. The initial Dada group which coalesced in Zurich was composed of individuals who, 
for various reasons, were overwhelmed by the pangs of anomie engendered by their reluctance 
to participate in the war. Like Vachd, they chose to embrace and even cultivate their spiritual 
malaise in an effort to survive it. 
6' As with the note on the "doctrine" of Dada, I am consciously over- s imp lifying the matter 
here, but only in the interest of brevity. Many Dadaists, particularly those in the Parisian and 
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indifference" with anything is laughable, and points to the frivolity of striking 
any serious pose, to whatever end. The "crystal monocle", an affectation 
adopted by some of the Dadaists, was intended "to poke fun at bourgeois 
pretensions" (Lenti 262). The "theory for troubling paintings", a most 
improbable vade mecum, underlines the pointlessness of bourgeois artifice 
(reduced metonymically by Vache to two instances of ostentation 
- 
the 
"monocle" and the "theory") in a world destroyed by mass warfare. And by 
pretending (at least to himself) that he is actually an enemy who has infiltrated 
the Allied camp, he engages in a similar sort of self-fragmentation as the sort 
indicated by Bergson with regards to the humourist. In order to dampen the 
mental anguish engendered by the ubiquitous violence of the war, Vache 
fragments himself in a gesture of creative despair. Unlike the Bergsonian 
fragmentation detailed above, however, Vache manages to splinter into many 
different selves, thus complicating the issue further. Yet like Bergson and 
Baudelaire's figure of the humourist, he does possess a self-awareness that 
enables him to perceive the mechanical elements of military society which 
threaten to stifle the fluid and creative impulse. For example, rather than 
accepting the prescribed function of the military uniform to facilitate 
identification of any given soldier with his corresponding military body, 
Vache uses it to pluralize his own identity. This penchant for self- 
pluralization was unsettling even to some of Vache's closest friends; to those 
who did not know him, his play-acting rendered him a disturbing enigma. 62 In 
New York sectors, stressed their independence from the Expressionists by flaunting their 
disinterestedness and indifference as much as possible. 
62 In his essay "The Disdainful Confession", Breton recollects, "He sometimes strolled the 
Nantes streets dressed in different uniforms: as a Hussar lieutenant, an aviator or as a doctor" 
(17). Furthermore, in his "Introduction 1919", Breton writes, "for to tell the truth, I was never 
sure to which branch of the military Jacques Vachd belonged" (13). 
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the fourth letter, he relates the story of how he undermined a General and a 
Staff major: 
I was introduced today to a Division general and a Staff major at headquarters under the name of a famous painter 
- 
(I think the said 
general was 50 or 70 years old 
- 
perhaps he is dead also 
- 
but the 
name remains) 
- 
They (the General and the Staff major) managed to 
run away from me as soon as possible 
- 
it's strange and I amuse 
myself by imagining how unamusing this will end up 
- 
In any 
case 
... 
Besides 
... 
And in the end it leaves me indifferent as to how it 
will all turn out 
- 
it's not really funny 
- 
not funny at all. No. (215- 216)63 
Vache indulges in insubordination of a different kind by eliciting a response 
from his superiors which he himself is forbidden from giving (he cannot 
simply turn and walk away). His disdain for them is clear, but cleverly he 
manufactures a situation in which they flee from him, not the other way 
around. More important are the incomplete thoughts at the end of the passage. 
The independent clause "I amuse myself by imagining how unamusing this 
will end up" is a succinct and yet precise example of creative despair. The 
reader is once again presented with a pervasive indifference, and ultimately 
Vache manages to undermine the nihilistic laughter that he has previously 
proven is so valuable to his subsistence. 
The most salient point to emerge from the correspondence is the 
concept behind the nebulous tenn 'umour, which is introduced as early as the 
third letter. Although Poggioli misattributes 'umour to Breton, as evidenced 
by the letters it was a word coined by Vache and taken up by the latter. The 
invocation of such neologisms delighted Vache, who more than likely took on 
the sport from one of his favourite authors, Alfred Jarry. 64 Throughout the 
63 As with much of Vachd's war correspondence, the story may or may not be apocryphal. 
What matters for our purposes are the sentiments expressed. 
64 Vachd celebrated his appreciation for the unfathomable, and by that time legendary, 
playwright and novelist. In the fourth letter, he writes to Breton, "Are you sure that 
Apollinaire is still alive or that Rimbaud even existed? For me, I don't think so 
-I only see 
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Ubu trilogy, to which Vache often alludes, Jarry appropriates common cuss 
words such as merde and transposes them slightly, usually by adding a letter 
or combining two or more words; his most enduring neologism, "merdre", is 
popularly translated as "pschitt". 65 The usual order of letters, producing 
sounds familiar in colloquial discourse, is subverted in the cases of Jarry's 
merdre and Vache's 'umour, the immediate result being that what we 
anticipate does not follow, and thus we begin to dissect a word we previously 
took for granted. We come to realize that the conventional meaning conveyed 
by that word is easily upset when a letter is added, subtracted, or the order of 
letters is inverted. The conclusion at which we arrive upon further reflection 
is that words, which are arbitrary in their spelling, are equally arbitrary in what 
they denote if their meanings are so easily distorted by an orthographical trick 
played on us by the author. We detect the "ready-made formulas and 
stereotyped phrases" that constitute our language Laughter 103), and uncover 
beneath the seeming order of words "something mechanical encrusted on the 
living"; by necessity we laugh. Beaumont says as much when he observes 
that 
the third element inherent in the word 'merdre' is that of linguistic 
deformation and invention. The addition by Jarry (or by the pupils of 
the Lycee de Rennes, since it is certain that the word goes back to the 
play's schoolboy origins) of an extra r to the celebrated mot de 
Cambronne gives it a magnificent resonance far beyond that of its 
original forin (merde), which it is, alas, impossible to recapture in 
English. Far from euphemising the word however (as the somewhat 
Jarry (Anyway, what do you want, anyway 
-... - 
UBU)"... (216). The inscrutable 
parenthetical expression, punctuated mysteriously by hyphens and an ellipsis, suggests that 
Vachd truly is silenced by the contributions of Jarry. 
65 Keith Beaumont, in his book Jarry: Ubu Roi, writes the following: 
Nothing exemplifies more vividly, and more fully, the characteristic features 
of the language of Ubu Roi than the play's opening word, merdre. It 
embodies at one and the same time the vulgarity and obscenity of much of 
the play's language; its violence and aggressiveness; the element of 
linguistic deformation and invention; and the numerous elements of 
mystification which the text contains. (47) 
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I 
prissy substitution of mince for merde in French, or sugar for shit by 
some English-speakers, seeks to do), the purely derisory nature of 
Jarry's apparent camouflage gives to the word instead a parodic 
value, caricaturing a popular form of linguistic deformation and 
substitution. This linguistic deformation and inventiveness, 
moreover, is an important factor in enlivening the play's string of 
oaths and obscenities; for vulgarity and obscenity quickly become 
tedious unless constantly renewed by imagination and invention. (49) 
What Jarry and Vache establish in practice is Bergson's proposition: "a comic 
meaning is invariably obtained when an absurd idea is fixed into a well- 
established phrase-forin" (104). They also substantiate Bergson's theory of 
"the comic transformation ofsentences": "We may thus surmise that a phrase 
is likely to become comic if, though reversed, it still makes sense, or if it 
expresses equally well two quite independent sets of ideas" (109). What 
Bergson writes about phrases is equally true of words, as they are, at their 
basic level, the constituent elements of those same phrases. 
Vache's fondness for Jarryisms such as "merdre" and "oneilles" 
(translated as "earens") is but another side of his play-acting, and neologisms 
like 'umour function much like the assorted costumes and uniforms he donned 
in gestures of self-fragmentation. No fon-nal definition is provided anywhere 
in the correspondence of the word, in spite of Breton's attempts to coax an 
explanation out of his friend. It first appears in the third letter of the 
collection, and it would seem that either some part of the correspondence is 
missing or Breton has ventured, of his own accord, a definition of the 
neologism, for Vache teasingly dismisses him by writing, "... you only 
approximately grasp what I meant by 'umour", and continues on, without 
correcting the misinterpretation. He mentions it again when he observes that 
"the British Army, as preferable as it is to the French, is without a lot of 
ýumour" (214). The penultimate musing of the third letter concerns the 
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writing of St. Augustine, whom Vache imagines as "a monk who has 
absolutely no concept of 'umour whatsoever" (214). Clearly Breton was 
perplexed by the curious tenn and expressed his desire to be enlightened, 
because in the fourth letter Vache writes, "and then you ask me to define 
umour for you 
-just like thafl... " (216), but not before he confesses "... 1 
amuse myself by imagining how unamusing this will end up 
- 
In any 
case 
... 
Besides 
... 
And in the end it leaves me indifferent as to how it will all 
turn out 
- 
it's not really funny 
- 
not funny at all. No. " (216). The tone of the 
fourth letter is generally more forlorn than the others, and includes the very 
telling line "I'm tired of mediocrity and am of a mind simply to go to sleep for 
an indefinite period" (215). It is in this dejected mood that Vache issues his 
first attempt at defining 'umour. 66 He haphazardly explains that "... 'umour 
derives too much from a sensation of not being very difficult to express 
-I 
think that it's a sensation 
-I was going to say SENSE - also - of the theatrical 
(and joyless) futility of everything" (216). Almost as soon as the author 
begins to engage the concept of 'umour, he abandons it and completes the 
letter instead with the mundane and obviously facetious observation "it's 
boring to write with a pencil on lined paper" (217). It is clear from Vache's 
circuitous non-answers that he wishes to maintain the ambiguity of 'umour as 
much as possible. Nevertheless, the significance it held for him should not be 
underestimated, for in the tenth letter the singular importance he ascribes to 
the word is made explicit: 
0 ABSURD GOD! 
- 
because everything is contradiction 
- 
isn't it? 
and will 'umour be the one who is never taken in by the hidden and 
66 The phantom of Jarry, which hovers over Vachd's correspondence, is not to be overlooked, 
for as previously discussed it is in this same letter that he elevates Jarry and Vbu to an 
esteemed position far above the likes of Apollinaire and Rimbaud (216). 
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sneaky life of everything? 
... 
and will 'umour be the one who will feel 
the lamentable optical illusion of universal simile-symbols. 
- 
It's in their nature to be symbolic. 
- 
'Umour shouldn't produce 
- 
But what to do about it?... (228) 
Vach6's refusal to provide a solid definition is based upon two reasons. 
Firstly, as he indicates in the fourth letter, 'umour is a symbol of sorts, and 
after all "it's in the essence of symbols to be symbolic" (216). The concept 
behind the word is obfuscated by its own categorization. As Bergson states in 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
A representation taken from a certain point of view, a translation 
made with certain symbols, will always remain imperfect in 
comparison with the object of which a view has to be taken, or which 
the symbols seek to express. (5) 
and 
The very idea of reconstituting a thing by operations practised on 
symbolic elements alone implies such an absurdity that it would 
never occur to any one if they recollected that they were not dealing 
with fragments of the thing, but only, as it were, with fragments of its 
symbol. (25) 
Vache seems to recognize, or at least observe, that 'umour is only an 
impoverished symbol intending to relate pithily at least some of the angoisse, 
frustration, and nihilistically minded humour he and his artistic compatriots 
were harbouring at the time. We can imagine Vache believed that either 
Breton intuitively understood the visceral profundity behind the word or he 
did not; there was no method of explicating the symbol if one could not grasp 
what was being symbolized. Furthermore, the playful hints with which he 
taunts his friend underline the intrinsic dependency of the term on the ludic. 
Indeed, it would have been jarringly inconsistent for Vache to have laid bare 
his definition of such a nebulous term with scientific precision. Still, we are 
obliged to attempt an investigation into this curious term, for 'umour 
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encapsulates that same link between introspection and humour described 
earlier. 
The case of Jarry, along with numerous examPles taken from the Dada 
period, proves that social criticism couched in absurd humour is highly potent. 
This conclusion may be explained by considering what Bergson identifies as 
the social corrective purpose of humour. With these theories in mind, it is 
easy to see through the playfulness and absurdity of Dada and understand the 
more profound project of invoking laughter to the effect of addressing the ills 
of society. Likewise, seemingly nonsensical neologisms like merdre and 
'umour become valuable shibboleths wielded by artists like Jarry and Vache. 
Those familiar with Ubu Roi and as delighted by it as Vache was would 
recognize merdre and immediately understand the context; the social criticism 
contained therein would be immediately obvious to them. 'Umour is a bit 
more slippery a term, as it seems to be only the tip of a conceptual iceberg 
rather than a rallying cry unto itself 
. 
67 Still, the fact that it retains its 
mystifying power to this day underlines its potency. When we consider the 
profundity of 'umour, a profundity which surely was not lost on its author or 
on Breton, we are reminded of Bergson's assessment of the use of imagery in 
philosophical discourse: 
No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse 
images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the 
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to be seized. (14)68 
67 Breton addresses the 'umour enigma with the following: "It is difficult to know exactly 
what Jacques Vachd meant by 'umour (without an "h") or even to know where we now stand 
in his struggle between the faculty for affectation and for cultivating certain supercilious 
attitudes" ("The Disdainful Confession", as quoted in Vachd's War Letters 16) 
6' The concept is equally applicable to art, as this Edvard Munch quotation suggests: "In 
reality, my art is a confession made of my own free will, an attempt to clarify my own notion 
of Life 
... 
at bottom it is a kind of egoism, but I shall not give up hoping that with its assistance 
I shall be able to help others achieve their own clarity" (Bischoff 42). As with Vachd's 
P umour, the impetus behind Munch's work (and all Expressionist work for tf#at matter) is first 
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It would have been impossible for Vache to relate to Breton or Fraenkel the 
true state of his inner self as it was during his military service. Even if he had 
the luxury of composing exhaustive examinations of the psychological effects 
he experienced during the war, he could not have fully conveyed all the 
sensations to an audience which could not totally immerse itself in the author's 
position. It is much more effective (although still flawed) to introduce a new 
word to catalyse the reflection Vache's audience was meant to undertake upon 
reading his war correspondence. His invocation of 'umour, along with his 
liberal distribution of semi-quotations and words appropriated from other 
literary sources 
- 
in short his tenacious insistence on constructing tableaux 
rather than wholly descriptive treatises 
- 
all exert a magnetism on the mind of 
the reader which draws the attention (or perhaps even the subconscious) to the 
interface where it may converse directly with reality. An objection may be 
raised at this point that disputes the validity of this tactic. It may be said that 
such economizing on description serves only to distance the reader from the 
subject at hand, leaving as it does unnegotiable gaps which the reader may fill 
in with his own infonnation. The possible outcome would then be a 
description only loosely based on the author's intentions, most of which has 
been refashioned by the reader according to his own experiences. No doubt a 
collection like Vache's war letters runs this risk, and perhaps some readers do 
in fact fail to reach that introspective interface at which they were meant to 
arrive. Still, I would argue that the author in this case strikes the proper 
balance between a narration of the reality which surrounds him and inducing 
and foremost the realization of an idea, and secondly the effort to communicate that idea as 
viscerally as possible to one's audience. 
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an introspective mode in his audience. From the self-reflexive point of view, 
) umour functions as a Bergsonian "image" in that it "direct[s] consciousness 
to the precise point where there is a certain intuition to be seized (14). 
Conclusion 
Admittedly, Bergson's distinctions between the ironist and the 
humourist become quite blurred in the example of Vache, for he appears 
throughout his correspondence as both a Bergsonian ironist (his prepossession 
with language proves as much) and an humourist who acts a "double part" and 
"set[s] down details [of brutality and "evil"] in the most cold-blooded 
69 indifference" (132 and 116). Vache epitomizes Bergson's comic figure, and 
in his war correspondence we uncover a superior example of how humour and 
self-reflexivity are linked through the condition of creative despair. It is not a 
linear or steady progression between the two poles, however, and by this point 
in our study we should not expect it to be so. The path the hurnourist traces is 
13 t- akin to that pursued by the self-reflexive artist, for the trajectory is 
meandering, uncertain, and treacherous. The war letters collection presents 
this criss-crossing trajectory and follows it through from Romantic (self- 
conscious) introspection to modernist fragmentation, back to Romantic 
creative despair and towards trenchant avant-guard irony, finally arriving (but 
69 Indifference is critical in Bergson's characterization of the humourist, for it distinguishes 
said character from more conventional comic figures. The humourist makes use of subtlety to 
the effect of negatively emphasizing the sharpness of his criticism. Breton's depictions of 
Vachd do not paint the picture of a wildly comic figure, but rather one whose comic effect is 
heightened by his self-immersion in what he deems most unsatisfactory, namely, military 
service: "His refusal to participate is absolute, and takes the guise of a purely formal 
acceptance pushed to the limit: he maintains all the 'outer signs of respect, ' of a somewhat 
automatic acquiescence to precisely what the mind deems most insane" ("Jacques Vaclid", 
essay by Breton in his Anthology Of Black Humor 293). 
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not resting at) black humour. Indeed, what Bergson writes about the comic 
character is highly applicable to the case of Vache: 
In one sense it might be said that all character is comic, provided we 
mean by character the ready-made element in our personality, that 
mechanical element which resembles a piece of clockwork wound up 
once for all and capable of working automatically. It is, if you will, 
that which causes us to imitate ourselves. And it is also, for that very 
reason, that which enables others to imitate us. [ 
... 
I It is comic to 
wander out of one's own self. It is comic to fall into a ready-made 
category. And what is most comic of all is to become a category 
oneself into which others will fall, as into a ready-made frame; it is 
to crystallize into a stock character. (134) 
Jarry, unparalleled as a comic figure (or more appropriately, a tragi-comic 
figure), attained his comic zenith by first creating and breathing life into a 
character who was an arnalgamation of vices and gestures. On stage and in 
text, Pere Ubu was the embodiment of mechanical rigidity, and so when Jarry 
began to fashion himself as much as possible on his creation, by necessity he 
70 had to "wander out" of himself towards the realm of the improbable. Vache 
moved in a similar direction, with the exception that he manufactured (or 
rather fragmented into) many personages, but in his case he finished, 
posthumously, as a ready-made category into which many of the Dadaists 
would happily step', rather than "fall". 71 
Schwitters also fits Bergson's characterization of the humourist, and 
his comic nature was noted, begrudgingly at times, by those who had occasion 
to interact with him (Huelsenbeck, for example). Richter offers this double- 
edged insight into Schwitters' comic nature: 
70 And this movement away from the creative self towards the rigidity of form is obviously 
Simmelian. I perceive here a link, deserving of further exploration, between the 
subjective/objective struggle which engenders culture and the fragmentation of the humourist 
who courts the rigidity of forms as he fragments his own creative self. 
71 The reverence many of the Dadaists held for Vach6 is indicative of more than a sense of 
affinity or an acknowledgement of influence. Vachd tapped into the precise state of being that 
was best suited to many of the young avant-gardists, of the era, and although such posturing 
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There was never a moment's boredom when 'Kurtchen' was around. Whatever he did was in deadly earnest, even when we took it as a joke. This disconcerting ambivalence was a source of tremendous 
energy released, in fifty per cent of the cases, in an explosion of laughter. But it was laughter of a special kind, laughter that 
awakened and stimulated the spirit. (Dada: Art and Anti-Art 139) 
The ambivalence of which Richter takes note is somewhat similar to the 
indifference witnessed in the writings of Vache and in the "dryness" of 
Duchamp's readymades. This ainbivalence/indifference is, in Bergson's 
estimation, an indication of a "natural detachment" which some individuals 
are fortunate enough to possess. Its function is to divorce the mind from the 
innate connection to executable action, a connection (though necessary for 
life) that threatens to impose geometrical thinking on the contemplation of 
non-geometrical matter: 
Were this detachment complete, did the soul no longer manage to 
cleave to action by any of its perceptions, it would be the soul of an 
artist such as the world has never yet seen. It would excel alike in 
every art at the same time; or rather, it would fuse them all into one. 
It would perceive all things in their nature purity: the forms, colors, 
sounds of the physical world as well as the subtlest movements of the 
inner life. (Lau hter 139) ! &J- 
It would be specious to claim that Schwitters, or any of the Dadaists for that 
matter, had elevated themselves to such heights, but certainly Schwitters was 
moving in this direction when he sought to produce, within the contextual 
unity of Merz, art that was in direct communion with the creative spirit. And 
as we shall see in the following chapter, the neo-Gesamtkunstwerk project of 
the Hanover Merzbau sought the fusion of the "forms, colours, sounds" and 
"movements of the inner life" that had, prior to its construction, floated within 
the domain of Merz. 
resulted in his untimely death, others, like Breton, could play at being his disciples as much as 
he played at being in the enemy camps. 
Reynaga 151 
Chapter III 
Towards the Self-Reflexive Essence of the Hanover Merzbau: The 
Architectural Triumph of Vitalist Metaphysics 
"For with our thousand weaknesses and the tiny spark of the ideal, we human heings 
can at hest merely give ourselves, openly and honestly, and work, in the ideal sense, 
towards ourselves. "' 
Introduction 
Of all the divergent explanations offered for the origins of the name 
"Dada", perhaps the most satisfactory is the etymological definition; the 
word, from the Slavic tongue, translates as the emphatic affirmation "Yes 
yes". The overwhelming majority of artistic movements proclaim in their 
titles more or less accurate descriptions of the principles on which they are 
founded, but Dada is singular in its very lack of specification. 2 That the title 
was chosen because in French it signified a hobby-horse, or because it was the 
exact entry in the dictionary upon which Huelsenbeck's attention capriciously 
landed, are claims which need not be disputed, for the word is elastic enough 
3 to absorb various interpretations and even misinterpretations. The 
nonsensical connotation evoked by the first explanation, or the triumph of 
chance suggested by the second, work equally well when we attempt to 
uncover the relation between the movement and its title. So much of the Dada 
' The quotation belongs to Schwitters, who is speaking in particular about his tenacious 
proclivity towards naturalistic painting. The passage is reproduced in Kurt Schwitters 
(Elderfield 216). 
2 To cite some examples, "Expressionism" was a call for artists to move beyond the passive 
assimilation of impressions towards the tangible expression of the inner states of the mind (in 
all their vibrant confusion and authenticity). "Futurism" announced the fixation of the 
aesthetic eye on whatever lay beyond the quotidian past and present. Names like "Fauvism" 
and especially "De Stijl" serve as more than mere definitional reductions, as "Expressionism" 
and "Futurism" (or "Constructivism" and "Minimalism") do, but they still do not approach the 
mystical potency contained in "Dada". 
3 In Dada: Art and Anti-Art, Richter provides a superb overview of the "Homeric struggle 
over the ownership of the trademark" (3 1). Also, Elderfield addresses (in great detail and with 
sharp insight) the enigma of the name in his afterword to Flight Out of Time (23 8-25 1). 
Dp 
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spirit originates in the ludic drive inherited from the Romantics, and the 
reliance on chance was, ironically enough, carefully cultivated in many works, 
most notably in pieces like Duchamp's "3 Stoppages Etalons" ("3 Standard 
Stoppages", 1913-1914). The proliferation of theories and assertions of 
authorship that enshroud the meaning of the word suggest that the disciples of 
the movement were genuinely at a loss for an irrefutable definition, as are 
biographers and theorists today. 4 However, to scramble as many have done to 
unearth with archaeological exactitude the true origin and meaning of "Dada" 
is to betray that noncommittal modus vivendi of the movement. 5 In "Dada" we 
approach an intuition rather than a concept, and thus we are already several 
steps closer to exhuming a duration that has been buried beneath decades of 
scholarly analysis. In his chapter "The Case of Dada", Huelsenbeck touches 
upon the same idea when he writes, "One could say that the other movements 
concentrated more on a theory of art or of life rather than on life itself ' (13 6). 
We take then as our point of departure the philosophical "nought" which the 
affirmation inherent in the name "Dada" betrays, although we remain 
conscious of the distance that remains between the metaphysical unity given 
spontaneous and free expression in the title and our understanding of what is 
signified. 
What are we affirming when we speak the name of Dada, and more 
crucially, what are we denying? Before we attempt an answer to this weighty 
" Again, Richter comments, "To this day it is impossible to be sure who discovered or 
invented the word Dada, or what it means" (3 1). 
5 With a flourish that stifles the competing opinions over the origins of the word (or at least 
casts aspersion on further argument), Richter writes: 
but these petty jealousies only appeared after Dada had become a world- 
wide enterprise. [ 
... 
J Some of the leading members of Dada set out, a 
posteriori, to cut off each other's supplies of vital fluid even, as it were, in 
the womb, and many, with an insensitivity that was totally foreign to the 
Zurich group as I remember it, are still trying. (32) 
Dp 
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question, let us briefly investigate what a few of the interpretations the original 
(that is, Zurich) Dadaists have suggested. If we consult Richter on the matter, 
we find that the focus falls on the affirmative interpretation of the word: 
"Nothing could better express our optimism, our sensation of newly-won 
freedom, than this powerfully reiterated "da, da" 
- 
66yes, yes" to life" (3 1). In 
marked contrast, we encounter Tzara's characteristically effusive negativity in 
the June 1916 entry in his "Zurich Chronicle (1915-191 9)55: 6 
A word was born no one knows how DADADADA we took an oath 
of friendship on the new transmutation that signifies nothing, and 
was the most formidable protest, the most intense armed affirmation 
of salvation liberty blasphemy mass combat speed prayer tranquillity 
private guerilla negation and chocolate of the desperate. (18) 
Affirmation here is quite distinct from the kind that is given voice in Richter's 
quotation, for the fact that Tzara issues a litany of both traditionally positive 
and negative concepts, and in doing so stresses the all-embracing quality of 
such militant affirmation. It is, perhaps, less an avowal of certain percepts 
than a jubilant reception of all percepts; Tzara celebrates the fact that under 
the rubric of "Dada", anything goes. 7 Elsewhere he states that it was a word 
devoid of meaning ("DADA MEANS NOTHING"), but follows that 
characterization with a variety of possible interpretations, both plausible and 
fantastic. 8 Huelsenbeck, who allied himself with Ball over the matter of the 
coinage of "bada" (against the Tzara/Arp axis), endorsed the German-French 
6 The text was initially published in Huelsenbeck's Dada Almanac, and it is from this source 
that I quote. 
7 Tzara's coyness over the authorship of the term was soon replaced by strident claims, 
substantiated by Arp, that he had selected the disyllabic utterance first and used it to christen 
the loosely bound group that was gathering at the Cabaret Voltaire. Elderfield, in the 
afterword to Flight Out of Time, cites Arp's prankish testimonial (242). 
81 am quoting from Tzara's "Manifest dada 1918" ("Dada Manifesto 1918"), as reprinted in 
Motherwell's anthology, page 77. 
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dictionary myth, 9 which is challenged by Elderfield in favour of Ball's sole 
authorship, in whom he finds the likeliest (although still unverified) of authors 
(25 1). In "En Avant Dada: Eine Geschichte des Dadaismus" ("En Avant 
Dada: A History of Dadaism", 1920), Huelsenbeck challenges, with more 
than a little vituperative criticism, Tzara's stance vis-a-vis the nonsensical 
nature of the word "Dada": 
A word which affects the masses so profoundly must embody an idea 
that touches the most vital interests of these masses, shaming, 
frightening or encouraging them in their innermost soul. That is why 
it is so incomprehensible that this Tristan Tzara, who out of childish 
ambition passes himself off as the inventor of Dada, should try to 
bind Dada to abstract art. [ 
... 
] To be sure, the choice of the word 
Dada in the Cabaret Voltaire was selective 
- 
metaphysical, 
predetermined by all the idea-energies with which it was now acting 
upon the world 
--.  
but no one had thought of Dada as babies' prattle. (31) 
Huelsenbeck categorically refuses Tzara's authenticity as well as his 
characteristic leanings towards nonsense and anti-sense, and when we consider 
the separate spheres of Berlin and Paris Dada, each (respectively) spearheaded 
by these two original Dadaists, then we can easily trace how their 
contradictory interpretations of "Dada" coloured the satellite movements they 
initiated. 10 
Elderfield follows a different path in his efforts to trace the true origin 
and author of "Dada". Firstly, he cites none other than Schwitters as the 
instigator of the decades long dispute between Tzara and Huelsenbeck. 
Having been dismissed from the blossoming group almost a priori, Schwitters 
9 His story, which involves Ball and Hennings, appears in his essay "Dada Siegt! " ("Dada 
Lives! ",, 1936), reproduced in Motherwell's anthology (277-281). 
10 Berlin Dada followed, from its inception, more of a political agenda, while Paris Dada was, 
more frequently, gratuitously provocative. In Kurt Schwitters, Elderfield observes: 
Under Tristan Tzara, in Zurich and later in Paris, [Dada] became an 
aggressively experimental and increasingly Gallicized movement, dedicated 
to the shocking and the mystifying virtually for their own sakes. Under 
Huelsenbeck, however, when he returned to Berlin from Zurich in 1917, 
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was, with reason, wary of Huelsenbeck, and in the interest of discrediting him 
in the eyes of the Dadaists, he challenged Huelsenbeck's authority as the 
reigning sovereign of Berlin Dada and Dada at large. 11 (We shall return later 
to the issue of Schwitters and his struggle for inclusion in Dada. ) Elderfield 
does, however, lean more towards Huelsenbeck's influence, for his side 
- 
which finds that the word did indeed have meaning and significance 
- 
is more 
closely corroborated by Ball's diary entries (247). Ball, as a poet first and 
foremost, was preoccupied with the mystical power contained in words, and I 
agree with Elderfield's conclusion that as the founder of the Cabaret Voltaire 0 31 
he would have no doubt been reluctant to authorize a word chosen for its very 
lack of meaning (250). We have before us, then, a multitude of suggested 
meanings, but I must concur with Elderfleld's theory that the word, in spite of 
its infantile sound, carried with it great significance. I do, however, wish to 
explore another possible route by which the same conclusion may be reached, 
one that will incorporate Bergson's theory of the nought and our own theory 
of self-reflexivity thus far developed, which comes to great fruition in the 
Hanover Merzbau. 
Huelsenbeck's quotation cited above regarding the potency of the word 
"Dada" merits further attention. In the same essay, he reports how violently 
the word asserted itself amongst the European populace: 
During the past decades in Europe, no word, no concept, no 
philosophy, no slogan of party or sect can be said to have burst upon 
the imagination of a civilized society with such catastrophic force. 
Dada became something very different indeed, and implacably opposed to 
what Schwitters and his connections stood for. (34) 
1 refer to Elderfield's abridged history of the conflict in his afterword to Flight Out of Time 
(240). On the same page, he situates this great schism in the year 1920, which he points out 
was the same year in which Dada disintegrated into the splintered movements which were 
built on its ruins. In emphasizing that fateful date, Elderfield strongly suggests that the furore 
over the name (which Schwitters deviously instigated) had more than a small part to play in 
the fissure of the group. 
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[ 
... 
] The immense effect of Dadaism on the great mass of the 
artistically indifferent lay in the senseless and comic character of the 
word Dada, and it would seem that this effect, in turn, must derive from some profound psychological cause, connected with the whole 
structure of "humanity" today and its present social organization. ("En Avant Dada", Motherwell 3 1) 
Even if we allow for the usual Dadaist blustering and self-aggrandizement, we 
still must acknowledge that the movement did indeed make a heavy impact not 
only upon Europe, but upon America as well. The explanation offered here by 
Huelsenbeck is redolent of both Simmel and Bergson. The allusion to a 
pervasive psychological condition affecting society as a whole recalls "The 
Metropolis and Mental Life" and Simmel's theory regarding the tragedy of 
culture, while the comedy inherent in the movement (and the serious 
philosophical preoccupations it veils) harkens back to Bergson's Laujýzhte 
. 
While it is certainly the case that nonsense was cultivated under the battle cry 
of "Dada" and that it came to inform many works of the period, there was, in 
reality, a great deal of order which lurked beneath the chaos. 12 Many 
declamatory manifestos were written to the contrary, but Dada clearly kept at 
its core a positive ideal, a unity that stretched across the contradictions and 
embraced even the most divergent of styles and concepts. For although many 
Dadaists like Tzara and Picabia posited an anti-art stance, they continued to 
compose poems and execute paintings, just as the predecessors they eschewed 
had done for hundreds of years. Even Tzara, carne to appreciate the positive 
productivity of the movement he once claimed fell under a title that signified 
"nothing". 13 
12 To conjure up a fitting image, we may imagine a turbid stretch of river whose turbulence 
nevertheless derives from the concrete arrangement of its rocky (but stationary) bed. 
13 His "Dada Manifesto 1918" begins as follows: "The magic of a word 
- 
Dada 
- 
which has 
brought journalists to the gates of a world unforeseen, is of no importance to us" (Motherwell 
76). Age seems to have tempered his deliriousje m'enfbutisme, however, for in "An 
Introduction to Dada" (written many years later and also appearing in Motherwell), he states, 
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The Shadow of the Nought 
Bergson's theory of the nought is predicated upon the belief that 
"nothingness", in spite of our conception of it, is in reality as full as its 
positive opposite: 
the idea of Nothing, if we try to see in it that of an annihilation of all 
things, is self-destructive and reduced to a mere word; and that if, on 
the contrary, it is truly an idea, then we find in it as much matter as in 
the idea of All. (Creative Evolution 324) 
Bergson begins by identifying a critical problem in our comprehension of "the 
inner life". As consciousness is tethered to the faculty of the intellect, it is 
unaccustomed to interpreting the inner life by the intuitive method; rather, it 
selects static moments and extrapolates the nature of duration by those fixed 
points (297). There is another problem Bergson identifies, one that develops 
as a result of our reliance on the interpretive abilities of our consciousness. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, our intellect perfonns its duties as a 
function of the action we require, and for this reason it is difficult to move 
outside of a philosophy based on our desires and the actions we undertake to 
achieve them. 14 At this point, we identify the common misperception which 
feeds our understanding of the void and complementary fullness: 
All action aims at getting something that we feel the want of, or at 
creating something that does not yet exist. In this very special sense, 
it fills a void, and goes from the empty to the full, from an absence to 
a presence, from the unreal to the real. (297) 
We mislead ourselves, therefore, by supposing that our disappointment, which 
comes when we fail to locate an object or situation of our wishing, is 
equivalent to the reality of what we encounter. In reality, "it is only order that 
"Was this movement, only the destructive side of which had been seen by most critics, really 
necessary? It is certain that the tabula rasa which we made into the guiding principle of our 
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is real", for disorder is only man's word for an order Which disappoints the 
expectation. 15 It is this unveiling of terms that prompts Bergson to conclude, 
"The idea of disorder is then entirely practical" (298). We fall into a 
philosophical ab^lMe whenever we propose the non-existence of order, because 
in that very proposal we simply vacillate between the order that is in concert 
with our ideals and the order that disappoints us (that which we tenn disorder). 
Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that "the supposed suppression of the 
one and the other implies the presence of the two" (298-299), and so it is that 
disorder (and as we shall soon see, nothingness) is but a mirage. Still, we 
perceive it on the horizon as a reality that affirms our belief in order and 
fullness. 16 Bergson even positS'that at the first moment of self-reflection, the 
mirage of disorder appears in the distance, coaxing us to step forward but 
eluding us at every pace. In pursuing that illusion, however, we eventually 
discover that "Existence appears 
... 
like a conquest over nought" (300), and it is 
this error which stimulates the mind to form the question: "How 
- 
why does 
this principle ["a Principle of creation"] exist rather than nothing? " (300). 17 
activity, was of value only in so far as something else would succeed it" (405). 
14 " We thus express what we have as a function of what we want" (298). 
15 "All that is left of disorder is a word" (299). 
16 Disorder is., in these passages of Creative Evolution, defined as the "absence" of order, and 
it is in this way that the argument Bergson makes soon shifts to the question of absence in 
general. Intuitively we perceive that the pejorative opinion we hold of disorder is but a few 
gades shy of the negativity we ascribe to our idea of absolute nothingness. 
7 Ortega y Gasset, in Some Lessons in Metaphysics, also addresses the issue of the external 
world and how our curiosity of it is prompted by the unanswered desire manifest in action. It 
is when "things" fail to yield to our wishes, when we are disappointed in the reluctance of 
objects to bend to our will, that we come to recognize them as "beings". The example given is 
of a table which gives way when a hand is placed on it. Such an experience would convince 
one that the table is but an extension of the body. If, on the other hand, the table yielded when 
it was meant to be supporting the hand, then it would prove an "annoyance", and "when a 
thing annoys me, it poses a question to me; because I need it and cannot 'count on it', because 
it fails me" (88). Thus, Ortega y Gasset sees disappointment in the external world as the 
requisite prompt for metaphysical questioning. It also leads one to understand the outside 
world as foreign and distinct from the "1" (87). 
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In order to reach that state at which theoretical nothingness may be 
encountered face-to-face, Bergson proposes an exercise of wilful self- 
extinguishment. He first supposes that all sensorial perceptions can be 
blocked out, and in this way the "material universe sinks into silence and the 
night" (302). Once that realm fades away, he tries to "blot out and forget my 
recollections up to my immediate past", but in doing so the crux of the 
problem emerges: "at the very instant that my consciousness is extinguished, 
another consciousness lights up 
- 
or rather, it was already alight: it had arisen 
the instant before, in order to witness the extinction of the first" (302-303). Of 
course, if one is to recognize oneself as having been extinguished, there needs 
be a witness, another self, who is capable of testifying to the effacement of the 
primary self, "for the first could disappear only for another and in the presence 
of another" (303). 18 In summation, 
do what I will, I am always perceiving something, either from 
without or from within. When I no longer know anything of external 
objects, it is because I have taken refuge in the consciousness that I 
have of myself. If I abolish this inner self, its very abolition becomes 
an object for an imaginary self which now perceives as an external 
object the self that is dying away. (303) 
We find, then, that the mind is seduced into believing that the spectre of 
nothingness haunts all reality, both concrete and theoretical, and that the 
n'k 
absence of existence stealthily lingers around existence, threatening to envelop 
it at any moment (300-301). It is not entirely clear why the mind is so 
preoccupied with the nought, but it is possible that it finds in it a self- 
justificatory reason for its own existence. We know from Bergson that, living 
as we do in the world of solids (xix), our primary concern is executable action. 
" Again we recall Schopenhauer's "knower" and "known" (The World as Will and Idea 88). 
He also finds that there is no extinguishment of the self-conscious ego, and its tenacity he 
ascribes to the endurance of "will". 
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To this end, we are accustomed to viewing the external world in geometric 
terms, and we are fond of imagining that laws are immutable, constant, and 
predictable. Although there is at the core of our existence an intuitive 
consciousness cognizant of its own duration, for practical purposes we operate 
under the direction of our intellect, and in doing so we stray from the self- 
conscious impulse that resides in our hearts. Nevertheless, as we learned from 
Simmel and Ortega y Gasset, the self-conscious "I" reaches itself by way of 
the external world, for objects are produced that in turn inform our existence. 
In the procedure Bergson proposes above, we find that the abolition of all 
objects may, theoretically, be achieved, but that at the final moment the self 
cleaves itself once more, and so is able to keep the torch of consciousness 
alight while the former self slips away. It would seem, in these lines and in 
other passages in Bergson and Simmel, that the self is condemned to endless 
generation. To put it another way, before man is "condemned to be free", man 
is simply "condemned to be". Ortega y Gasset: 
I do not give myself life, but it is given to me; I find myself with it 
on finding myself with myself. But what is given to me when I am 
given life is the inexorable necessity of having to do something under 
the threat of ceasing to live. And not even in this am I free 
- 
because 
ceasing to live is also a form of doing [ 
... 
]. (89) 
It is ironic, considering that we are engaged in constant production and that we 
endure in a world increasingly over-populated by our own products, that we 
conceive of nothingness at all. Perhaps it is but another example of our 
geometrically inclined philosophy attempting to extend its reign over our inner 
lives as well; we tend towards dualisms, and so what else could oppose 
fruitfulness but barrenness, fullness but the void? It may be that the thought of 
nothingness serves as a great motivator, that we engage in the production of 
objects (again, to the end of achieving self-knowledge) more fervelitly than 
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ever when we sense the darkness of nothingness pushing ever closer. Bergson 
suggests that our fixation on the nought is simply the opposite face of the 
interests and desires we invest in the outside world. When we encounter that 
which we did not anticipate, or when we are confronted with a reality other 
than the one for which we hoped, we are disappointed, for a spanner has now 
been thrown in the works we were intending to execute for our own gain. In 
our exasperation, we state that we find the room in disarray, that "nothing" has 
replaced the item for which we were searching. 19 
These suppositions are but illusions in disguise, and these are the 
illusions in which we place so much confidence. At the core of the error is a 
flux between what we perceive externally and what we believe we perceive 
internally. Bergson suggests that at a point equidistant between these two 
poles, the concept of "nothingness" resides. However, in reality, this space 
that sits between subject and object is only virtual: 
the image of Nothing, so defined, is an image full of things, an image 
that includes at once that of the subject and that of the object and, 
besides, a perpetual leaping from one to the other and the refusal ever 
to come to rest finally on either. (304) 
This kind of "nothingness" is self-evidently replete with "somethingness", and 
thus cannot possibly be relied upon for a definition of the nought. 
Furthennore, because the process is predicated upon the wilful annihilation of 
the self, it incorporates, in spite of itself, "existence in general" (304). 
Bergson refutes the likely protest given by philosophers who suppose that the 
19 Bergson: 
In a general way, human work consists in creating utility; and, as long as 
the work is not done, there is 'nothing' 
- 
nothing that we want. Our life is 
thus spent in filling voids, which our intellect conceives under the influence, 
by no means intellectual, of desire and of regret, under the pressure of vital 
necessities; and if we mean by void an absence of utility and not of things, 
we may say, in this quite relative sense, that we are constantly going from 
the void to the full: such is the direction which our action takes. (323) 
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nought exists only as an idea. He likens such a proposition to the idea of a 
64square circle", the impossibility of which is immediately apparent. "An idea 
constructed by the mind is an idea only if its pieces are capable of coexisting; 
it is reduced to a mere word if the elements that we bring together to compose 
it are driven away as fast as we assemble them" (305). In this way, the 
"annihilation of everything" is only a word, according to Bergson, in the same 
way that a square circle contradicts itself at its first appearance on the tongue. 
The basic objection Bergson presents to the attaimnent of the nought via the 
annihilation of everything is that in order to suppose mentally one thing non- 
existent, it is necessary to replace it with another. In this way the substitution 
of "something" for "nothing" is carried on indefinitely. Thus, 
the representation of the void is always a representation which isfull 
and which resolves itsetf on analysis into two positive elements: the 
idea, distinct or confused, of a substitution, and thefeeling, 
experienced or imagined, ofa desire or a regret. (3 0 8, author's 
italics) 
In addition, it is crucial to recognize that the process by which we seek to 
uncover nothingness (we first imagine something and then imagine it non- 
existent) is a process predicated upon the idea of existence, upon the mental 
picture of something of which we can form a thought. If we wish to deny the 
existence of something (Bergson uses the general figure of "object A"), then 
we first must picture, or at least acknowledge to ourselves, the existence of 
object A. We then imagine that another entity has replaced this object. 
Practically speaking, if the absence of object A disappoints us, we envision 
another object having taken its place. 20 Due to the fact that the mind generates 
20 Bergson is vague in what he supposes may be the replacement object, but as he reminds us, 
we are dealing with theoretical existences here, and so it really does not matter what supplants 
object A: "it is useless to represent this latter reality explicitly; we are not concerned with 
what it is; it is enough for us to know that it drives out the object A, which alone is of interest 
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at least several concepts in its attempts to seize upon the nought, there is 
46more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as 'not existing' than in 
the idea of this same object conceived as 'existing"' (311). On a similar point, 
we find that affirmation "bears directly on a thing": we affin-n our findings 
when they reveal themselves to us according to our anticipations (313). 
Conversely, negation "aims at the thing only indirectly, through an interposed 
affirmation. 
... 
a negative proposition expresses a judgment on a judgment" 
(313). For the simple explanation that we cannot prove a negative, we instead 
judge our initial judgment, which itself is formed by the information relayed 
by the senses. 
21 
In brief summation, Bergson acquaints us with the elusive idea of 
"nothing" by proposing we investigate the processes by which we attempt to 
uncover the nought. It is customary to try and arrive at nothingness by 
performing the mental function of imagining an object and then imagining it 
non-existent, but Bergson proves to us that such an operation is in reality only 
the replacement of the initial concept with another thought, and so the result is 
22 
at least twice removed from "nothing" 
. 
Even when the mind supposes itself 
extinguishable, another consciousness rises up in place of the former to 
witness its predecessor's demise. The element of desire also cannot be 
ignored, for what we find we express in terms of what we hoped to find. To 
this end, we translate our disappointments into negation, but this negation does 
to us" (3 10). If, for example, we hope to locate object A on our desks, and we fail to find it 
where it is meant to be, it is not "nothing" that we find, but either another object instead or 
perhaps even a "blank" space. Still, that seemingly empty space is, in terms of molecules, 
atoms, and so on, not "empty" at all. 
21 Bergson gives the example of a table one encounters and judges to be black. Such a 
statement is a simple affirmation, but should one be disappointed with what one encountered, 
that is, if one expected to find a white table, the resulting statement would be, "This table is 
not white" (312-313). It is a logical impossibility to perceive the absence of the colour black, 
and so a judgment is cast on the initial judgment, and not the table (313). 
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not hold for, as previously proven, "there is no absolute void in nature" (305). 
And as with his theory of laughter, Bergson uncovers in negation a social 
cause. When we negate a presence, we implicitly suggest to "an interlocutor, 
real or possible" (and this shadowy figure may one's own self) that whatever 
he had previously been affirming must, by necessity, be replaced by 
something else (313): 
There is no longer then, simply, a person and an object; there is, in 
place of the object, a person speaking to a person, opposing him and 
aiding him at the same time; there is a beginning of society. 
Negation aims at someone, and not only, like a purely intellectual 
operation, at something. It is of a pedagogical and social nature. It 
sets straight or rather warns, the person warned and set straight being 
possibly, by a kind ofdoubling, the very person that speaks. (313- 
314, my italics) 
It is in the social signification of negation that we find partial justification for 
our belief in the nought. We have already learned that, as with the square 
circle, "nothingness" is but a word, and as Bergson reminds us, words 
symbolize concepts; it is in the realm of conceptual thought that our quotidian 
actions are executed (317). What is of particular interest at this point is the 
sociological significance Bergson identifies in negation. The didactic nature 
of negation is even more profound than that of affirmation, for with 
affirmation we have but one judgment, but in negation we have two; thus, 
twice as much information is being imparted. With regards to a theory of self- 
reflexivity, Bergson's words above, coupled with the procedure he describes 
for the ostensible attaimnent of the nought, establish a strong link between 
negation,, introspection, self-fragmentation, and social interaction. To invoke 
the nought, to illustrate one's disappointment in a given situation by retreating 
into the terminology of negation, is not just to express said disappointment, 
22 Does not the linguistic "double negative" function in the same way? 
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but more crucially to court correction, either of oneself or one's neighbours. 
Similarly, "the idea of annihilation is therefore not a pure idea; it implies that 
we regret the past or that we conceive it as regrettable, that we have some 
reason to linger over it" (320). The Futurists' and Dadaists' calls for 
annihilation are, in this light, to be recognized not as wanton nihilistic 
proclamations, but rather the voicing of a Romantic creative despair that spurs 
feverish creation even in the face of overwhelming cultural pessimism. 
Finally, the periphrastic expression of disappointment (for example, "This 
table is not white") misleads one to believe that the absence of white can be 
empirically established, and in the same way that error replicates itself to the 
point where we imagine that the self, like any other entity, is extinguishable. 
This often-repeated error is not without social value, however, for it compels 
man to keep his attention fixed on action. As he commonly sees it, the 
stealthily lurking spectre of the nought is forever threatening to erase his 
products and his very being. We can now comprehend how it is that the 
Dadaists, in spite of their superficially nihilistic calls for the abolition of art, 
were, in reality, an industrious group. 
Not the Nought, But the Self 
Having investigated Bergson's theory of the nought, we may now 
return to the question of the word "Dada". As stated in the beginning of this 
chapter, the name is a double affirmative, but the vehemence behind that 
emphatic affirmation, a negativity that appears, however briefly, in nearly 
every Dadaist manifesto and work, should be just as audible as the infamous 
"Yes yes". At the core of this nebulous movement, exemplified in its very 
Reynaga 166 
name, is the Dadaists' spirit for enantiodromia. For them, it was not enough 
to shuttle back and forth between the poles of affirmation and negation: 23 
It is ridiculous and a sign of idiocy exceeding the legal limit to say 
that Dada (whose actual achievements and immense success cannot 
be denied) is "only of negative value. " Today you can hardly fool 
first-graders with the old saw about positive and negative. (Huelsenbeck, "En Avant Dada: A History of Dadaism", Motherwell 
44) 
The Dadaists perceived that there was an overarching unity to uncover, and 
they set about this Herculean task with results that corroborate Bergson's 
theories discussed above. If we follow his line of thought, we find that a great 
deal of self-reflexivity informs the processes of affirmation and negation. In 
tracing the latter, we discover that the self is inextinguishable, and as the 
attempted attainment of the nought begins and ends with the self, the journey 
itself is illusory. It is only a word, and in a sense that word, at least for a brief 
period in the early twentieth century, was "Dada". Ribemont-Dessaignes may 
or may not have been aware of Bergson's theories when he composed his 
"Histoire de Dada" ("History of Dada", 193 1), but the characterization he 
provides of the movement is remarkably supportive of the latter's conclusions 
on the issue of the nought: 
the implications Of the movement went beyond literature and art. It 
aimed at the liberation of the individual from dogma, formulas and 
laws, at the affirmation of the individual on the plane of the spiritual; 
it may even be said that the movement liberated the individual from 
the mind itself, placing the genius in the same rank as the idiot. 
(Motherwell 102) 
23 As the greatest of all oppositions, "Affirmation" and "negation" (or, more basically, "Yes" 
and "No"), is the wellspring from which all other dualisms derive. The Dadaists proved that 
the distinction between these two poles was not only blurred at times, but that it was mutable 
and malleable even. Once this seminal dualism was revealed to be subject to flux, then all 
other traditionally acceptable dualisms became assailable. Ball is clearly speaking to this new 
condition when he writes, "He [the Dadaist] no longer believes in the comprehension of things 
from one point of view, and yet he is still so convinced of the unity of all beings, of the totality 
of all things, that he suffers from the dissonances to the point of self-disintegration" 
(12. VI. 1916, Flight Out of Time 66). We shall return to the issue of self-dis integration 
shortly. 
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What is here tenned the "spiritual" is equivalent to Bergson's invocation of 
metaphysical intuition. Thus, the "affirmation of the individual" may be 
understood as the informed self-consciousness achieved when external 
realities are processed not by the intellect but by intuition. The idea posited 
here, however (that the mind is capable of self-liberation), was disproved by 
Bergson, but what follows makes it clear that Ribemont-Dessaignes was more 
interested in illustrating the levelling effect of Dada than in proposing a valid 
method for self-effacement. In order to achieve self-liberation (in other words 
to immerse ourselves in the richness of duration rather than just attempting to 
conceptualise it) it is necessary to recognize that the nought is but a detour on 
the path to self-knowledge (Creative Evolution 324), and I maintain that the 
very name "Dada" does just this. We cannot visualize the affinnation it 
proclaims without questioning what is being denied, and so "Dada" is the 
condition at which we arrive after the academies have been swept clean, after 
nihilism and the nought have been revealed as detours or puerile sport. What 
is stated above is far from the conventional nihilism with which Dada is 
conventionally charged, for liberation implies a shedding of an outmoded and 
increasingly constrictive skin that no longer fits the blossoming body. 
Something more positive, something of greater value supplants the old laws, 
and from negation springs an ecstatic affirmation: an enantiodromia once 
again effects its power. 
The Italian Futurists, the French Cubists, and the German 
Expressionists, all immediate predecessors of Dada, revealed with great 
innovation and passion the subtext of endless contradiction and flux that 
pervaded even the most civilized and bourgeois of societies. The liberation of 
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typographical characters, the arrogation of militaristic belligerence, the 
embrace of the mechanical, and the integration of commercial products into 
the hitherto sacrosanct realm of the painter's canvas are all commonly 
identified with the Dadaists, but even a cursory survey of modemist European 
art would reveal the true origins of these developments. In fact, most pieces of 
Dadaist art are not as singular as we would be pressed to believe if we yielded 
to the movement's propaganda (Duchamp's readymades excepted for obvious 
reasons). Nevertheless, Dada clearly garnered for itself a legendary aura with 
which it has yet to part, no small achievement considering how far beyond the 
bounds of tradition and propriety much postmodernist art has gone. The 
negativity and the reactionary postures adopted in defence against the 
mediocrity of bourgeois culture do not belong to Dada alone, even though 
Dada constituted the pinnacle of such cultural protests. It was, rather, the 
realization at which the Dadaists arrived; the eternal poles of affin-nation and 
negation, construction and destruction, civilization and barbarism, and all the 
other dualisms that follow contained a vitality which suffused all cultural 
endeavours. Up until that point, artists, like their scientific, religious, and 
political brethren, trained their eyes and thus their disciplines on solutions that 
would somehow stabilize the system under scrutiny. What Dada contributed 
most significantly was an espousal of negativity, destruction, and barbarism, 
recognizing as it did that it was not a transcendence that was required (for 
others had already transcended the parameters proscribed by representation), 
but rather a transfiguration. 24 Even to the point of predicting and welcoming 
24 1 refer the reader to Birringer's article "The Struggle for Transfiguration in Modem Art", in 
which he identifies the seminal struggle of modem artists to be between the "transcendence of 
representation through the individuating spirit" and "a transfiguration through a move visceral 
experience of the 'secret soul of things"' (143). 
Reynaga 169 
its own demise, Dada understood, perhaps more insightfully than any 
preceding group, that "human beings became truly human only when they 
accept the smallness of their place within Creation, admit their dependence on 
the material world, and cultivate a respect for the natural powers that flow 
through and around them" (Sheppard 178). The objection may be made at this 
point that primitive art is the embodiment of precisely this ideal, and it is the 
doe-eyed innocence with which the primitives greeted their pantheistic world 
that suffuses early art and makes it so appealing to modem viewers. However, 
if we recall the great importance that Bergson ascribes to memory, we may 
extend without difficulty the parameters of the theory a bit further and come to 
speak of a collective social memory which governs a society9s present and 
future as much as an individual's memory does his own life. Then we find 
that the concretion of thousands of years of human experiences has rendered 
modem man cynical and pessimistic, and this is why the primitivism which 
Dada affects is but the invocation of an ideology that could not possibly carry 
any true validity in the modem world. In his Ober das Geistige in der Kunst 
Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 1911) Kandinsky opines in a similar way that 
the affinity which the modem artist holds for the art of the primitive is but a 
"spark", and the "doubt" that has taken hold of modem man (an apprehension 
that combines cynicism and dread in seemingly equal measure, and which 
derives from materialism) is what distinguishes him most significantly from 
his inspired ancestor (1 
-2). 
In the section of Modernism 
- 
Dada 
- 
Postmodernism entitled "Triune 
Dada and Camival Laughter", Sheppard addresses the three species of Dadaist 
humour: the "ebullient and anarchic joy", the "scathing satirical fierceness", 
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and, most importantly for our purposes, the "highly developed sense of self- 
irony" (198-199). Deriving in part from "Schlegel's Romantic Irony", the 
self-irony of the Dadaists "signifies [their] awareness that in a world in flux, 
the subjective point of view and human formulations are relative" (199). 25 
Sheppard continues: 
Self-irony guarantees an attitude of flexibility and openness toward a 
world of uncertainty. Self-irony functions as a means of checking 
blind enthusiasm and utopian dreams. [ 
... 
] Self-irony can even help 
one come to terms with mortality 
- 
which explains why the Dadaists 
cultivated an indifference toward the survival of their own artistic 
products. But finally, self-irony, the ability to stand back from 
oneself and laugh, betokens that there is a quality in human nature 
that is stronger than all the negative and disorienting pressures that 
play upon it. [ 
... 
] Ultimately, and despite all its provocative 
cynicism and uncomfortable subversiveness, the humor of Dada says 
"yes" to life 
- 
even if it cannot solve the philosophical problem that 
would be inherited by postmodernism of why it should say"yes" to 
anything at all. (199) 
The "self-irony" of which Sheppard writes operates within the realm of self- 
reflexivity, for it actively influences the self in which it originates, and serves 
to colour its relationship to the external world. Furthermore, we find 
Bergson's humourist (and his not-too-distant cousin, Baudelaire's comic man) 
lurking stealthily in Sheppard's words. To quote Bergson once again: 
When the humorist laughs at himself, he is really acting a double 
part; the self who laughs is indeed conscious, but not the self who is 
laughed at. (132) 
Combining what we have learned about the self-fragmentation of the 
humourist with the fragmentation exercises of the mind in search of absolute 
negation, we discover the answer to the riddle Sheppard quietly poses above. 
That "quality in human nature" which stands up to the lashings of 
25 Sheppard cites several examples of how the Dadaists championed relativist philosophy in 
their works. Most notably, he mentions that Van Doesburg granted Bergson the distinction of 
being a Dadaist. Unfortunately for Bergson, this relativism, based as it was on the almighty 
intuition, soon became for his critics a foray into anti-intellectualism and ultimately 
irrationalism. However, in his defence, such conclusions are based on biased analysis and 
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disorientating and destructive forces is much more than a simple quality. It is 
the immutable self that resists extinguishment, even attempted extinguishment 
by itself. It is the elan vital from which all creativity streams; it is the self- 
conscious soul that exerts a centripetal force upon its own products and 
organizes them around its core. Dada's brand of humour emphatically affirms 
life not simply because it is heavily informed by vitalist philosophy, but 
because it is the gesture of a movement that understood just how unavoidable 
the self really was. Thus, to speak of Dada as a group predicated upon a 
philosophy of nihilism is to utter a pure contradiction, as surely as affirmation 
is all that really exists, and the nought is no more than a mirage. I would even 
venture as far as to challenge Sheppard's suggestion that Dada ultimately 
stood silent before the postmodernist enigma of enforced affirmation. The 
most lucid of the Dadaists (and besides Schwitters I am thinking primarily of 
Duchamp and Ball, although others may of course be considered) intuitively 
understood that Dada had to say, "Yes yes" because "No", as pure negation or 
as a philosophical nought, never existed and so could never be found, 
precisely because the self was inextinguishable. 
Schwitters' Merzbau constructions, and in particular the Hanover 
Merzbau, encapsulate the modernist artist's ambition towards a "pure art" that 
is pure primarily in its "transfigurative" self-reflexivity. What Birringer 
suggests regarding this issue is especially applicable to Schwitters' most 
significant work: 
We could say that this idea of 'transfiguration, ' this search for pure 
forms which can transcend the objective, concrete world and all 
representational ballast that suggests and reminds us of the very 
contingency and impermanence of this world, is in itself almost a 
thus yield only specious characterizations. See Antliff 4 and Alexander 53 and 62 for more 
detailed arguments concerning the matter of Bergson's supposed unadulterated relativism. 
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metaphysical project, and it clearly denotes a spiritual protest against 
the materialism and positivism of our time. Paradoxically, the 
project announces itself rhetorically in the name of a heightened 
subjectivism, which means that it remains caught up with the 
dilemma the protest was directed against in the first place. (140) 
In the case of the Hanover Merzbau, the incorporation of found objects, 
enshrined in numerous "grottoes" similar in concept and construction to the 
displays of holy relics one encounters in Catholic cathedrals, speaks to "this 
search for pure forms". As is the case with Duchamp's readymades, these 
objects (and shortly I shall detail some of them) were seemingly objective 
products of a material world that bore the signature of the artist who collected 
and arranged them (like Fountain, 1917, and "R. Mutt"). The selection of the 
objects, the nearly obsessive care with which they were collected and 
incorporated into the work, and the move towards permanence they signified 
constitutes a "spiritual" enterprise of great importance to Schwitters. The 
Merzbau, as "a metaphysical project", partook of vitalist metaphysical 
philosophy (as understood in the contemporary works of Simmel and Bergson) 
that was in circulation at the time. It is noted repeatedly in books and essays 
addressing the complexities of the Merzbau that the creator constructed and 
encouraged the metaphysical flux that informed the project. Thus, we are 
reminded of Duchamp's "Large Glass", which was also several years in the 
making and left incomplete: 26 
26 An investigation into the similarities and differences between both projects, particularly as 
they function on vitalist principles, would yield a fruitful study. One of the greatest 
discrepancies between both works is the fact that Duchamp welcomed the encroachment of 
chaos (I refer to the accident that left the piece severely cracked and the collection of dust that 
inspired Man Ray's memorable photograph "Dust Farm", 1920). Contrariwise, Schwitters 
was loath to abandon his work when he was forced to emigrate in 1937, and the subsequent 
destruction of the Hanover Merzbau in an Allied bombing raid in October 1943 (Elderfield 
157) disturbed him greatly. Elderfield also looks to some comparisons between the artists, 
and concludes that a project of "dissociation" was central to both Duchamp's readymades and 
Schwitters' collages (235). 
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As [Schwitters] stated in an article from 1931 entitled "Ich und meine 
Zeile" ("Me and my work"), an article that appears as part of Merz 
21. erstes Veilchenheft, an issue of his Merzheft (Merz-journao and 
contains the first and most elaborate discussion of his Kathedrale, the 
work was, "in principle, always in flux. " (Gamard 5) 
Such a statement is perhaps too elementary to bear analysis unless we consider 
it in philosophical terms. Any work requiring revision or restoration may be 
said to be "in flux", but on a much more profound level, the Merzbau was in 
flux because it shuttled constantly between the subjective and objective poles. 
Furthennore, it flaunted that shuttling as one of its virtues. As a work that was 
consistently in progress, the Merzbau held various dialogues: with the artist, 
with the viewer, with itself, and with the realm of objects, both aesthetic and 
not, in which and with which it was conceived and executed. Before we 
interpret the Merzbau in terms of Simmel and Bergson's philosophies, let us 
first detail its construction and situate it in Schwitters' oeuvre. 
Out of Dada, Merz 
From the softly-hewn organic woodcuts of Arp to the politicised vitriol 
of Grosz's drawings, and from the esoteric cosmogony of the "Large Glass" 
and "Tu M"' (1918) to Man Ray's haunting Rayograms, Dada can only be 
labelled "a movement" for convenience's ake, for no movement (in the 
traditional sense) could hold so many discordances and still march behind a 
single tune. It was undoubtedly the sustained internationalism of Dada, a 
salient accomplishment considering the World War raging at the time, coupled 
with its open-door policy for all genres of artistic creation, that enticed 
divergent figures who under normal circumstances would never have cause to 
exhibit together. Daimonides' "Towards a Theory of Dadaism" provides a 
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rarely cited characterization of the group that speaks to its (supposed) all- 
encompassing nature: 
Dada's view of life takes account of all possible transcendence. Its 
horopter is thoroughly universal; so it is a misunderstanding, often 
enough criticised by qualified Dadas, to imagine that DADA limits 
itself even technically to being an art movement. (Dada Almanac 
64)27 
The metaphoric allusion to optometry speaks to the visual clarity with which 
Dada surveyed its domain. It would follow that a group whose merit rested 
with the appreciation of "transcendence" (to the point of welcoming a 
transcendence of its own parameters), which at various times counted among 
its members no less than the Son of Man, would readily receive a talent as 
unique and developed as Schwitters, but it is to the discredit of Dada that such 
an ignominious eschewal by Huelsenbeck in 1919 resulted in his official 
exclusion. Richter, in Dada: Art and Anti-Art, recalls with poignant regret the 
way in which Schwitters' "application" for admission to Club Dada in Berlin 
was refused by the self-proclaimed leader of the group, Huelsenbeck. In spite 
of proclaiming in his "En Avant Dada: A History of Dadaism" (1920) that 
"everyone can be a Dadaist" and that "Dada is not limited to any art" 
(Motherwell 28), Huelsenbeck took a nearly instant dislike to Schwitters, 
whom he characterized as unforgivably bourgeois, a heavy criticism at a time 
when the European avant-garde rallied behind an expressly anti-bourgeois 
code. Nevertheless, as much as one can speak of "true" Dadaism, it was 
Huelsenbeck who was the lesser Dadaist. As Elderfield states, the original 
2' The cursory biography of Daimonides, appearing in the Dada Almanac but composed by the 
editors of Atlas Press, erases at least some of the enigma behind this satellite Dadaist. He was 
otherwise known as Edgar Fim or Dr. Karl D6hmann, and he lived between 1892 and 1982 in 
Berlin. He was a venereologist and a Sanskrit scholar, and participated as a pianist at several 
Berlin Dada soirdes. Surely his profession, as well as his knowledge of Sanskrit, would have 
made him more than a welcome member of Berlin Dada, in spite of his lack of artistic 
credentials. 
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intentions of Dada (under its founder, Ball) were much closer to Schwitters' 
aesthetic concerns (34). When Huelsenbeck imported Dada to Berlin in 1917, 
it adopted a much more polemical, political flavour; his statement in "En 
Avant Dada" 
- 
"Dada is German Bolshevism" 
- 
unequivocally underlines his 
political interests (Motherwell 44). By the time Schwitters was seeking 
admittance to Berlin Dada, he was already at a disadvantage for having 
aligned himself with Sturm Expressionism: 28 
The first target of Berlin Dada was Expressionism, and especially 
Sturm Expressionism: its inwardness, its spirituality, its isolation 
from social conditions, its middle-class support. [ 
... 
] Schwitters' 
association with Der Sturm was an alignment to art, outside of social 
or political commitment. It was therefore, implicitly at least, anti- 
Dada. (Elderfield 34) 
It merits comment that the objections presented here, levied against 
"inwardness", "spirituality", social independence, and bourgeois "support" 
are somewhat insincere, considering that it was Zurich Dada that assumed 
these supposedly Expressionist qualities and incorporated them, albeit in a 
more refined form, into many of its plastic and literary works. Nevertheless, 
these four characteristics of Expressionism reveal themselves quite clearly in 
Schwitters' work, and so if Huelsenbeck objected to Sturm for these reasons, it 
is self-evident why he objected to Schwitters. The "inwardness" aspect of his 
aft, informed by his association with Sturm Expressionism (and ultimately 
derived from German Romanticism), is related to the self-reflexive nature of 
the Merzbau, and I shall be devoting much more time to this issue presently. 
For the moment, however, I wish to explore the other qualities noted above, 
28 Elderfield tells us that it was on 27 June 1918 that Schwitters "signed his name for the first 
time in the guest book of Herwarth Walden in Berlin and joined the Sturm group". He was 
not just a signatory, for he was also profoundly influenced by the movement: "the 
organization itself became the model from which Schwitters' own one-man movement, Merz, 
was developed" (30). 
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and how their incorporation led Schwitters to be declared unfit for active 
service in the army of the Berlin Dadaists. 
In the context in which it is presented here, "the expression 
ý spirituality' functions largely as a metaphor, hinting at imaginative 
possibilities that may promise new meanings for the connection between the 
work of art and the world it presents" (Birringer 138). It does not connote 
allegiance to a particular religious doctrine, although certainly it carne to its 
greatest fruition in the case of Ball. Rather than try and pinpoint precisely 
what such a nebulous ten-n entails, it serves our purposes better simply to 
oppose it, as Elderfield does, to the "extravert asceticism practiced by the 
Berlin Dadaists" (34) 
. 
29 There is more than a little spirituality contained 
between the walls of the Merzbau (more evident in fact than in many of the 
collages and assemblages), but certainly it is a spirituality known only to the 
artist. Schwitters was not a religious man, but he clearly displayed great 
devotion to the tropes and figures which populated his private universe. 30 
Schwitters' allegiance to his profession was particularly irksome to 
Huelsenbeck, who understood Dada to be "a philosophy that went beyond art 
into life itself' ("The Dada Dnn=er", in Memoirs of a Dada Drummer 63). 
The terminology employed by the artist in reference to his Merzbau does 
betray religious fervour, but again it is fervour that functions self-reflexively 
and is not directed towards an external God but rather back towards the work's 
29 Huelsenbeck's distrust of religiously derived spirituality is echoed in his rather dismissive 
characterization of Ball as "too honorable, too Roman Catholic, too something" ("En Avant 
Dada", Motherwell 33-34). 
30 He revered Anna Blume with a Marian devotion. Gamard puts great emphasis on 
Schwitters' spirituality as it pertained to what she erroneously calls "The Cathedral of Erotic 
Misery" (the Hanover Merzbau), and she interprets the work in terms of Christianity and 
German mysticism. Elderfield is much less inclined to search the Merzbau for shadows of 
Christian convention. Considering Schwitters' lack of religious faith, it seems t1lat Elderfield 
is much closer to the truth on this point. 
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creator. 31 Schwitters called the diminutive concavities "grottoes", and while 
some of them were populated with items selected by Schwittersfor Schwitters, 
others housed mementos donated by (and stolen from) friends. 32 The overall 
form of the work, with its vaulted ceilings, cavernous dimensions, and (in its 
later stages) secret chambers hidden beneath uniformly white walls, impresses 
one as a construction whose creative impulse must have been spiritual in 
origin; the Merzbau never seems as secular as Schwitters himself. 
We would be much more justified in interpreting the Merzbau in 
spiritual terms if its creator were a religious man, but by every account he was 
not. If we consider Ball and his Catholicism, which was in remission but 
nevertheless present during his Expressionist and Dadaist phases, we find that 
even in the years when he was less than religious, his writing was nevertheless 
infused with a profound spirituality. The difference here is that the spirituality 
we find in Schwitters' work is subservient to his personal elan vital, and at 
best lives with it symbiotically. The same may be said for the third objection 
Elderfield paraphrases above, that is, Berlin Dada's dissatisfaction with Sturm 
Expressionism's "isolation from social conditions". The phrase "social 
conditions" is here understood as commitment to social reform, and the 
political affiliations of the Berlin Dadaists proved their strong interest in 
31 The title "Kathedrale des erotischen Elends" ("Cathedral of Erotic Misery") is a common 
misnomer for the Hanover Merzbau, but Elderfield makes it clear that in spite of an early 
predilection for interchangeable names for his new structure, Schwitters recognized the 
"Cathedral of Erotic Misery" as only one column out of approximately ten from which the 
Merzbau grew (147). 
32 As it is the main premise of her thesis, Gamard focuses on the spiritual elements of 
Schwitters' Merzbau, although again, she is perhaps misled from the beginning by her 
misappropriation of the title "Cathedral of Erotic Misery". Still, her likening of the "grotto- 
reliquaries" to those found in Roman Catholic churches is sound and intriguing: "Much like 
Roman Catholic reliquaries, in which physical aspects (teeth, fingers, a piece of a martyr's 
clothing) specific to the various saints are stored, the presence of the various objects would 
elicit the presence of the individual's spirit or aura" (104). 
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achieving that reform through art. Huelsenbeck's ambition to this end is 
voiced in the following quotation from "En Avant Dada": 
In January 1917 1 returned to Germany, the face of which had 
meanwhile undergone a fantastic change. [ 
... 
] Berlin was the city of 
tightened stomachers, of mounting, thundering hunger, where hidden 
rage was transformed into a boundless money lust, and men's minds 
were concentrating more and more on questions of naked existence. 
Here we would have to proceed with entirely different methods, if we 
wanted to say something to the people. Here we would have to 
discard our patent leather pumps and tie our Byronic cravats to the 
doorpost. While in Zurich people lived as in a health resort, chasing 
after the ladies and longing for nightfall that would bring pleasure 
barges, magic lanterns and music by Verdi, in Berlin you never knew 
where the next meal was coming from. Fear was in everybody's 
bones [ 
... 
]. (Motherwell 39) 
It is much more than a banal observation to say that Berlin was a wildly 
different city demanding a wildly different existence. The severity of life 
there convinced Huelsenbeck and his followers that art could no longer be 
produced for the pleasure of the artist and his bourgeois patrons; the artist 
now bore a responsibility to "say something to the people". As surely as he 
was non-religious, Schwitters was also apolitical, and the paucity of references 
in his oeuvre to political events underlines his sustained disinterest. Perhaps 
Huelsenbeck would have been somewhat placated if Schwitters had shown 
even a modicum of sympathy for any political party, but as it was, 
"Schwitters, in his romantic idealism (which the petty bourgeois touch made 
rigid), was totally removed from my world of the intemational, the universal- 
intellectual, and philosophical" ("The Dada Drummer" 65). It is going too far 
to say that Berlin Dadaists under Huelsenbeck's guidance were politicos first 
and Dadaists second, but certainly after a period of free fall, Dada was once 
again forging an alliance with something outside of itself, something beyond 
purely aesthetic concerns. Yet Schwitters, by all accounts, was "an artist and 
nothing but an artist" ("The Dada Drummer" 64), and so it quickly became 
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self-evident that Club Dada had no room for such a traditionally minded 
Hanoverian, even if he was quite avant-garde. All of these other criticisms 
aside, it was really the bourgeois element of Schwitters that incensed 
Huelsenbeck the most. Or rather, it was the fact that Schwitters did not stray 
from his bourgeois origins and continued to live comfortably in Hanover, all 
the while working assiduously as an avant-garde artist. 33 
If we take into account the quintessence of Dada, which I suggest is its 
embrace of contradiction in the interest of mirroring the flux of modem life, 
then we must acknowledge that an artist who both adopted and eschewed its 
tenets would be an artist closest in spirit to the quiddity of the movement. "To 
be against this manifesto is to be a Dadaist" is a proclamation found at the end 
of one of the most stentorian of the Dada manifestos, Huelsenbeck's 
"Dadaistisches Manifest" ("Collective Dada Manifesto", 1920). 34 Or consider 
Tzara's "Manifesto of mr. aa the anti-philosopher" (reproduced in 
Motherwell's anthology), in which he confesses, "Take a good look at me! /I 
am an idiot,, I am a clown, I am a faker" (Motherwell 84). Shrewdly enough, 
the Dadaists understood that previous artistic movements offered polemical 
commentary on contemporary issues, but none had gone so far as to cast such 
systematic aspersion on their own justifications for existence. In order to 
distinguish themselves as much as possible, they trumpeted their own 
destruction, and bestowed honorary membership on figures who (technically 
33 Elderfield's analysis of Schwitters' short story "Revolution in Revon" includes the 
observation that the father of Merz was both an alien to the bourgeoisie of Hanover, as well as 
a member of it (167). In his two-fold relationship to the city of his birth, Schwitters "joins his 
self-image to two long-standing personifications of the contemporary artist" (167). For 
Elderfield, those two poles are represented by the figure of thefldneur, and the tangentially 
related (but distinct) personage of the "scavenger" (167-168): "This connoisseur's view of 
reality meant both that he found security in his Hannover world 
- 
by documenting and 
certifying it in his art 
- 
and that he refused its effect on him, moving passively and at random 
throughout its society converting everything in sight into an instant souvenir" (168). 
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speaking) existed outside the bounds of Dada, men such as Alfred Jarry, 
Arthur Cravan, and Jacques Vache. So for all of Huelsenbeck's distrust of 
Schwitters., is it not possible to see in him the essence of a true Dadaist? In his 
entry for 12 July 1916, Ball writes, 
The dadaist loves the extraordinary and the absurd. He knows that 
life asserts itself in contradiction, and that his age aims at the 
destruction of generosity as no other age has ever done before. He 
therefore welcomes any kind of mask. Any game of hide-and-seek, 
with its inherent power to deceive. (Flight Out of Time 65) 
To harken back to that familiar distinction between representation and 
presentation, would it not, in the context of such a self-conscious avant-garde 
movement as Dada, be far more valuable to present oneself as a contradiction 
in vivo than simply represent, in vitro, those same contradictions? And 
furthermore, could we not read Huelsenbeck's attacks on Schwitters as an 
extension of that great Dadaist innovation of guarding against complacency in 
all its insidious fonns? 
It is not the aim of this investigation to interpret Huelsenbeck's 
dismissal of Schwitters, although I would suggest that instances of dissension 
in the ranks of Dada, could prove useful in determining what precisely the 
parameters of the satellite groups were as understood by the constituent 
members. What is critical for our purposes is a recognition that the 
disaffection that drove Schwitters from any affiliation with Berlin's Club Dada 
led to his isolation from many would-be peers, which in turn engendered the 
creation of the Merz universe and ultimately what may be viewed as the castle 
of the Merz-kingdom: the Hanover Merzbau. The etymology of Merz is 
legendary by now, but to reiterate briefly, the name is a sort of "rectified 
readymade", lifted as it is from a sign adorning the "Kommerz- Und 
34 The manifesto is reproduced in Motherwell (242-246). 
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Privatbank" ("Commercial and Private Bank"). Although it was during the 
previous year that Schwitters began executing his characteristic collages and 
assemblages, it was only in July 1919 that his new brand of art was christened 
"Merz" (Elderfield 12). Prior to that date, Schwitters was primarily a 
naturalist painter, and his continued commitment to landscape painting, even 
in the years of his most aggressive avant-garde experiments, has proven a 
source of much consternation to art historians eager to delineate a more 
conventionally unidirectional progression from naturalist to abstract 
painting. 35 Here again we find evidence that Schwitters was an ]Ober-Dadaist, 
straddling as he did two poles of artistic allegiance commonly viewed as 
irreconcilable; this spirit of contradiction was at the heart of Schwitters, and 
so like Duchamp he was, paradoxically, more of a Dadaist for being 
(superficially at least) less of one. 
There is always traceable evidence, however, in an artist's juvenilia, 
and this is especially the case with Schwitters, who retained his fascination 
with nature painting to his death in 1948. Even in his early days as a painter, 
there was, as Elderfield observes, a fixation on surfaces, because Schwitters 
was preoccupied with "creating conceptual rather than perceptual symbols for 
objects 
... 
attempting, somewhat naively, to make the rendering of the motif 
serve expressive before descriptive ends" (15). A look at some of the early 
works such as "Landschaft aus Opherdicke" ("Landscape from Opherdicke", 
1917), and "Hochgebirgsfriedhof '("Mountain Graveyard", 1919) 
corroborates this characterization, for in these paintings the emphasis is 
squarely situated with the expression of the "innerer Klang" ("inner sound") as 
35 Schmalenbach summarizes the matter as follows: "That Schwitters never ceased to paint 
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theorized in Kandinsky's Concerning theSDiritual in Art. In the fonner piece, 
a heavy impasto technique is applied deliberately and with great effect, but 
slicing through the picture, on a diagonal plane, is a conspicuous wall whose 
colours are much lighter than the brooding greens on either side. Regarding 
Kandinsky's theories, it would be useful to apply them in an analysis of this 
painting and "Hochgebirgsfriedhof ', for both fall under the rubric of 
Expressionism and Kandinsky's treatise was of seminal importance to the 
German Expressionists at that time. In the Opherdicke painting, various tones 
of green dominate, but most striking is the heavy green of the trees in the 
upper half of the painting. The colour is so intense in places as to border on 
black, but along the top of the wall (which is flat) we find, nearly centred in 
the composition, a light yellow surrounded by shades of blue, its 
complementary colour. The weighty pensiveness of the piece is attributable to 
the abundance of green, which, according to Kandinsky, "is the most restful 
colour that exists" (3 8). Green is more than restful, however, as the theory 
states that "pictures painted in shades of green are passive and tend to be 
wearisome" (38). 
- 
The connotations in Kandinsky's mind are clearly 
pejorative, as he continues on with this characterization: "In the hierarchy of 
colours green is the 'bourgeoisie' 
- 
self-satisfied, immovable, narrow" (3 8). 36 
The constituent colours that produce green, yellow and blue, are given much 
attention in Kandinsky's writings, for in them he finds two opposing 
from nature, by no means just for a livelihood but often with unmistakable enthusiasm, is 
continually surprising 
- 
and even to his contemporaries it seemed exceedingly strange" (76). 36 Without stretching the comparison too far., it is worth mentioning that Schwitters displays 
an affinity for the colour green, and he even wrote a poem entitled "Grilnes Kind" (Green 
Child) around 1918. Green is perceived by Germans to be the colour of romance, and of 
course it connotes blossoming vegetation and thus spring and summer fertility. The word 
shares its Old Teutonic root with "grow". It would be yielding to temptation to suppose that 
Schwitters' use of the colour is linked to his cultivation of bourgeois sensibilities, but at least 
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tendencies. The first, associated with yellow, is the tendency to portray 
warnith, action, and an earthly feel. More specifically, yellow possesses what 
we shall term (borrowing the vocabulary of thermodynamics) an "exothermic" 
property, which is to say it extends its energy out to the viewer. In contrast, 
blue (as the "heavenly colour") connotes coolness and "repose", and it is an 
44endothermic" colour in that it draws in upon itself, forever in retreat from the 
viewer's eye. Returning to the Opherdicke landscape, we find that the greens 
employed are primarily more blue than yellow, and thus they partake more of 
that endothermic restfulness and coolness than if they were more slanted 
towards yellow. The violets that enter the upper left-hand comer of the picture 
and contribute to the patchwork of shades on the left side of the wall are the 
coldest shades of the piece, displaying as they do a heavy reliance on blue: 
Just as orange is red brought nearer to humanity by yellow, so violet 
is red withdrawn from humanity by blue. [ 
... 
I Violet is therefore 
both in the physical and spiritual sense a cooled red. It is 
consequently rather sad and ailing. It is worn by old women, and in 
China as a sign of mourning. (Kandinsky 41) 
Wann yellow accents pepper the scene, but it is the sunlit segment of the wall 
that commands the most attention. The wall is drawn so that it retreats into the 
background, but what is most curious is that the progression of colours along 
the top side of it imply a movement towards the viewer, and so the colours 
perform the opposite function as the perspective in the painting. 
As previously quoted, Elderfield perceives the painting (and others 
executed around the same time in Opherdicke, where Schwitters spent his 
honeymoon) to be rather flat, due to the fact that the artist was "exaggerating 
for our purposes it suffices to say that in this painting (and in some others) the strength of the 
colour calls for quietude and "equanimity". 
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the tactility of the surface, while keeping the color of a fairly even intensity 
and restricted range of hues" (14). As a result, we are confronted with a 
landscape that does not spread its magnificence before the viewer, but remains 
static and even somewhat introverted. The unanticipated splash of yellow in 
the centre of the work is jarring and adumbrates the curious pieces of script or 
other foreign materials that appear in the later Merz assemblages, pieces that 
stand out from the background and often determine the works' titles. 37 We 
need not make an attempt to reconcile the contradiction between the 
introspective colours of blue and green and the stridency of the yellow, for 
what matters here is that Schwitters, even in this early period, self-consciously 
exploited contradictions in his work (and beyond), and at least in this regard 
he remained a staunch Dadaist. However, "Mountain Graveyard" appears to 
be Romantic in inspiration and Expressionist in execution, and we may infer 
that such a painting found a home in Huelsenbeck's armoury of invective 
directed against Schwitters. 38 Primary colours dominate "Mountain 
Graveyard", but green also makes a notable appearance, as does black. 
Wheels and schematically drawn churches are motifs employed time and again 
in Schwitters' work, particularly in some of the Aquarelles and the Rubber 
Stamp Drawings. Of course, the painting is immediately reminiscent of 
37 Assemblages like "Merzbild 32A. Das Kirschbild" ("The Cherry Picture", 192 1) and the 
Constructivist- inspired reliefs such "Merzbild 1924,1. Relief mit Kreuz und Kugel" ("Relief 
with Cross and Sphere") prove my point. In the former, a rectified readymade card (which 
appears to be the sort used to teach children foreign languages) with a simple colour drawing 
of a bunch of cherries framed by the words "Kirchen" and "Cerises" sits fmnly in the centre 
of a field of coloured scraps of paper, newspaper clippings, pieces of wood and other 
ephernera. The red ball of the relief construction, which is vertically but not horizontally 
centred, exudes a warmth that is less aggressive (but more permanent) than the yellow 
rectangle besides it. 
38 Elderfield suggests that the work probably predated the first "Membilder", also finished in 
1919, and that it could have been the piece misnamed in the catalogue for the January 1919 
Der Sturm show (387). It was also exhibited at the Kunstverein in Jena in the months of May 
and June 1919 (387). 
T) 
- 
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Caspar David Friedrich's Romantic mountains punctuated by crosses, and 
Gamard recognizes as much when she reads the piece in conventional 
religious terins. On the other hand, Elderfield finds in "Mountain Graveyard" 
early evidence of the artist's preoccupation with wheels and pulleys, forms 
with which he became very familiar when he was working at the Wiffel 
ironworks between 1917 and 1918 (26). There is something mechanistic 
about the piece, perhaps because it too appears to be more a matter of surface 
than depth, and it is difficult to read conventional religiosity into a flat and/or 
mechanistic picture. Returning briefly to Kandinsky's colour theory, we find 
that in places where the background could have indicated a retreating 
perspective, the areas are painted in glowing hues of yellow, and so the 
opposite effect is achieved; these segments move towards the viewer. 
Furthermore, we notice in this painting and in "Landscape from Opherdicke" 
that the detennined partitioning of certain areas (Schwitters uses strong black 
lines to indicate where one fonn ends and another begins) contributes to the 
flatness effect. Elderfield attributes these lines to the artist's attempts to 
resurrect motifs lost beneath "a dense, clogged surface of even and 
uninteresting uniformity": 
Schwitters was impelled, therefore, to reinforce his compositions 
with a different kind of drawing, both to excavate the motif from the 
surface and to provide stability and accent for his painting. He would 
put in accents, nearly always in lines of dark paint, emphasizing 
salient contours of the motif. [ 
... 
] The result of this is that the 
paintings seem to contain two quite specific methods of handling. In 
"Landschaft aus Opherdicke", the interiors of the different forms 
almost fuse with each other to create a generalized green mood. The 
drawing is left to carry the burden of information about the motif. 
This separation of drawing from painterly surface continues to be 
crucial in his development owards abstract art. (15) 
These decisive lines, it may be reasoned, are the predecessors of the discrete 
borders created by the juxtaposition of the collage elements such as newspaper 
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scraps and pieces of fabric. In later works, the demarcation is more 
pronounced, particularly in assemblage constructions like "Merzbild 1924,1. 
Relief mit Kreuz und Kugel" ("Relief with Cross and Sphere"). Another 
consideration to take into account is what Elderfleld identifies as Schwitters' 
marriage of "rural" and "urban iconography" (26). In "Mountain Graveyard", 
the stylised Romantic imagery is played off against an impersonal, 
mechanistic style and assortment of primary colours. 39 
In 1917 "Schwitters' art thus broke through to abstraction", an 
observation supported by the emergence of a series of paintings done in 
Futurist/Cubist style (19). 40 Certain works, like "Z57 Abstraktion" 
("Abstraction", 1918), resemble Futurist paintings such as Carlo Carra's 
"Interpenetration of Planes", 1913. Elderfield finds in the more sophisticated 
pieces in this group of paintings "a clear two-part structure of loosely gestural 
tone painting and tense linear scaffolding", and he attributes this development 
to the influence of Cubism (23). It was not so much that Schwitters sought to 
adhere to particular tenets of either Expressionism or Cubism, for he was 
always an artist whose primary allegiance was to himself rather than to any 
school or group. Many artists encounter new influences and ideologies and 
incorporate them into revised styles, immersing themselves to the point of 
saturation only to be seduced by the latest trend. Schwitters, however, is often 
39 A similar painting, entitled "Abstraktion 19 (Entschleierung)" ("Unveiling", 1918), is 
interpreted by Elderfield as a "bridge" between nature and the metropolis (26). 
40 Schwitters was keen to organize his works into descriptive categories and sub-categories. 
For example, he named the Expressionist paintings from around 1917 "Expressionen", the 
abstract works that followed "Abstraktionen", the watercolours "Aquarelles", and so on. Most 
notably, the Merz oeuvre was partitioned into "drawings", and "pictures", as well as "relief 
assemblages" and "large collages". Although the system is not entirely reliable for historical 
classification purposes, it does speak to Schwitters' fastidious nature, at least in his earlier 
years as an artist. On page 49 and in footnote number 9 on page 390, Elderfield delves into 
the complexities of Schwitters' system and explains it in great depth. In any case, 1921 was 
the year in which such rigorous classification ceased. 
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credited with conserving influences; as much as he was loath to discard his 
seemingly insignificant objets trouves, he was equally loath to move beyond 
former styles. Thus, we are confronted with the retention of Post- 
Impressionist naturalist landscapes, even into his last year, and we find that 
elements of Expressionism, Cubism, Dadaism, and Constructivism all 
continue to populate the Merz universe. It was as if Merz was set tumbling 
down the modernist slope, and as it rolled it accumulated and assimilated the 
various (and often contradictory) styles over which it passed. Yet at its core it 
retained its inscrutable essence, and what provided it with its unity (in the face 
of all these competing influences) was the centripetal force of the artist. 
"The confusion is like that of a kaleidoscope, which though possessing a 
life of its own, belongs to another sphere". 41 
Moving quickly through the chronology of Schwitters' artistic 
development, we arrive next at the enigmatic but thoroughly pleasing "Dadaist 
drawings", appearing in 1919, the same year as the official advent of Merz. 
Many are watercolours, hence the designation "Aquarell" (or "Aq. " as 
Schwitters often wrote), but Schmalenbach and Elderfield include them in the 
genre drawings and page designs such as the one that served as the cover for 
"Anna Blume, Dichtungen" (1919). 42 They seem to partake of a consistent 
narrative whose characters include "isolated heads in profile, hands, eyes, 
hearts, pots, wheel, churches, umbrellas, windmills, coffee mills, little railroad 
trains, animals, fish, arrows, and sketched typographical elements such as 
4 1 The quotation is Kandinsky's, appearing in his section entitled "Theory" (Concerning the 
Spiritual in Art 47). 
42 Elderfield recognizes two distinct groups of "early graphic art": Dadaist and rubber-stamp 
drawings (44). 
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letters and numbers" (Schmalenbach 78). 43 Bearings are easily lost in these 
works, as inverted figures float by in a realm of suspended coordinates. 
Schmalenbach assesses the drawings in terms of typical Dadaist 
"discontinuity": 
But the unity of the pictorial space is suspended: discontinuity 
prevails in the relation of part to part. Fragments of the objective 
world are "senselessly" juxtaposed and brought together in a new 
relation that more or less makes new sense. Here a Dadaist principle 
enters in: objects that in "reality" do not belong together are brought 
into "random" association by being combined in pictorial space. (78) 
However, in spite of courting chance, nonsense, and even anti-sense, Dada 
established perhaps more solidly than any preceding group that rando=ess 
still yielded order and that nonsensical juxtapositions still engendered 
narratives. Duchamp's endeavours to evade "style" and "taste" by selecting 
commercially produced objects at predetermined moments resulted in an 
oeuvre that was still his own (and thus subject to his whim and personality) 
and upon which critics still continue to inscribe their interpretations. The 
Surrealists, likely aware (after dabbling in Dadaist projects) that sense 
prevailed after all, returned with automatic drawings which very much 
resemble Schwitters' watercolours. Simmel explained this effect by 
suggesting that the self-conscious soul exerted a centripetal force over the 
objects it created as well as encountered, and we recall that through this 
process the soul substantiates its own existence and creative powers. As a 
result, culture is made. We also recall that in An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Bergson established that the presentation of diverse images could lead the 
reader or viewer, via his intuition, to the point at which the underlying 
duration could be apprehended. Therefore, two possible methods present 
43 Elderfield produces a similar list, but adds "buckets", "houses", and "pin-figures" (45). The 
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themselves, although both arrive at the same result. If we interpret these 
seemingly nonsensical works according to Simmel's theory, we infer that 
Schwitters was subject to that self-conscious, uneradicable "I" that manifested 
itself by generating forms. 44 Although these characters superficially appear to 
be chosen at random, upon further reflection the viewer concludes that their 
very inclusion presupposes deliberation on the part of the artist, however brief. 
Having been created by the same hand, they must bear relation to one another. 
Suppositions are confirmed again when the viewer encounters the same 
characters in other works, for then it appears that the artist clearly possessed 
an affinity for the objects. In this way anti-sense is proven to be a fallacy. If 
we look to Bergson on the matter, we reach the same conclusions, albeit from 
the perspective of the viewer. Initially perplexed by the pig's tail extending 
from the backside of the diminutive chapel, the viewer remains befuddled 
when he is confronted by animals that are vaguely familiar but still 
unclassiflable. 4' Hearts as simplistic as those found on Valentine's Day cards 
jostle with little trains reminiscent of childhood toys, and such odd couplings 
startle the viewer as much as the mental visualization of Lautreamont's sewing 
machine atop an operating table. Intellectual analysis betrays its own 
shortcomings when it is invoked in the interpretation of such works, for an 
artist working at a creative pitch does not create by the light of his intellect; 
thus, we cannot rely upon ours to uncover his creative impetus. These works 
ppmt is that in these busy works many characters reappear in a variety of permutations. 
" We understand "forms" in this context to mean both the characters of the drawings and the 
drawings themselves. 
45 Schwitters' recombined birds are redolent of the frightening chimerical beasts that populate 
the earthly and hellish landscapes in Hieronymus Bosch's paintings, but of course the former 
are much more benign. 
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originate in another faculty, and so we employ our faculty of intuition and find 
that connections begin to reveal themselves. To quote Bergson once again: 
No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images, borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the 
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point 
where there is a certain intuition to be seized. (14) 
That "certain intuition" may or may not be the one that guided the hand of the 
artist, but it is likely to be in sympathy with it. In this way, the artist has "won 
over" his audience by circumventing realism and intellectual analysis at the 
same time. He has managed to lay himself bare through the medium of his 
art. 46 Either way, such abstract pieces function self-reflexively, but whether 
Simmel or Bergson's theory prevails depends on whether we believe the 
pieces were self-consciously designed to such an end. As indiscriminately 
juxtaposed as these figures seem at first, there is an ease and fluidity that 
suffuses the "Aquarelles" and renders them successful 
- 
they are far too 
advanced to be considered experiments, in spite of their affected juvenile 
hand. 47 
Emphasizing the movement of the works, Dietrich contrasts their 
depiction of flux to the relative stability of preceding pieces: 
All elements are thrown together in a seemingly haphazard manner, 
irrespective of scale and perspective, and drawn in an abbreviated, 
sketchlike manner in a self-conscious reference to children's 
drawings. There is a pervasive sense of movement in these drawings 
that Schwitters, further accentuates with arrows and overlapping 
circles. (85) 
46 Elderfield writes that the viewer reconstructs the narratives of the "Aquarelles" "through the 
dual mechanisms of synecdoche and metonymy". He finds that each figure metonymically 
replaces its referent, and likewise the figures indicate by way of synecdoche the world(s) from 
which they originate, worlds that are "domestic", "industrial", or "quaintly archaic". These 
devices lead us to "look for affinities, or causal connections", and eventually to "discover in 
each of these drawings a fictional universe in which the original functions and meanings of the 
objects it contains have been altered" (45). 
4' Dietrich qualifies the series as "experimental", but in the same paragraph she attests to their 
importance in Schwitters' artistic development (84). 
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Throughout his career, Schwitters was preoccupied with lines, circles, and 
other geometric forms. In those early post-Impressionist and Expressionist 
paintings, heavy black lines delineated prominent motifs, but as their 
composition was so decisive and the motifs were comparatively less so, they 
gained aesthetic significance beyond their original meaning. 48 Concerning the 
"Abstraktionen" series, Elderfield speaks of "a clear two-part structure of 
loosely gestural tone painting and tense linear scaffolding", a description 
strongly reminiscent of the emphasized borders in "Landscape from 
Opherdicke" (22). The lines in the "Abstraktion" paintings are "sometimes 
curved but more often tense, sharp and abbreviated", and they constitute a 
"skeletal framework" that is much more exo- than endo- in appearance. There 
is clearly an evolution behind the vector lines displayed in the "Aquarelles", 
and so we dispute Dietrich's claims that "the drawings come as a surprise in 
Schwitters' oeuvre", and that "nothing in his earlier work prepares us for their 
inventive playfulness, their degree of abstraction, and their radical new style" 
(85). It is true that the series (to which approximately forty works belonged) 
is striking at first and appears discordant with the rest of the paintings, but I 
would argue that in reality, they are a focused maturation of some earlier 
preoccupations. Again, Schwitters was not the kind of artist to move through 
a style and leave it behind, and so it is that after some reflection and a little 
analysis, we come to the realization that the "Aquarelles" constitute but one 
possible line of development in Schwitters' art. 
"' Elderfield concludes that the "separation of drawing from painterly surface", as evidenced 
in early works like "Landscape from Opherdicke", foreshadowed years of preoccupation with 
surfaces (15), a fixation that came to fruition in the collages and assemblages, as well as in the 
Merzbau projects. 
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This series is by far the most vitalist of all of Schwitters' painterly 
works, and so a Simmelian/Bergsonian interpretation is in order. Let us focus 
one on exemplary watercolour work, "Aq. 23, Koketterie" ("Coquetry", 1919). 
Firstly, the viewer is drawn to the centre of the picture, where a yellow 
struthioid creature is stepping across the roof of a nondescript building, on the 
near side of which the numerals "I", "2"5 'T' and "4" appear (in that order). 
The building extends from the lower middle to the lower right-hand comer of 
the field, and at what would presumably be its entrance, we find a floating eye 
whose sclera is shaded light pink and whose pupil is dark and exaggerated. 
Moving diagonally towards the upper left-hand comer, we notice that the feet 
of the "bird" echo in shape, cOlour, and orientation the eye beneath. The eye 
reappears just left of centre at the very top of the picture, but this time it is 
connected (by a slightly crooked line) to the eye of the "bird". This third eye 
belongs to a kite-like figure which is either drifting into or out of view, for like 
the building it is truncated by the border of the painting. Across the top edge, 
to the right, is a circle of which approximately one-sixth is segmented by a 
rod. The final noteworthy figure is a man balancing upside-down on a curved 
line. He is more or less a stick figure, with no discernible facial features (his 
head is far too small to accommodate any) but nonetheless he sports a hat. As 
already mentioned, the "bird" is predominantly yellow, and yellow appears 
beneath the eye at the entrance of the building, in a lighter hue on the roof of 
the building, on the segment of the circle, on the near face of the kite, and on 
the trousers of the man. Most of the remaining colour is given over to pale 
shades of green done in gentle washes, except for the area immediately around 
the head of the upside-down man. A light cornflower blue, some dark grey, a 
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few splashes of light pink, and a chalky black are the only other colours 
an 
, 
pearing in the composition. 
"Coquetry" is populated by figures that reappear in Schwitters' other 
Dadaist drawings. The "bird", the inverted stick-figure, the free floating eye, 
the kite, the circle, and the numbers must, either singly or in various 
permutations., represent a private world known only to Schwitters. If we 
follow Elderfield's line of reasoning, we may interpret the figures according to 
the synecdochic or metonymic devices, and so by the first method, circles 
come to signify the wheels of machinery of which Schwitters became 
increasingly enamoured. The line of vision between the eye of the kite and 
that of the "bird" is literally Made manifest in the picture, and thus it signifies, 
metonymically, the attraction, the "coup de foudre", resonating between the 
figures (perhaps this tangible magnetism between the two was the titular 
flirtation Schwitters had in mind). Dietrich reads the narrative of this piece 
and others in the series metaphorically, and finds that in his employment of 
mundane objects in fantastical orientation to one another, Schwitters taps into 
the language of Expressionism only to subvert it (104). 49 It is possible to 
analyse the images contained in these unusual works metaphorically, and in 
this way to recognize in the "bird", for example, a folkloric yearning for a 
reconnection with the natural world, but I would argue that to do so is to focus 
too closely on details that were selected to be enigmatiC. 50 Therefore, let us 
49 In tracing the trope of inversion in this series, she arrives at the conclusion that Schwitters 
was playfully invoking the theme of the "World Upside Down" (104): "Schwitters's images 
of inversion offer a space for artistic experimentation, but serve to reconfirm hierarchical 
order. His chaos is a chaos to be explored and restructured... " (106). 
50 Compare Marc Chagall's domesticated fowl and other farm animals, which were invoked in 
an effort to sustain the folkloric quality of the artist's work. In the case of Chagall, the 
invocation of rustic nature is part and parcel of his vision to preserve his provincial heritage, 
while Schwitters returns to nature partly for inspiration but mostly in order to juxtapose and 
play its organic feel off his mechanistic urban materials. 
Reynaga 194 
gather an overall impression and use it as our starting point for a closer look at 
the work. 
The most cohesive theme to reveal itself is that of movement and flux, 
and the paintings are composed in such a way as to emphasize the motion of 
the narratives they depict. Firstly, the inversion of many of the figures, such 
as the upside-down man in "Coquetry", imparts to the viewer the sense that 
the characters were tossed into the air and then sketched as they were in 
freefall. We recall that at about the same time, several of the Dadaists were 
experimenting with similar procedures in the interests of tapping into the 
spontaneity of chaos and chance and depicting their effects on various objects. 
Duchamp's "Three Standard Stoppages" is one such work, and the three 
51 pieces of string were, reportedly, set in the positions in which they fell. In a 
similar way, Arp (whimsically at first) produced a work that also sought to 
capture the hidden logic of chance as it manifested itself on scraps of paper. 52 
Schwitters at this point has not yet transcended the constraints of pictorial 
convention, but he is clearly involved in an attempt to channel the kinetic 
energy inherent in motion and apply it to a two-dimensional surface, To this 
end, he not only uses the inversion of figures and (seemingly) a haphazard 
distribution of motifs, but he also resorts to the much more fluid medium of 
watercolour, a far cry from those impasto-laden Expressionist landscapes. 
Furthermore, the undulating effects evident in the application of the pastel 
paints, in some areas no more than the gentlest of colour washes, enhances the 
" The method behind this piece, and some critical commentary concerning its place in 
Duchamp's oeuvre, is provided in Cabanne's Duchamp & Co. (89). 
52 The anecdote is told by Richter, who credits the episode with leading Dada to the 
conclusion "that chance must be recognized as a new stimulus to artistic creation. This may 
well be regarded as the central experience of Dada, that which marks it off from all preceding 
artistic movements" (5 1). 
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fluid movement of the picture. It appears as if the colour has softly drained 
from the regions of heavier colouration, such as the darker green surrounding 
the inverted stick-figure. There is also the hastily applied lines of pencil, 
which appear somewhat more deliberate in this piece but less so in others like 
"Aq. 1, Das Herz geht vom Zucker zum Kaffee" ("The Heart Goes from Sugar 
to Coffee", 1919). Other works in the series have motion lines drawn in as 
they would appear in a cartoon, but again, in this "Aquarell" the lines exist for 
purposes of shading rather than the suggestion of movement. The kite-figure, 
floating into the frame of view, is a motif employed to portray a quiet and 
drifting kind of motion. The numbers, arranged in standard counting order, 
beg continuation, which is why they may appear on the side of the building 
whose nearest edge is cut short by the picture's border. Finally, in what is 
maybe the most significant inversion of all (a figurative, not literal inversion, 
that is) the animal commonly representative of flight is grounded, at least 
temporarily, as it strides along the roof; its wing is rendered vestigial by crude 
pencil lines and awkward positioning. What Schwitters presents in this piece, 
and in others similar to it, is his intuition of movement, and by doing so he 
skilfully leads the viewer to their own personal intuition as well. The lively 
tumbling of the figures, suspended momentarily in their free fall, is apparent at 
even the most cursory glance. Dietrich sees a threatening chaos in these 
paintings: "the entry into that world is a violent, fragmenting birth... " (93), 
but I would argue that the levity of the motifs, and the playfulness with which 
they are imbued, proves that the world may be chaotic, but it is still benign. 
Although he frequently courted other kinds of oppositions, Schwitters was 
never really a polemicist like Grosz or a truculent critic like Picabia. His work 
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exists unto itself, and for this reason he is preoccupied mostly with aesthetic 
concerns rather than socio-political ones. In the "Aquarelles" he is much more 
concerned with the depiction of motion, but that depiction is limited to a two- 
dimensional surface where little illusion of depth is offered. With regards to 
the illustration of flux, we recall Bergson's notion of mobility: 
There is a reality that is external andyet given immediately to the 
mind This reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the 
making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states, exist. 
Rest is never more than apparent, or, rather, relative. The 
consciousness we have of our own self in its continual flux 
introduces us to the interior of a reality, on the model of which we 
must represent other realities. All reality, therefore, is tendency, if we 
agree to mean by tendency an incipient change ofdirection. (n 
Introduction to Metaphysics 55) 
Schwitters provides an assortment of figures and motifs and gives the viewer 
only the barest necessities of representation. The viewer has thus been led to 
an intuition of mobility much more immediately than if the artist had opted for 
conventional methods of illustrating motion. The ludic quality of "Coquetry" 
serves to conceal the complex mechanism beneath the narrative of the picture, 
a mechanism by which Schwitters lays bare his preoccupations and coaxes the 
viewer to construct their own narrative from the fragments he provides. This 
work directly prefigures the Merzbilder in that fragments borrowed from a 
fragmented society are entrusted to the viewer's interpretation. In the 
Merzbilder, they become the elements of collage and assemblage 
- 
paper 
scraps, broken pieces of commercial products, and so on. "Coquetry" as a 
whole is thus also an inversion, for it inverts the tradition of realist painting by 
which an artist produces a painted narrative and presents it as afait accompli 
to his audience. For this reason, this watercolour and others like it fall under 
the rubric of "meta-art", and thus reside within the realm of self-reflexive art. 
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As much as this series prefigures the collages and assemblages of 
"Merz", it was not until Schwitters was fully engaged in the construction of 
his "Merz" universe that the self-reflexive nature of his art came to fruition. 
In 1920 he composed an article that first appeared in the January 1921 Munich 
periodical "Der Ararat" (Elderfield 41). The title, appropriately, is "Merz". 53 
In this rather lengthy piece, Schwitters gives his account of the evolution of 
his art and how it was that he arrived at his own branch of Dada. He begins by 
describing in (intentionally) tedious detail how an artist learns to "paint after 
nature". Although he conscientiously relates the method of reproducing the 
model with photographic accuracy, he peppers the description with dismissive 
statements: "This you can learn if you are in good health and not color blind", 
"All this can be learned". and "That is academy" (57-58). He continues: 
I beg the reader's pardon for having discussed photographic painting 
at such length. I had to do this in order to show that it is a labor of 
patience, that it can be learned, that it rests essentially on 
measurement and adjustment and provides no food for artistic 
creation. For me it was essential to learn adjustment, and I gradually 
learned that the adjustment of the elements in painting is the aim of 
art, not a means to an end, such as checking for accuracy. (58) 
The reader is here presented with a valuable insight into Schwitters' idealistic 
idea of what the essence of art should be, and to what (unfortunately) it is 
customarily reduced. His insistence on "ad ustment" echoes what Elderfield i
was quoted earlier as saying; Schwitters' art remained a matter of surfaces 
and the juxtaposition of his "pictorial elements", how they articulated with one 
another, was of seminal importance. 54 According to Schwitters, the move to 
Expressionism occurred when ambition towards "the personal grasp of nature" 
53 The article is reproduced in full in Motherwell's anthology (55-65), and so all quotations 
and page numbers refer to that translation (given by Ralph Manheim). 
54 It is because Schwitters was so concerned with that articulation of elements that his art 
remains an art of surfaces, and the focus on surfaces provides the forum for an art of 
juxtaposition. 
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supplanted the attaimnent of photographic accuracy. The realistic 
representation of nature was used to formulate expression, but soon it became 
apparent that "the striving for expression in a work of art" was "injurious": 55 
Art is a primordial concept, exalted as the godhead, inexplicable as 
life, indefinable and without purpose. The work of art comes into 
being through artistic evaluation of its elements. I know only how I 
make it, I know only my medium, of which I partake, to what end I 
know not. (5 9)56 
The artist is reduced to a vanishing point. Schwitters often proclaimed with a 
studied self-effacement how subordinate his person was to Merz. His position 
is similar to Ball's when he transfigured himself into the "Magic Bishop", or 
to Duchamp, when he sought to eliminate personal style and taste. The latter 
often spoke of himself not as an artist, but rather as a craftsman, and the notion 
inherent in that self-characterization is precisely the same as the one 
Schwitters voices in these lines. What we are beginning to perceive in these 
comparisons is the phenomenon by which artists who create highly self- 
reflexive works, artists who have moved to the very precipice, seek to nullify 
their presence in the universe of their art. The shift is unexpected, for one 
would anticipate, by analysis of the term, that self-reflexive works mirror and 
preserve the image of their creator and actively substantiate his presence, not 
negate it. However, when the artist, after sincere and studied immersion in his 
work, has accomplished a distillation of his subjective spirit into his 
55 Compare Kandinsky's conclusions in his section on theory: 
The revolt from dependence on nature is only just beginning. The 
artist must train not only his eye but also his soul, so that he can test colours 
for themselves and not only by external impressions. If we begin at once to 
break the bonds which bind us to nature, and devote ourselves purely to 
combination of pure and abstract form, we shall produce works which are 
mere decoration, which are suited to neckties or carpets. Beauty of Form 
and Colour is no sufficient aim by itself, despite the assertion of pure 
aesthetes or even of naturalists, who are obsessed with the idea of "beauty". 
(47) 
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(objective) product, he may comfortably relinquish that tenacious hold on 
himself qua artist. He is now liberated from the common desire to "express" 
himself and imbue his work with his personality. The soul, as Simmel 
suggested it would, has travelled the path back to itself 
We encounter in this utterly complex process a crucial enantiodromia. 
The creative spirit of the artist compels him to produce objects by which his 
spirit substantiates its existence. Taken alone, these items do not contribute to 
that higher ideal, but the centripetal influence of the self-conscious spirit 
organizes them and draws them back to their origin. Thus, there is a point at 
which the identity of the artist becomes eclipsed by the vibrancy given to the 
work; if we understand the achievement of a pure, self-reflexive work to be 
the zenith of artistic creativity, then this point would be tenned the 
corresponding nadir. Yet art of this kind, full of flux and as dynamic as the 
spirit that created it, does not remain at its nadir for long, for soon it collapses 
into its opposite, and what results is a rare but pure symbiosis between the 
artist and his art, the zenith of artistic creation. Only then may the artist 
comfortably dismiss his artistic influence, because now the work he has 
created begins to direct its own creation and offer constructive commentary of 
what the creation of art entails. Simmel addresses the ecstasy of an artist who 
has achieved such an advanced level: 
In the happiness of a creator with his work, as great or insignificant 
as it may be, we find, beyond a discharge of inner tensions, the proof 
of his subjective power, his satisfaction over a fulfilled challenge, a 
sense of contentment that the work is completed, that the universe of 
valuable items is now enriched by this individual piece. Probably 
there is no higher sublime personal satisfaction for the creator than 
when we apperceive his work in all its impersonality, apart from our 
56 Here we find Schwitters as reverent as ever towards art, and views like these would have 
done little to endear him to the iconoclastic Berlin Dadaists rallying under the direction of 
Huelsenbeck. 
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su. ectivity. Just as the objectifications of the spirit are valuable 
apart from the subjective processes of life which have produced 
them, so, too, they have value apart from the other life processes 
which as their consequences depend on them. ("On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture" 32) 
A great infusion of personality has led to the generation of a work that 
transcends the personality of the creator and the viewer; herein we find the 
enantiodromia behind Duchamp's "The Bride Stripped Bare by Her 
Bachelors, Even" and especially behind the Hanover "Merzbau". While it 
may have seemed to more politically charged Dadaists like Huelsenbeck that 
Schwitters' inwardness could only detract from his talent, it is now apparent 
that the self-reflexive work of art was the logical corollary of Dada's sacred 
tenets, and such art, leading the soul on the j ourney back to itself (the soul of 
the artist and the art), could only be formed by an introspective (read: highly 
self-conscious) artistic mind. The self-conscious individual must produce 
objects in order to see before it the products of its unique and spiritual creative 
force, but the artist whose ambition is directed towards self-reflexive art goes 
even further, pouring his subjective spirit into the creation of a new world in 
which his products may reside. In a more general sense, that new world for a 
collective of young artists in 1916 Zurich mras Dada, but more specifically a 
"kingdom of one" arose, and it was Merz. 
The well-documented confrontation between Schwitters and 
Huelsenbeck obviously influenced the former to pursue a movement that 
would be receptive to his aesthetic ideology and corresponding work; lie was 
so ripe with contradiction that not even a self-contradictory movement like 
Dada could contain him. Although the antipathy directed towards Schwitters 
by the Berlin Dadaists was predicated largely on his ties to Sturm 
Expressionism, that affiliation allowed for two crucial influences to take hold 
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over Schwitters' work. The first was the ambition to embark on a 
"multidisciplinary artistic enterprise", an endeavour that Sturm sought to 
cultivate based on "the synthesist tradition of the Italian Futurists, and of 
Kandinsky and Marc's Blaue Reiter group" (Elderfleld 30-3 1). 57 The second 
influence is perhaps more appropriately viewed as a corroboration of the 
artist's pre-existent ideas. It is an emphasis on art attesting to or simply being 
44a spiritual renaissance before a social one" (32). The multidisciplinary 
approach was far from anathema to the Dadaists, for in spite of their eagerness 
to distance themselves from all preceding movements, their membership drew 
heavily from the same groups they denounced. Furthermore, Dada itself was 
multidisciplinary, looking as it did to disciplines beyond the scope of the 
18 
aurts. It was, then, the increasingly unpopular conviction of Herwarth Walden 
that art should not be conscripted into political service that incensed many. 
Such an apolitical stance was deemed unconscionable and pretentious, 
especially when one was faced with the turbulence erupting in Gennany at the 
time. Thus, the opposition came to rally behind "Die Aktion", a periodical 
which Franz Pfemfert founded in 1911 (33): 
In terms of specifically artistic modernism, Walden's group was 
certainly more advanced; but Walden's unwillingness to declare a 
position on the social front meant that as the war developed - and 
especially as it ended, in defeat and then in revolution - there was a 
gradual erosion of Der Sturm's place at the forefront of avant-garde 
activity. With few exceptions, those who were to become Dadaists in 
Berlin had, through the war, allied themselves to the Activist rather 
57 In "Merz" Schwitters summarizes this ambition: 
To busy myself with various branches of art was for me an artistic need. 
The reason for this was not any urge to broaden the scope of my activity, it 
was my desire not to be a specialist in one branch of art, but an artist. My 
aim is the Merz composite artwork, that embraces all branches of art in an 
artistic unit. (Motherwell 62) 
5' For example, Dadaists such as Duchamp were investigating the philosophy and physics of 
chance and the fourth dimension. Ball notes in his diary entry for 8 April 1917, "1 have 
realized a favorite old plan of mine. Total art: pictures, music, dances, poems - now we have 
thaf' (Flight Out of Time 104). 
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than the Sturm cause, even though the specific social proposals 
voiced in Die Aktion were often absurdly utopian and unrealistic 
- 
to 
such an extent indeed that the Dadaists came to repudiate all 
Expressionism, not only the Sturm variety. (33) 
With his inward focus and his ambition to create pure art, Schwitters 
obviously found more common ground with Walden than with Pfemfert and 
his cohorts. 59 For this reason, he was already a target by the time he "applied" 
to Club Dada, even though Elderfield suggests that it was unlikely he even 
knew anything of Dada when he joined Stunn in the spring of 1918 (34). Stillý 
even if he did, the kind of art that he was then making had nothing in 
common with Berlin Dada. In Huelsenbeck's first Berlin lecture of 
February 1918, he condemned Cubism, Expressionism and 
Abstraction as no longer useful or relevant to the contemporary 
situation. At that time, Schwitters was making this Cubo- 
Expressionist drawings and Abstraktion paintings. Huelsenbeck's 
First (German) Dada Manifesto of April 1918 had spoken of three 
techniques that he did think were useful and relevant: "bruitism, " 
"Simultaneity, " and "the new medium, " that is to say, sound poetry, 
simultaneous group performance and collage. Not until Merz was 
invented in the winter of 1918-19 could Schwitters agree. (34-35) 
It was likely that Schwitters met Arp in late 1918, after he became involved 
with the Berlin avant-garde (35). Soon afterwards he was in contact with 
Tzara, and so his knowledge of Dada would have grown as he started to 
receive publications from the Zurich group (35) 
. 
60 That Schwitters was able to 
penetrate even slightly (he met with Raoul Hausmann in early 1919) is likely 
due to the fact that the Revolution had temporarily relaxed the "partisan 
59 Elderfield observes, "Schwitters' own understanding of art was never as completely 
spiritual and Expressionist as that of Walden and his fellow Sturm artists. Still, he obviously 
valued the Sturm emphasis on artistic purity... " (33). Perhaps it is fair to say that Schwitters 
was more taken with the introspective method than the spiritual end to which it was directed. 
Nevertheless, he played on the periphery of spirituality (mostly a traditional Christian 
spirituality) and Gamard's book investigates his work from this point of view (although she 
does seem to forget that Schwitters himself was not a spiritual man). A study covering how 
Schwitters subverted traditional Christian iconography (emphasis on "subverted" rather than 
"incorporated" or "appropriated") would be an enlightening project. 
'0 According to Elderfield, it was probably Tzara or Arp who moved Schwitters in the 
direction of Berlin Dada, for Zurich Dada enjoyed amiable relations with Der Sturm. 
Probably unbeknownst to them, Berlin Dada was distancing itself from Sturm Expressionism 
(and eventually all Expressionism), and so anyone who came bearing sympathies for Der 
Sturm "was in for a rude surprise" (35). 
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stances" of the various Berlin groups (35). Soon enough, however, Club Dada 
broke free and Expressionism was as detestable as ever. For Schwitters, good 
timing soon turned bad and he was shut out before he could ever really be 
considered ", in". In terms of Merz, however, the timing proved exquisite, for 
in July 1919 Schwitters began to term his assemblages and collages (which 
date to the last part of 1918) with the readymade term that was to signify his 
artistic maturity and independence. In his defence of Merz ("Merz", 1920), he 
underlines the freedom inherent in his newly found art: "Merz stands for 
freedom from all fetters, for the sake of artistic creation. Freedom is not lack 
of restraint, but the product of strict artistic discipline" (Motherwell 59). 
Clearly exuberant though he was over his discovery of a movement 
liberated from socio-political concerns, Schwitters was more concentrated and 
focused than ever. Merz was crucial in that it provided a private forum in 
which the artist could be as introspective as the work demanded without 
having to answer to objections from others in his group, but it was also 
absolutely essential to his development as an artist for another reason. In the 
preceding lines, Schwitters relates how important the juxtaposition of 
materials was for him: 
When I adjust materials of different kinds to one another, I have 
taken a step in advance of mere oil painting, for in addition to playing 
off color against color, line against line, form against form, etc., I 
play off material against material, for example, wood against 
sackcloth. I call the Weltanschauung from which this mode of 
artistic creation arose "Merz". (Motherwell 59) 
Merz as a movement was not only based on the juxtaposition of materials, for 
it too functioned as a juxtaposition. Straining for individuality (or perhaps 
being forced into it), Schwitters created a universe built on contradiction that 
by necessity contradicted the universe out of which it was bom. If avant-garde 
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art at that time in Germany was meant to adhere to a political agenda, then 
Merz was fiercely apolitical, and if Berlin Dada eschewed the Romantic figure 
for his inwardness and proclivity for solitudinous reflection, then Merz was 
the ideal sanctuary for an artist of self-reflexive inclinations. It is not enough 
to say that Merz was different from Berlin Dada or even that it cultivated an 
individualistic quality. It actively moulded itself in contradiction to what was 
popular at the time in anti-popular circles such as Dada. So when Schwitters 
writes, "The meaning of the concept 'Merz' changes with the change in the 
insight of those who continue to work with it" (Motherwell 59), he is being 
intentionally enigmatic, because the value of the change (positive or negative) 
is incidental. What matters is the flux, or at the very least, the tendency for it. 
At times Merz could appear Romantic in conviction, while at other times it 
presciently anticipated the innovations of postmodernist art. It was 
irrepressibly Dada because it refused Dada and asserted Merz instead: 
Here I must clear up a misunderstanding that might arise through my 
friendship with certain kernel Dadaists. It might be thought that I 
call myself a Dadaist, especially as the word "dada" is written on the 
jacket of my collection of poems, Anna Blume, published by Paul 
Steegemann. On the same jacket is a windmill, a head, a locomotive 
running backwards and a man hanging in the air. This only means 
that in the world in which Anna Blume lives, in which people walk 
on their heads, windmills turn and locomotives run backwards, Dada 
also exists. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I have inscribed 
"Antidada" on the outside of my Cathedral. This does not mean that 
I am against Dada, but that there also exists in this world a current 
opposed to Dadaism. Locomotives run in both directions. Why 
shouldn't a locomotive run backwards now and then? (Motherwell 
60)61 
Schwitters is addressing a thorny issue that arose upon the publication of "An 
Anna Blume". He had already been banned from Club Dada, but his 
inscription of the word on the cover stirred Huelsenbeck's animosity 
61 The drawing of which Schwitters writes was composed much like "Coquetry", and as his 
description indicates, some of the same figures we have already encountered reappear. 
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(Elderfield 39), and a stern rebuttal was issued in Huelsenbeck's introduction 
to his Dada Almanac. We find evidence here that Schwitters is attempting to 
garner legitimacy for his new movement (it was closer to the ideals of the 
original Dada group), a legitimacy he believed "Huelsendada" lacked. 
Nevertheless, he does not profess himself a Dadaist, and he clings to a 
noncommittal position with regards to the movement. The world of Anna 
Blume, a fantastical universe where the laws of convention are flounced even 
to the point of welcoming convention (there is more than a little Romantic 
influence in this poem and in other similar works), is the world of ludic 
contradiction, and I would argue that Schwitters' insistence on remaining non- 
partisan is akin (once again) to Duchamp's efforts to obliterate personal taste. 
This stance became Schwitters' method for keeping Merz as inventive as it 
could be, and if that meant on occasion that he had to introduce themes dear to 
the German bourgeoisie, then he welcomed such unpopular additions. Ball's 
diary entry for 9 January 1917 illustrates the point with lucidity: 
Self-assertion suggests the art of self-metamorphosis. The isolated 
man tries to hold his own in the most unfavorable circumstances; he 
has to make himself unassailable. Magic is the last refuge of 
individual self-assertion, and maybe of individualism in general. 
(Flight Out of Time 96) 
The circumstances were certainly unfavourable for Schwitters, notjust 
because of the social difficulties he endured under Huelsenbeck but also 
because of the despair into which Germany was falling at the time. Ball found 
such magic in the "inner alchemy of the word", while Schwitters found it in 
the myriad permutations that unfolded when juxtapositions were forced and 
cultivated, not only in Merz but in himself as well. Critical, as Ball points out, 
was the necessity to undergo constant "self-metamorphosis", and although 
metamorphosis traditionally signifies a profound change of being, the 
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metamorphosis suggested here is harnessed into an art form, not unlike the 
cultivation of creative despair presented in the previous chapter. And of 
course, the invocation of magic implies the courtship of the unknown, or 
perhaps even of primitive forces. Most curious is the implication that the self 
must subject itself to change, that it must abandon itself to the nebulous logic 
of magic if it is to assert its quintessence. This conclusion serves as further 
evidence that the individual, through an enantiodromic process, must break 
with its self-conscious point of origin before it can enter back into the self- 
conscious realm with actual, not theoretical, knowledge of itself. 
Keeping this complex theory in mind, we find in the Merz collages and 
assemblages, and in Duchamp"s readymades as well, that there is an initial 
dampening down, or perhaps even eradication, of the artist's presence. The 
twentieth century avant-garde's search for and incorporation of objets trouves 
(and their logical counterparts, the rectified readymades) was in part the 
salvaging of fragments from the ruins of society, but it was also related to the 
fragmentation of the modem artist. Coming to us as they do from the world of 
mass production, objets trouves signify a world in which mass production, 
while providing for the masses, has concurrently nullified the unique essence 
of any given individual. 62 When these items emigrate to the canvas, the 
viewer is inspired to the following cognitive process. Firstly, he notes that the 
item has relinquished the function for which it was intended: the snow shovel 
is impotent without snow, the button useless without the buttonhole. His 
curiosity piqued by this condition of implied incompletion, the viewer then 
62 This thought is given much attention in Simmel's work, and we recall that it plays an 
important part in his theory of the metropolitan: "Money is concerned only with what is 
common to all, i. e., with the exchange value which reduces all quality and individuality to a 
purely quantitative level" ("The Metropolis and Mental Life" 326). 
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begins to ponder the human presence hidden behind the object. This line of 
questioning is particularly stimulated by segments of newspaper clippings in 
which only partial narratives can be uncovered. After this speculative 
investigation of the materials, the viewer finally comes to consider the hand of 
the artist behind the work, what motivated the selection of these objects over 
others, how they came to be arranged thusly, and what significance they held 
for the artist. So while the objects have lost their connection to the individuals 
who once had use for them, they have become tokens of the artist's intent and 
personality, and it is through them that the artist exerts his creative influence 
on the work and on his audience as well. Furthermore, the fragmented nature 
of the collage or assemblage artwork mirrors the exercise in self-fragmentation 
in which every self-reflexive artist partakes. As the self-conscious "I" of the 
artist produces objects and forms and by way of that production j ourneys back 
to itself, the collage work participates in a similar process. The unity of the 
entire piece is temporarily suspended in the prism of its constituent elements, 
but if the work is successful, that is, if it achieves an overarching unity (in 
spite of the disjointedness of its elements), then the viewer is hypnotically 
drawn into an intuitive understanding of the piece. Recognizing this effect, 
Shattuck writes: 
The intimacy of the voyeur relationship to art, watching it from the 
wings, represents a yearning to be in touch with the subconscious 
world which produced it. This candidness is turned inward. Interest 
in the inaccessible resources of the human mind induced the arts to 
model themselves less and less on the rational polite disciplines of 
the past. They sought what Sergei Eisenstein called "inner speech. " 
Subconscious thought processes 
- 
dream and memory and wit 
- 
function by sudden leaps the way a sparkjumps a gap. The arts have 
sought to duplicate these inner creative processes, to portray them 
without putting them through rigorous realignments of dramatic 
development, linear perspective, or tonality. (341) 
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Shattuck's invocation of Eisenstein's crucial theory is quite fortunate from our 
point of view, for it is the cinematic counterpart of the painterly self- 
reflexivity we have thus far been examining. Furthermore, Eisenstein's essays 
are contemporaneous with Schwitters' Merzbau years, and so they offer an 
intriguing example of how self-reflexive art was a preoccupation (and 
oftentimes more so an aim) of artists working in various disciplines and 
countries. 63 
The "inner speech" to which Shattuck refers appears under the rubric 
of the "inner monologue". This concept, according to Eisenstein, developed 
out of a necessity to portray "the feverish race of thoughts, intennittently with 
the outer actuality" of a character under duress; the Romantic authors E. T. A. 
Hoffmann, Novalis, and Gerard de Nerval are credited with the innovation 
64 (104). The impetus behind the "inner monologue", which manifests itself 
cinematically as the "montage" sequence, is the same heightened self- 
consciousness that we find at the root of all self-reflexive art: "How 
fascinating it is to listen to one's own train of thought, particularly in an 
excited state, in order to catch yourself, looking at and listening to your mind. 
How you talk 'to yourself, ' as distinct from 'out of yourself " (105). In "Film 
Form: New Problems", Eisenstein observes that there is a definite logic 
governing "inner speech", a logic "subject to no less clear-cut laws and 
63 Eisenstein's essays that deal with the theories of montage and "inner monologue" (under 
which "inner speech" falls) are: "A Course in Treatment" (1932), "Film Form: New 
Problems" (1935), and "Dickens, Griffith, and the Film Today" (1944). All of these works, 
among others, appear in Film Form, edited and translated by Jay Leyda. 
64 "'Slipping' from the objective into the subjective, and back again, is a characteristic of the 
writings of the romantics... " (104). With regards to our theory of self-reflexivity, the 
subjective is the obvious point of departure, but Eisenstein's characterization of this very 
specialized kind of art is nevertheless applicable. 
Reynaga 209 
structural peculiarities" as the kind to which more superficial methods of 
communication subscribe: 
What is remarkable therein, and why I am discussing it, is that the 
laws of construction of inner speech turn out to be precisely those laws which lie at thefoundation of the whole variety of laws 
governing the construction of theform and composition of art-works. (130, author's italiCS)65 
According to Eisenstein, these laws "represent an inexhaustible storehouse", 
and so he restricts himself to enumerating two salient examples. 66 The first is 
termed "pars pro toto" (synecdoche) and the second is explained as the 
phenomenon by which "every embodiment must be in strict artistic accord 
with the story situation being embodied" (134). Following a brief description 
of these points, Eisenstein intriguingly turns to the case "where the material of 
the fon-n-creation turns out to be the artist himself', and in that case he finds 
that the second example given above is given even fuller expression (13 5): 
in this instance the structure of the finished composition not only 
reproduces, as it were, a reprint of the structure of the laws along 
which flow sensual thought-processes. In this instance the 
circumstance itself, here united with the object-subject of creation, as 
a whole duplicates a picture of the psychic state and representation 
corresponding to the earlier forms of thought. [ 
... 
] It is the 
characteristic involving the conception that a human being, while 
being himself and conscious of himself as such, yet simultaneously 
considers himself to be also some other person or thing, and, further, 
to be so, just as definitely and just as concretely, materially. (135) 
We encounter in these lines a complete substantiation of the theory of self- 
reflexivity we have been formulating. First of all, Eisenstein speaks of the 
element of structure, which may contradict our initial impression of self- 
reflexive art as partaking of the turbulence of the subconscious from which it 
65 And in "Dickens, Griffith, and the Film Today": 
Thus we arrived at the primary source of those interior principles, which 
already govern not only the formation of montage, but the inner fon-nation 
of all works of art 
- 
of those basic laws of the speech ofart in general 
- 
of 
those general laws ofform, which lie at the base not only of works of film 
art, but of all kinds of arts in general. (25 1, author's italics) 
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draws at least partial inspiration. It is customary to imagine avant-garde 
artists, particularly Dadaists, as characters that perform with abandon, but as 
Schwitters unequivocally reminds us in "Merz", "Freedom is not lack of 
restraint, but the product of strict artistic discipline" (Motherwell 59). 
Certainly Schwitters operated behind strict formal laws, many of which were 
known only to him but nevertheless exerted a profound power over his work. 
Elderfield often refers to Schwitters' adherence to a strict formal code. When 
writing of the artist's transition into full-fledged Merz works, Elderfield 
concludes, "The effect was to heighten the real expressive feeling of the art, 
which came to depend above all else upon Schwitters' control of a strictly 
delimited vocabulary of formal elements" (27). Second of all, we encounter 
the subject-object dualismq but Eisenstein adds a fascinating new element 
when he proposes that this dualism, marked by flux, joins with itself and thus 
results in a total "picture" of the inner life that conceived the work in the first 
place. The subject-object dualism, or what we have been calling the 
manifestation of the self-conscious "I" in objects or forms of its own 
production, itself functions as but a part of the self-reflexive gesture, while at 
the same time maintaining its integrity as that same gesture. 67 Finally, this 
nexus of interactions (between the subject and subject, the object and object, 
the subject and object, and the subject-object with itself) induces in the self- 
conscious mind a state not unlike that in which primitive man immersed 
66 The author appositively qualifies "inner speech" as "sensual thinking", and in a footnote he 
cites Hegel and Plekhanov's interest in "sensual thought processes" (13 0). 
67 Eisenstein, in his discussion of the pars pro toto method: 
At that stage of non 
-differentiated thinking the part is at one and the same 
time also the whole. There is no unity of part and whole, but instead obtains 
an objective identity in representation of whole and part. It is immaterial 
whether it be part or whole 
- 
it plays invariably the role of aggregate and 
whole. (132) 
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himself; the artist acknowledges his sovereign existence but concurrently 
understands himself to be another entity. 68 In the case of Schwitters, we need 
no further evidence than his statement "I am Merz". 
"Eternal Creation": The Evolution and Structure of the Hanover 
Merzbau 
As with all artistic projects of this magnitude and legacy, a haze of 
mystery engulfs the true origins of the Hanover Merzbau. According to Ernst 
Schwitters, it "began when his father became interested in the relationship 
between the columns or sculptures and the pictures that he hung on the walls 
behind them" (Elderfield 147) 
. 
69 Accordingly, Schwitters began to link these 
pictures with string, which was soon replaced by wire, which in turn was 
ensheathed by wood, which ultimately was moulded over with plaster of Paris 
(148). 70 If this account is accurate (and we have no reason to doubt the 
veracity of Ernst Schwitters, who laboured diligently on the reconstruction of 
the Hanover Merzbau and who recalls living in its presence), then we have a 
before us a fascinating insight into the evolution of the work. 71 
6' Eisenstein provides numerous anthropological examples of how primitive or uncivilized 
cultures perform in such a fashion. His tangential discourses upon such societies also 
elucidate Schwitters' case, for it has been well established that he (and many of the other 
Dadaists) were strongly influenced by primitivism. 
69 Unfortunately we have no way of knowing in what arrangement the connections occurred or 
whether or not Schwitters laced the string according to a predetermined pattern. Nevertheless, 
the delineation of these negative spaces, combined with the manifestation of otherwise purely 
mental associations, establishes for us the basic principle of the Merzbau: the exposure of the 
relationships between objects and forms which the self-conscious creative spirit provides on 
its journey back to itself. 
70 t4 It was probably in 1924-25, therefore, that the period of joining pictures and sculptures 
with string and wire gave way to the creation of a fully environmental, sculptural interior" 
(Elderfield 152). 
7' The interlacing of the works with string prefigures Breton's "First Papers of Surrealism" 
exhibition, organized in New York in 1942, in which Duchamp, provided a similar effect: 
"Duchamp's contribution was to hang an inextricable cat's-cradle across the rooms in which 
the show was held, so that the visitors who wanted to look at the works were obliged to 
perform feats of gymnastic contortion in order to reach them" (Cabanne 148). The major 
difference between the two gestures is that Schwitters' was contained in a private residence, 
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We know from Schwitters' preoccupation with landscape painting that 
he relied upon nature to provide eternal themes which could be incorporated 
into his urban art. One theme that was clearly of interest to him was that of 
organic growth, a theme surreptitiously at work in the Merzbilder, but more 
readily apparent in the later sculptures (dating from the late thirties to his 
death) and the Elterwater Merzbam (1947). The proliferating tangle of string 
would have made the artist's studio seem more like a bog swamp heavily 
strewn with sphagnum moss. 72 Perhaps with some precedence, Schwitters was 
emphasizing unspoken connections rather than abrupt juxtapositions, but 
either way the self-reflexive element remains the same, for in practice both 
methods are really complements of one another. In the case of juxtaposition, 
the onus is placed on the viewer to hazard a guess as to what creative impulse 
motivated the artist to assemble such contradictory items. With the connective 
method, the artist has provided tangible links between the works, but the 
question regarding creative impulse remains. Juxtaposition functions more in 
concert with Bergson's theory regarding the presentation of diverse images in 
an effort to conduct the viewer's attention to a position more sympathetic with 
duration. 73 In emphasizing the negative spaces between the works hanging in 
his studio, Schwitters was heeding Bergson's call to grasp the "trajectory" of a 
and so the string functioned more as a tangible expression of the artist's interest in the 
connections between his works. In Duchamp's case, the intent to subvert the typical viewing 
experience of the audience and to promote danger in the otherwise neutral and safe 
atmosphere of the museum formed the impetus behind the stunt. 
72 The ensheathing of the string also recalls the organic ensheathing of neuronal axons. 
Schwann cells wrap themselves around axons and create a smooth sheath that expedites the 
neural impulses. An investigation into the organic tendencies of the Merzbau (perhaps even 
along anatomical lines) would be an ambitious and enlightening project. 
73 Shattuck clearly thought so too, for he writes regarding the juxtapositional method, 
"Bergson felt this dynamic so deeply that he sounds as if he were writing about film, or 
cubism" (342). He then quotes the passage from An Introduction to Metaphysics which 
explores the achievement of duration through the presentation of "many diverse images". 
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phenomenon rather than attempting to reproduce it by way of instantaneous 
moments. The string serves as a rudimentary signifier of the mental 
connections we forge when we take into account the totality of an artist's 
oeuvre and sympathetically immerse ourselves in the duration with which the 
artist infuses his work. It now becomes evident that the string threaded 
through the negative spaces between Schwitters' works is akin to the vectors 
and schematically drawn lines of motion we see in the Aquarelles; it implies 
movement and is indicative of flux and change. However, unlike the lines in 
the Aquarelles, the string clearly marks a point at which Schwitters was 
making a decisive move away from surfaces and into the three-dimensionality 
of the Merzbau. Of course the assemblages, with their assortment of machine 
parts, toys, blocks of wood, and other bulky items, were three-dimensional in 
composition, but Schwitters was still preoccupied with what effects he could 
produce on the surfaces of these works: 
Schwitters begins in 1920 to address the surface of his work as a 
responsive rather than an inert object, and makes of his art an affair 
not merely of placing materials and covering surfaces but of 
animating and actually creating surfaces 'through the choice, )74 distribution and metamorphosis of materials'. (Elderfield 62 
Still, the imprisonment of these materials within the bounds of a traditional 
four-sided frame kept them from asserting their three-dimensionality, 
preventing any disruption of the piece's surface tension. 
When Schwitters began to hang string between the various pictorial 
items in his studio, he made a significant leap from the relative two- 
dimensionality of his collages and assemblages to the three-dimensionality 
Shattuck concludes, "A great diversity employed to suggest and delimit a point in another 
dimension aptly describes juxtaposition" (342). 
74 Elderfield traces this shift to "more physical, bulky reliefs" to the influence of 
Constructivism upon Schwitters in the early twenties. 
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inherent in an architectural work. With this added dimension, the flatness for 
which he had striven in his earlier works was, by contrast, further emphasized. 
At the same time, attention was drawn to the interstitial spaces that 
transcended (but included) those earlier planar pieces. At least in the 
beginning, and probably more so towards the end, the Merzbau was a 
Merzbild piece grown beyond the usual dimensions; it was a Merz picture 
into which the artist could step and by which he would ultimately be 
enveloped. Prior to its development, Schwitters had immersed himself in the 
various disciplines that existed under the rubric of Merz 
- 
Merz painting, 
Merz poetry, Merz prose, Merz typography, et cetera 
- 
but each of these 
endeavours still existed, for the most part, independently of one another, and 
although Schwitters' wilful self-effacement was already underway, he was not 
yet subsumed by his art. In the case of the Merzbau, however, it soon became 
self-evident that Merz had achieved autonomy because all of its satellite 
activities were now combined, and likewise the construction, in its unity, was 
capable of encompassing (literally and figuratively) its creator. What marked 
the shift, besides the Brobdingnagian proportions of the Merzbau, was the fact 
that this project, which was the closest Schwitters ever came to a 
Gesamtkunstwerk, was a unification of what had hitherto been the 
preoccupations of the artist: movement and the vital flux, organic growth, 
humour and nonsense, the maintenance and rupturing of surface tension, 
fragmentation, juxtaposition, natural and urban iconography, machines and 
their function in modem art, and of course, self-reflexivity. Furthermore, 
these constituent themes within the confines of the Merzbau articulated with 
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one another in an unprecedented fashion, 75 and besides the incorporation of 
these and other secondary themes, the Merzbau grew concentrically around 
the influences of contemporary art movements. Its core was Dada ("The Holy 
Affliction" is very much Dada in inspiration) or perhaps more accurately 
Merz, but by the time of its demise, it was predominantly Constructivist in 
appearance. 76 Yet Elderfield underlines the point that the work was more than 
a concretion of styles: 
Although it developed from a Dadaist source to a stylized exterior, it 
was never a "joint artistic activity" telling metaphorically of a 
harmonized social environment, but a way for Schwitters to preserve 
his individuality in a period of increasingly impersonalized styles. (148) 
The irony is that Schwitters asserted his individuality by first effacing it in a 
construction whose dimensions dwarfed him. This indirect route of self- 
realization in parallels that which we have already witnessed vis-a-vis self- 
reflexive art. 
As Ernst Schwitters' account relates, the Merzbau grew in concentric 
layers from its very inception. Before we continue with our interpretation, let 
us pause and consider some of the accounts given of the work. In "Merz 2 1. 
erstes Veilchenheft", composed in 193 1, Schwitters provides insight into the 
ideas and growth of the Merzbau. 77 He notes that "it is unfinished", but he is 
quick to remind the reader that it is intended to be so. He continues: 
It grows about the way a big city does 
- 
when a new building goes 
up, the Housing Bureau checks to see that the whole appearance of 
the city is not going to be ruined. In my case, I run across something 
or other that looks to me as though it would be right for the KdeE, so 
75 Schmalenbach speaks to this unifying quality of the Merzbau as follows: "When, around 
1923, Schwitters moved his studio to another room of the house, he began to let the hitherto 
separate creations coalesce into a whole" (130). 
76 As Elderfield notes, Constructivism was experimenting in "environmental design" at that 
time (15 0). 
77 All citations for this piece refer to Schmalenbach's book. 
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I pick it up, take it home, and attach it and paint it, always keeping in 
mind the rhythm of the whole. (Schmalenbach 130)" 
Schwitters' likening of the Merzbau to a city is more than a metaphoric 
device. In a large city, the individuality of the citizen is both enhanced and 
diminished by his participation in such a mass social group. The metaphor of 
the "big city" is a felicitous one when we consider the position of the artist 
within such a looming artwork, for like the metropolitan, he too relinquishes 
some of his individuality in order to join a much larger sphere. This premise 
may seem contradictory, but consider Simmel's sociological position as 
expressed in "Group Expansion and Development of Individuality": 
"Individuality in being and action generally increases to the degree that the 
social circle encompassing the individual expands" (Levine 252). 79 Similarly, 
we recall Sheppard's observation that the Dadaists understood with great 
clarity that "human beings became truly human only when they accept the 
smallness of their place within Creation" (178). Comparing these two 
quotations, we arrive at the basis of a theory which holds that the individual 
must diminish himself if he not only is to retain his individuality but to 
aggrandize it in a greater arena, that of the large social collective. 
Immediately we are reminded of our earlier conclusions regarding the 
proclivity of the artist who, in creating self-reflexive works, forgoes his 
identity in favour of that of the work. When he does so, he follows the path 
that Simmel delineates of the self on its journey to a heightened self- 
consciousness. There is, then, another enantiodromia at work. Rather than 
" The confusion over Schwitters' name for the Merzbau continues here, but as already 
confirmed by Elderfield, "KdeE" ("Kathedral des erotischen Elends") was somewhat of a 
misnomer. In this quotation, Schwitters is clearly referring to the Merzbau. 
'9 This quotation, italicised in the original, appears under the sub-heading "Group Expansion 
and the Transformation of Social Bonds". The essay was published in 1908. 
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resulting in the extinguishment of individuality altogether, the infusion of a 
work of art (an "object" or "form" in Simmel's terms) or the self-submersion 
of the individual in the collective results in greater individuality. Elsewhere in 
the same essay, under the sub-heading "Group Expansion and Consciousness 
of the Ego", Simmel lays bare the mechanism behind this enantiodromia, and 
in doing so expressly connects self-consciousness with a temporary 
relinquishment of individuality: 
The more uniformly and unwaveringly life progresses, and the less 
the extremes of sensate experience depart from an average level, the 
less strongly does the sensation of personality arise; but the farther 
apart they stretch, and the more energetically they erupt, the more 
intensely does a human being sense himself as a personality. (Levine 
291)80 
In these lines, we discover an invaluable metaphysical line of thought that 
links the metropolitan with self-reflexivity. Again we find, as we did in "The 
Metropolis and Mental Life", that discontinuous but highly noticeable stimuli 
provoke the mind to move towards a more heightened state of awareness. In a 
similar fashion, when the individual steeps himself in a collective comprised 
of "other highly differentiated individuals", the quintessence of his personality 
is temporarily eclipsed by those surrounding him, but as he struggles for 
identity, his individuality emerges to his own mind as a singular and 
distinguishable character (292): "it is precisely through the alternation of 
sensations, thoughts, and activities that personality documents itself' (29 1). 
However, as evidenced by Schwitters' quotation above, there is a critical 
quality responsible for ensuring that the work exists beneath an overarching 
unity. Simmel, as we have seen, attributes that centripetal organizational force 
'0 This passage is redolent of Bergson's stipulation that "many diverse images" inspire the 
mind, by way of its own intuition, to enter into a sympathetic relationship with its own 
duration and perforce all other durations (An Introduction to Metaphysics 14). 
Dp 
riteynaga 218 
to the self-conscious "I", while Bergson localizes it in the duration of the elan 
vital. In either case, the esemplastic power resides in the creative individual 
who summons his intuition to process and interpret conflicting and 
disorientating perceptions; invariably he finds the flow of duration beneath it 
all: 
Just as duration can be determined only in the presence of alternation, 
and just as it is only the alternation of nonessential properties that 
throws constancy of substance into bold relief, so too tile ego is 
apparently perceived as the one constant in all the alternation of 
psychological contents, especially when these contents provide a 
particularly rich opportunity. (29 1) 
Schwitters initially invokes the metaphor of the city to describe the 
growth of the Merzbau, and in his rather humorous portrayal he casts himself 
in the bureaucratic position of the "Housing Bureau". The necessity of 
preserving the unity of the whole, a difficult task considering the myriad items 
that comprised the Merzbau, is in concert with the artist's struggle to assert his 
individuality. In the case of the city, the objects and forms (notjust the 
buildings but the laws and customs of the populace as well) produced by so 
many hands may threaten to disrupt the unity of the metropolitan centre, but 
the overseeing bureaucracy ensures wholeness in spite of fragmentation. 
Keeping in mind the quotations above, it would seem that an artwork that 
includes as many diverse items as possible, should it be under the direction of 
a creator in search of heightened self-consciousness, would be like a city that 
encompasses myriad forms but is even more of a metropolis for that reason. 
The Merzbau is precisely this kind of artwork, and like the city that grows 
under the guidance of its Housing Bureau, it expanded under the self- 
conscious (and ultimately self-reflexive) influence of its creator. That 
influence is explicitly demonstrated in Schwitters I active role of procuring 
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items and fitting them into the Merzbau, with an eye to preserving (like the 
Housing Bureau) the unity of the entire construction. There is, however, a 
secondary interpretation to be considered with regards to Schwitters' function 
in the realm of the Merzbau. The structure was primarily a means of the artist 
asserting himself on a grand scale and in truly individualized form, but it also 
became the embodiment of his obsession over the preservation of objects. The 
quotation from "Merz 21. erstes Veilchenheft" cited above continues thusly: 
Then a day comes when I realize I have a corpse on my hands 
- 
relics of a movement in art that is now passe. So what happens is 
that I leave them alone, only I cover them up either wholly or partly 
with other things, making clear that they are being downgraded. As 
the structure grows bigger and bigger, valleys, hollows, caves appear, 
and these lead a life of their own within the over-all structure. (Schmalenbach 13.0) 
There is a marked shift in tone following Schwitters' whimsical self-portrayal 
as the Housing Bureau of the Merzbau. The invocation of death in this 
passage recasts the previously described gathering activities of the artist as 
scavenging forays, the results of which eventually amount to no more than "a 
corpse". The "passe" art movement to which he refers is probably Dada, 
although Expressionism and Cubism are also possibilities. We have already 
addressed the issue of Schwitters' reluctance to part with past trends and 
forms, and so it should hardly come as a surprise that he finds it necessary to 
entomb these "relics" rather than dispose of them altogether. It is crucial to 
note that Schwitters is not laying these items to rest, but rather sending them 
into serene seclusion. Far from being stripped of their vitality, these relics are 
enshrined in grottos ("hollows" and "caves") that come to serve as organic 
units, organs perhaps, of the super-structure body that is the Merzbau. As we 
shall soon see, Schwitters dedicated much effort to these grottos, which came 
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to be one of the most significant (and disturbing) aspects of the project, 
remarked upon by visitors with dread and voyeuristic enthusiasm. 
The Threshold of Imaginative Recall 
The looming dimensions of the Merzbau deserve further attention, and 
to this end let us consult one of Simmel's earlier essays, "Ober aesthetische 
Quantitiften" ("On Aesthetic Quantities", 1903). 81 This short but dense piece 
takes as its point of departure the conviction that artistically portrayed 
proportions correlate to the nature of the "physical objects" depicted. In and 
of itself this idea is not so profound, but how Simmel develops the argument is 
intriguing and quite applicable to the issue of the Merzbau's construction. He 
begins by distinguishing between the illustration of inorganic and organic 
natural features, and gives as an example of the former the impossibility of 
representing the full magnificence of the Alps (8 1). Conversely, 
In all organically grown phenomena we find that the circumference 
always reaches as far as the inner forces are able to develop it. Thus 
we may have a feeling, through complex, probably unconscious 
experiences, and through empathy, for the inner forces of growth. 
Usually therefore, we are in agreement with their size. For the artist, 
too, the transformations of form which are required because of 
changes in quantities come about without effort. (82) 
For the reason that we are governed by organic forces and thus find ourselves 
in sympathy with them (even when we trace them outside of our own 
existence), we are capable of discerning the vital impulses that dictate organic 
growth. Intuitively we understand that the growth of such specimens 
emanates in a centrifugal manner, and so, as Simmel writes, we accept with no 
hesitation the ultimate size achieved. He finds the same is true for the artist, 
" The essay is reproduced in Etzkorn's book The Conflict in Modem Culture and Other 
Essays (81-85). 
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who infuses his objects and forms with his creative spirit. The subjective 
spirit is akin to the vital forces that compel the growth of "organically grown 
phenomena" (82). For inorganic forms, growth is determined by the limiting 
factors of external influences: "Thus, we can only guide ourselves by the 
given facts of their spatial dimensions" (82). From these discrepancies, 
Sinimel reasons that we find ourselves at a disadvantage when asked to 
consider and reconstruct mentally the sensations and dimensional impact of a 
large architectural structure from a small-scale model. We can only engage 
our faculty of "reconstructive imagination" when we engage with "objects of a 
certain absolute minimum size", and it is this minimum that Simmel terms 
"the threshold of imaginative recall" (82). 82 
When the Merzbau began to expand three-dimensionally and challenge 
the confines of the artist's studio, a new and more pronounced juxtaposition 
erupted, narnely, that between the work and the viewer who suddenly found 
himself incorporated in it. In prior work, the viewer stood outside of the field 
of juxtapositions, but as the chambers of the Merzbau became large enough to 
accommodate a full-grown man, the viewer came to play an increasingly 
participatory role. 83 The question then arises as to whether or not the Merzbau 
is sizeable enough to push the viewer beyond the threshold of imaginative 
recall. More specifically, what intuitive response does the Merzbau pique 
(what is the viewer meant to recall) and how were the dimensions of the 
Merzbau limited or informed by the vision of the artist? In order to respond to 
82 According to Simmel, architecture throug hout history has customarily been constructed 
within the parameters of the proper dimensions required to stir "empathetic feeling" in the 
soul of the viewer. When the dimensions shrink beneath that threshold or expand too much, 
they render the architectural form "devoid of aesthetic effect" (82). 
83 That participation was at times enforced by Schwitters, who would secret away mementos 
of his visitors in the grottos of the Merzbau. 
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these questions, we need to reflect on precisely how the Merzbau would be 
classified in terms of the polar categories Simmel presents above. We have 
already spoken figuratively of its organic growth, but in the true sense of the 
word it is hardly so, unless we factor in the bodily waste bottled and displayed 
by the artist and the showcasing of the guinea pigs. It is not entirely inorganic 
either, for its growth, noted time and again, propelled it like a climbing vine 
that eventually "burst the room apart at the seams" (Richter 153) and came to 
"stretch 
... 
from the subterranean to the sky" (Elderfield 157). 84 A more 
reliable classification is hinted at in Simmel's essay, and so we inquire 
whether or not the growth of the Merzbau seemed to emanate from some vital 
force deep within or whether it appeared to be defined by external limitations. 
The work developed outward from the kernel of the original studio (in which 
the string was hanged), and so we remain justified in speaking of the project in 
terms of its organic nature. 85 It was not as if Schwitters had hewn the structure 
out of some pre-existing form, and the fact that the layers were added 
concentrically from this centre suggests that the Merzbau grew in such a way 
as to elicit a sympathetic reaction from its viewers. As an "organic" structure, 
the Merzbau conditioned the viewer (by his nature in sympathy with organic 
growth) so that he could extend his "imaginative intuition" to the 
contemplation of the intuition that informed the work. Once he entered into a 
sympathetic union with the structure, the viewer could explore its cavernous 
passageways and peer into its hazy grottos. Rudolf Jahns, who authored one 
of the few extant eyewitness accounts, relates the following: 
84 The Merzbau was growing so large by the 1930s that Schwitters extended it into the floor 
above (and out through a skylight) and down into an uncovered well (Elderfield 157). 
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Schwitters asked me to go into the 'grotto' alone and, once it had had 
its effect on me, to tell my thoughts to a beech tree in the middle of 
the structure on a small table (made of wood or plaster or plastered 
wood 
-I don't remember exactly anymore). I entered the structure, 
which, with its twists and turns, resembled at once a snail-shell and a 
cavern. The path to the centre was very narrow, because new 
structures and constructions and [ 
... 
] Merz reliefs and recesses kept 
emerging from the sidewalls into the as yet empty space. (143 )86 
In this account, we find that Schwitters was keen to subject Jahns to a kind of 
"baptism" in Merz. His insistence on contemplative solitude and a meditative 
communication with the structure 
- 
an insistence prefigured by Friedrich in 
the gravid darkness of his mystical forests 
- 
signifies a desire to immerse the 
viewer in the work and to incorporate him in such a manner that both entities 
would be tangibly altered after the encounter. 87 Even more remarkable is the 
sinuous path Jahns is forced to trace in order to enter that inner sanctum. 
Building such a structure in such a confined space as his home, Schwitters 
could hardly have avoided the gnarled and dank passageways, but it is entirely 
possible that he deliberately constructed the Merzbau in such a way as to make 
manifest the j ourney the artist tenaciously pursues on his own path to that 
heightened self-consciousness that Simmel identifies as the cultivated state. 
We have thus far seen how enantiodromic processes govern self- 
reflexive gestures, and here we discover yet another example of this 
phenomenon. In the quotation cited above, Jahns characterizes the section of 
the Merzbau he visited as being both like a "snail-shell" and a "cavern". At 
face value the two images appear contradictory, for a snail-shell is based on a 
mesmerizing sPirality that draws the eye to an infinitely rqceding point, while 
" It is not coincidental that the Merzbau is spoken of most frequently in these terms, even 
without any reference to Simmel's theories. Viewers and scholars alike reach the same 
intuitive response; the Merzbau is a "living" structure (Richter 152). 
86 This excerpt derives from Jahns' brief essay entitled "Notes About his First Encounter with 
the Merzbau". It is reproduced in I is Style (142-144). 
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the cavern is a surprising triumph of empty space in an otherwise confined 
88 
area. The former presents a collapse of space upon itself, while the latter is 
an expansion. What, then, is the effect of the coexistence of these two kinds 
of spatial organization? 89 I propose that as with the structure of the human 
ear, the combination of recessional and expansional space serves to amplify 
the intuitive response gathered by the viewer as he immerses himself in the 
work. Confronted with these different organizations of space, the viewer 
retains above all an impression of flux, and it was necessary for Schwitters to 
produce these telescoping spatial dimensions in order to lend to the bulkiness 
of the Merzbau a mobility that it would otherwise have denied itself. 90 That 
mobility was necessary, of course, if the Merzbau was to develop along 
organic lines, and its organic essence was indispensable to its status as a self- 
reflexive artwork. Antliff illustrates this connection between organic fonn and 
the creative product as follows: 
The organic metaphor itself is a construct possessing a determinant 
logic that overruns the powers of origination it is said to embody. 
Organic form is typified in Bergsonian criticism by its creative 
freedom, its continual invention, whereas mechanical form is 
" Consider for comparison Schwitters' plan to incorporate people in his Merzbilhne project 
(Elderfield 109-110). 
" These divergent organizations of space are redolent of the polar thresholds Simmel 
identifies in his theory of aesthetic quantities: 
Each artistically usable element seems to be composed of two thresholds of 
size. There is a certain quantity for their representation through which 
aesthetic reactions in the final analysis are produced, and there is one 
through which they disappear again. Such thresholds can also be found in 
other spheres of the higher mental life as, for example, the threshold of 
becoming conscious of justice or of religion. ("On Aesthetic Quantities" 
83-84) 
89 An unlikely comparison may be drawn between the structure Jahns describes and that of the 
human ear, in which a snail-shell (the cochlea) and a cavern (the auditory meatus that extends 
from the concha to the tympanic membrane) articulate with one another. The etymology of 
"cochlea" recalls the "snail-shell" appearance of that organ, as does the designation of 
"concha" for the external ear. 
90 In his brief commentary on the essence of art ("What art is, you know... ", 1926), Schwitters 
stresses the point that art "is nothing more than rhythm": "That's why you mustn't look too 
hard at the material; because that isn't what it's all about. Don't look for some hidden 
imitation of nature, don't ask about expressions of the soul, but try, in spite of the unusual 
materials, to catch the rhythm of the forms and the colors" (Ppappp 229). 
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predetermined, a lifeless fabrication. However, there is an inherent 
contradiction in this system, for while artistic invention is not 
mechanically predetermined, its relation to the organicist metaphor of 
growth of self-generation constitutes another detenninant. When 
Bergson declared human creativity a manifestation of the cosmic dlan 
vital, he understood artistic creativity as both the product and 
producer of a meta-creative process. In short, the personality was decentered as the origin of creativity, for as an instance of the 
materialization of the elan vital, the organic fonn bore within it 
creative capacities that did not originate with the artist. To enter into intuitive relation to the self was, paradoxically, to dissolve self- 
presence altogether [ 
... 
]. (12)91 
What Antliff observes here corroborates what we have thus far ten-ned the 
enantiodromic effect exemplified in self-reflexive art; the subjective creative 
spirit dissolves itself in the inorganic form it engenders, only to resurrect itself 
in a "cultivated" state. This theory of creation, in Bergson as well as in 
Simmel, is too vitalist, too infonned by flux theory to be constrained to a 
unidirectional representation. The arrows in this equation flow both ways 
between subject and fonn. Particularly speaking, the artistic form, as 
addressed in the quotation above, may be classified as an inorganic product of 
the creative spirit, but it is very much like the organically produced item in 
one critical way: it is not mechanically predetermined. Still, as Antliff notes, 
"artistic invention" is removed enough from the "organicist metaphor of 
growth of self-generation" to serve as its own determinant, and in this way it 
functions as a valuable example of meta-creativity. It is not organic creation, 
but it is creation in organic terms, and because it is safely removed from the 
strains and requisite considerations of true organic creation, the artist is free to 
lose himself in his work and experiment with methods of regaining that 
heightened self-consciousness. So it is then with the Merzbau, crafted from 
91 Concern with "organic form" does indeed take precedence over mechanics in Bergson's 
philosophy, but as we have learned from Simmel's later vitalist writings, inorganic fonns may 
be informed by the "stable substantive order of values", and thus they may reconnect with the 
life that produced them ("On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture" 3 1). 
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inorganic elements but assembled in a manner that rendered it organic in 
disposition. 92 Its organic nature was crucial in encouraging a sympathetic 
response from the viewer and in preventing it from succumbing to its own 
bulkiness. 
As for its size, Schwitters ensured that his Merzbau juxtaposed 
cavemous spaces with claustrophobic retreats, and what resulted from this 
combination was an overall impression of a vital flux, which leads us back to 
the metaphysical conception of an organic reality. From the perspective of the 
viewer, the size of the Merzbau needed to be large enough to envelop him. As 
he stood amidst the dizzying complexity of the work (the view showing the 
Blue Window illustrates this point well), he would surely have sensed the 
diminution of his own personality in the confines of Schwitters' highly 
personalized structure 
- 
built out of elements that were in themselves 
depersonalised. By the time a viewer like Jahns had reached a particular 
grotto, he would have encountered so many "diverse images" that his 
consciousness would have been at "the precise point where there is a certain 
intuition to be seized" (An Introduction to Metaphysics 14, my italics). That 
intuition, perhaps the most critical for our argument, reveals the self- 
conscious, self-reflexive, creative spirit of the artist, and in turn that creative 
spirit announces the much greater phenomenon of the cosmic elan vital. So by 
losing himself in the vastness of the Merzbau, the viewer has (like the artist 
92 In his aphorisms concerning aesthetics, Schopenhauer similarly looks to the different effects 
inorganic and organic nature have on us. The former, he concludes, "produces a very 
melancholy, indeed oppressive impression" because that which is inorganic does not triumph 
over gravity. We derive pleasure and are sympathetic to organic nature because of its triumph 
over gravity. Water, which like the Merzbau is technically inorganic, transcends what would 
otherwise be a "melancholy effect" because of its "great mobility, which produces an 
impression of life... " (Essays and Aphorisms 161-162). The Merzbau purports its vitalism in 
a similar manner. 
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before him) turned his focus from his own individuality to that of a more 
substantial existence, and in doing so he has arrived at a more informed 
conception of his being. In this sense, the size of the Merzbau was critical in 
determining its effect on the viewer, for it needed to be large enough to 
surround the viewer and render him a diminutive figure in its shadow. It could 
not, however, be too big or too small to propel him beyond the threshold of 
imaginative recall. This diminution of the individual (both the artist and the 
viewer) substantiates our hypothesis that artwork produced explicitly in 
accordance with organicist principles mirrors the self-consciousness of 
creation inherent in organic processes. 
The Unfolded Unity 
Whereas many of the Dadaists laboured towards anti-art aims (and in 
some notable cases arrived at non-art), Schwitters' oeuvre was in essence 
meta-art, as it was preoccupied with laying bare, often in an ironic way and 
subversive way, the hitherto sacrosanct and mysterious mechanism behind 
artistic creation. 93 His focus on surfaces, as demonstrated with particular 
keenness in the Opherdicke landscapes and the assemblages, is evidence 
enough of this fact. 94 These surfaces, exaggerated and in some cases 
conspicuously over-worked, were half motivated by and half responsiblefor 
his interest in the juxtaposition of materials, a concern that defined his 
93 In the 1929 piece, "About me by myself', Schwitters observes, "Art is above all only 
formation, creation" (Ppppl)v 239). The way in which Schwitters cultivated "roughness" in 
his collages, assemblages, and even in the Merzbau speaks to his desire to portray that 
"forming" element that he identified as being synonymous with art. Even his Constructivist 
pieces lacked the glossy veneer that characterized Mondriaan's work. I propose that 
Schwitters worked under his "forming" principle because the fmished product (if there was 
such a thing in his philosophy) was secondary to his ambition to expose the mechanism of 
artistic creation and the vital flux that set that "fon-ning" in motion. 
94 Still, the emphasis on surfaces conversely prompts the viewer to inquire as to what dwells 
behind those surfaces. This circuitous path to the secret profundity of the work encourages the 
viewer to step into the role of the scavenger, a role pioneered by Schwitters himself. 
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approach to uncovering and presenting the secret vitality of his ephemera. 95 
Surely Schwitters felt himself limited, however, by the constraints of his 
innovative but relatively traditional work 
- 
the collages and assemblages, for 
all of their fantastic display, remained bounded by the usual four-sided frame 
- 
for as early as 1919 he was publishing a theory of his first Gesamtkunstwerk 
project, the "Merzbtihne", or "Merz Theatre". 96 Elderfield classifies this 
project as a more fanciful extension of the Merzbilden, particularly in that the 
constituent materials are grouped formalistically by Schwitters and assigned 
different values. The "real stars" of the Merzbiihne project are, not 
surprisingly, surfaces, and they are. followed in importance by lines and then 
"meshes, nets and veils" (108). This progression derives entirely from the 
principles of the assemblages, in which the same kind of layering occurs to 
great effect (109). The only difference is that now Schwitters was turning his 
focus to a more conspicuous exploitation of three-dimensionality, whereas in 
the assemblages the three dimensions were compressed so tightly that their 
expansion was only suggested. Part of the power of the assemblages is 
precisely this call to intuit, to recall imaginatively, what the assemblages 
would look like if their elements were allowed to traverse the bounds of the 
four-sided frarne. With the MerzbWme (or at least with the theory of it 
- 
the 
project was never actualized), elements previously associated with the 
assemblages were in a post-expansion state, and as such the concern became 
95 1 qualify it "secret" because one does not often credit refuse with possessing a great deal of 
vitality. Always one to court contradictions, Schwitters ambitiously sought to reconstruct (or 
at the very least reveal) the vital flux he believed could be extracted from his Hanoverian 
rubbish. 
96 Elderfield notes that in 1919 the theory was published in Walden's Sturm-Bahne series, 
"and was thereafter reprinted (in sometimes slightly revised forms) on half a dozen occasions 
between 1919 and 1923" (106). 
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how they articulated with one another and how their concerted motion 
incorporated or influenced the viewer. 
Elderfield, in discussing the relationship between the Merzbtihne 
theory and the poetry and prose that Schwitters was composing 
contemporaneously, offers the following observation: 
To manipulate the structure of a work in a collage-like way was to 
dissociate its individual parts from the sources and the emotions from 
which they derived. [ 
... 
] Certainly in the Merzbiihne text we see an 
utter absorption both in the very mechanics of assemblage 
- 
so that 
formal elements seem possessed by a kind of potential energy as 
active, kinetic forces in the space they inhabit 
- 
and in the oddities of juxtaposition thus created, which make us think that the pictures too 
were generated from a story-tel ling sensibility. (110-111) 
That dissociation of individual parts, either the primary objective or the result 
of collage-work, mirrors the dissolution of the individuality of the artist in the 
medium of self-reflexive artwork. As we view a collage or assemblage, we 
naturally focus first on the elements themselves, but it is not long before we 
begin to reflect upon their origins and how it is that they came to be 
showcased in such a work. The issue of juxtaposition is secondary, but not in 
importance; only when we have properly scanned the items individually do 
we begin to question how it is that they work for or against one another. What 
those same elements lose in their fundamental individuality, however, they 
regain from the creative direction of the artist, and so it is that his individuality 
comes to fill the void created when the items are plucked from their original 
contexts. That creative direction is what Elderfield frequently ternis the 
"diaristic" or "story-telling" impetus of the artist, as posited above. Is it then 
the same with the complex interaction between the artist (Schwitters) and his 
work (the Merzbau)? If understood in terms of the theory of self-reflexivity 
we have been formulating, then surely it is. Schwitters surrendered himself in 
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the context of the Merzbau to a thorough self-effacement, and in doing so 
attained a more cultivated individuality that in Simmelian terms is expressed 
as "the unfolded unity". 
Let us return to the essay from which the phrase derives, "On the 
Concept and the Tragedy of Culture". 97 We recall from the chapter on Simmel 
that the main concern of the essay is to trace how it is that man becomes 
cultivated through the objects of his creative production. The focus then turns 
to the titular conflict that arises when those objects threaten to overpower and 
vanquish the very creative spirit that spawned them. In the familiar sense of 
"cultivation", we envision the studied collection and incorporation of valuable 
slices of "knowledge or skill" into our characters, and although it is not often 
expressly stipulated, it is commonly supposed that "we become cultivated only 
when all of them serve a psychic unity which depends on but does not 
coincide with them" (28). Bergson is equally interested in discerning between 
the accumulation of ideas and their absorption: 
Not all our ideas, however, are thus incorporated in the fluid mass of 
our conscious states. Many float on the surface, like dead leaves on 
the water of a pond: the mind, when it thinks them over and over 
again, finds them ever the same, as if they were external to it. 
Among these are the ideas which we receive ready made, and which 
remain in us without ever being properly assimilated, or again the 
ideas which we have omitted to cherish and which have withered in 
neglect. (Time and Free Will 135-136) 
That we seek an overarching unity capable of gathering under its mantle all of 
our intellectual and material acquisitions is not an arbitrary or coincidental 
desire, for the impetus ultimately derives from our self-conscious core. 98 In 
97 Again, this essay is translated and reproduced in Etzkom's edition of The Conflict in 
Modem Culture and Other Essays, and thus the ensuing page numbers refer to this book. 
98 As I state in my chapter on Simmel, "This organizational model was instituted ... at man's 
first instance of self-consciousness, for it was then, when he 'began to say "I" to himself, and 
became an object beyond and in comparison with himself', that 'the contents of the soul' 
aggregated around the self-conscious germ" (Chapter One, page 32). 
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addition to those external acquisitions, we also encounter our own tendencies, 
referred to by Simmel as "a bundle of developmental lines which expand in 
different directions and quite different lengths" (29). He suggests that these 
"developmental lines", the possible trajectories of our personal evolutions, 
may in themselves be actualised and perfected, but they carry no greater value 
for the bearer than the acquisitions he accumulates. 99 Unity, understood as the 
zenith of cultivation, extends outward from that self-conscious core; it cannot 
be manufactured by gathering up "isolated perfections" any more than the 
essence of motion may be divined through the analysis of stationary points. In 
Simmel's words, 
man does not cultivate himself through their isolated perfections, but 
only insofar as they help to develop his indefinable personal unity. 
In other words: Culture is the way that leads from the closed unity 
through the unfolded multiplicity to the unfolded unity. (29) 
"Developmental lines", by virtue of their existence, imply a "closed unity" in 
that they borrow whatever unity they possess from that self-conscious core, 
but as they have not yet been actualised, they remain "closed". When the 
subject begins to explore and engage those same lines, the paths on which he 
embarks become characterized as the "unfolded multiplicity"; they have 
unfurled themselves and have spread out before the subject, but they are too 
numerous and too divergent for him to travel concurrently. 100 In this way, 
they constitute a "multiplicity" more so than a unity. When the subject, 
99 These natural tendencies remind us of Bergson's understanding of reality: "All reality, 
therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean by tendency an incipient change of direction" (Ln 
Introduction to Metaphysics 55). 
100 We may consider the example of a young scholar who possesses multiple talents. 
For 
professional as well as social reasons, he cannot fashion himself a master of all 
disciplines and 
so he selects one or two to which he can dedicate his studies. In selecting one path, medicine 
for instance, he has followed what was clearly an inner proclivity for scientific study. 
Pursuing too many directions too superficially leads one further away from the ultimate goal 
of self-cultivation. The Latin phrase "aliquis in omnibus, nullus 
in singulis" sums up such an 
individual. 
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however, acts in sympathy with his "particular interests and potentialities" and 
traces a select few of those "developmental lines", the multiplicity becomes 
suffused with his "indigenous drive" and so becomes a unity (29). It is 
"unfolded", for he has moved through objects and forms of his creation (and 
perhaps even others' creations), and in doing so has definitively posited an 
external self that has matured in the objective realm. Of further significance is 
the fact that in naming these stages, Simmel moves from the ten-ns "closed" to 
"unfolded", thus enunciating what he has so far maintained is the necessity of 
the subject to move outside of itself. Also, the adjective "unfolded" suggests 
that while something has been unfurled, not all of the potential energy has 
been spent. Further development, or infinite development, is a critical 
component of this concept. By this point, it should be self-evident that the 
"unfolded unity" is but the Simmelian term for Bergson's duration, 
particularly as it is explained in An Introduction to Meta-physics: "The inner 
life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of 
direction" (13). 101 
Conclusion 
Elderfield suggests that Schwitters' reticence with regards to his 
developing masterpiece derives from the conflict that was growing between 
the form of the Merzbau and International Constructivist art, with which 
Schwitters was actively involved from the mid 1920s onwards (148). 102 From 
101 Simmel's phrase is fortuitous, for it qualifies the term "unity". Bergson cautioned, again in 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, against limiting duration to a profound experience of unity: 
"when I replace myself in duration by an effort of intuition, I immediately perceive how it 
is 
unity, multiplicity and many other things besides" (19). 
102 Schwitters, he tells us, refrains from any written documentation of the Merzbau until 193 1: 
"For such a self-publicist, this seems astonishing" (148). Elderfield attributes this reluctance 
Dp 
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Expressionism to Dada to Constructivism, the oeuvre that precedes the 
Merzbau testifies to the fact that Schwitters was involved in myriad 
movements and trends, and the fact that he incorporated techniques and motifs 
from these movements (long after his affiliation with them expired) establishes 
that he embraced diverse styles rather than eschewed their influence. The 
Merzbau project was not so much a way for Schwitters to try and shake off the 
impact of "increasingly impersonalized styles". Rather, it provided the best 
opportunity thus far to assimilate them into Merz. To have manufactured a 
construction purely out of unique and untested methods would surely have 
been a great achievement, but to do so out of the remnants of earlier 
movements is doubly so. First of all, the very act of selecting remnants and 
objects pivots on a pre-conceived ideal that the artist is hoping to fulfil. Why 
the grotesque but not the political elements of Dada appear in the Merzbau, or 
why guinea pigs eventually replace the white mice as the project's only live 
inhabitants (besides Schwitters) are questions that refer back to the artist's 
private intent. 103 Thus, Schwitters' scavenging activities constitute the first 
instance of his self-manifestation in the external world. 104 Second of all, the 
way in which these items came to articulate with one another, a process 
explicitly exposed when the string began to spread across the studio, is the 
assimilatory means by which Schwitters professes his individualized elan 
vital. If he had pursued the more direct route of embarking on a project that 
to the fact that the artist must have felt at least somewhat insecure in producing "so utterly 
personalized a monument while publicly supporting an opposite party line" (148). 
103 Elderfield: "And there is a photograph of the Merzbau which shows that guinea pigs did 
indeed inhabit it. Why Schwitters replaced white mice with guinea pigs is, I suppose, as fit a 
subject for scholarly study as many others... " (150, author's italics). 
104 Due to the fact that these objects and remnants were often not his own, he was trafficking 
in forms not produced by him but by foreign (and in the case of the mass-produced items, 
anonymous) hands. To be able to trumpet his individuality through such non-personal items 
confirms the artist's capabilities and ambition. 
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championed newness and the eradication of all cultural memory (that is, a 
Merzbau that had as little in common as possible with any preceding styles or 
movements, and one that did not make use of any Objets trouves), he would 
not have attained the cultivated sophistication that he did with the Hanover 
Merzbau. As we have seen, cultivation (in the Simmelian sense) is centred on 
the esemplastic nature of the self-conscious mind. The soul that travels the 
indirect route through its own products (or perhaps more generally the 
products of others) attains a more informed and specialized self- 
consciousness. 105 Similarly, an artist who is able to construct artwork from the 
objects and remnants of society commits himself to a greater effort, but it is 
precisely because he has moved through these objects and forms and has built 
with them rather than in spite ofthem that he attains a cultivated 
individuality. 106 Besides the objects themselves, Schwitters constructed the 
Merzbau incorporating the themes and stylistic conceits of various 
movements, and the composite nature of the Merzbau (its Dadaist grottos, 
Constructivist exterior, and Expressionist bearing) mirrored Schwitters' own 
trajectory and methodology. Certainly the International Constructivist 
movement was, as Elderfield stresses, not founded on the need for 
personalized art, and German Dada adhered to a policy of politics first and 
artistic ambitions second. Thus, for Schwitters to have borrowed extensively 
LI. 
. from these non-individualized movements is both an unexpected and an 
ingenious move. 
105 Again, this route is opposed to the more direct (but less meaningful) path taken by way of 
religious ecstasies ("On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture" 29). 
106 Bergson's insistence on the presentation of diverse images proves crucial once again. How 
much more stirring is a collage or assemblage that by its nature presents fragmentation rather 
than a conventional painting that attempts to represent it? 
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The "stylistic lamination"' 07 that is showcased in the Merzbau evolved 
from Schwitters' earlier preoccupations with juxtaposition. Elderfield 
summarizes the layering of styles thusly: 
between 1919 and 1921, he made a number of Dada columns; by 
1923, he had moved them into a new studio; between 1923 and 1926 he transformed them into an increasingly geometric environment; between 1926 and 1932, he enlarged this environment in a more 
curvilinear style. (156) 
In his Dada work and particularly in Merz, Schwitters achieved his most 
enduring self-expression through juxtaposition, but as the Merzbau evolved) 
Schwitters made a concerted effort to produce a smoother appearance. The 
temptation exists to consign that shift to the maturation of the artist's tastes; 
the emigration of Schwitters from the Dada sphere to International 
Constructivism informed the work but cannot be read as the exclusive 
motivating force. As noted time and again, Schwitters was never one to 
dismiss former styles and take on new projects to the exclusion of previous 
work (the very fact that the Merzbau grew from those early Dada columns is 
proof enough). It is a disservice to the artist to propose that in the mid 1920s 
he became dissatisfied with the progress of the Merzbau and decided to 
whitewash (literally and figuratively) its Dada origins with Constructivist 
forms. If that had been the case, then the Dadaist grottos would not have 
remained intact. 
107 The felicitous phrase belongs to Elderfield (15 8), and he employs it in order to suggest that 
the final "Constructivist veneer" may be understood as a sign of Schwitters having found in 
Constructivism what was lacking in Dada. However, Elderfield is clearly in favour of 
distinguishing between the "finished identity" of the Merzbau and its "real identity", the 
ý6 excavation" of which requires "an archeological expedition" (15 8). 
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Conclusion 
"Today every child knows what Merz is. But what is i? i is the middle vowel of the 
alphabet and the designationfor the consequence OfMerz in relation to an intensive 
apprehension of the artform. For the shaping of the work of art Merz uses large 
ready-made complexes that count as the material, to shorten as much as possible the 
path leadingfrom the intuition to the actualisation of the artistic idea, so as to avoid heat loss througlifriction. i defines this path as = o. i apprehends the work of art in 
nature. Here the artistic shaping is the recognition ofrhythm and expression in a 
part of nature. Thus no loss throughfriction, i. e., no disturbing distraction during 
creation occurs here. I demand i, not as the onlyform of art but as a specialform. "' 
By virtue of his unconventionality, his adherence to his bourgeois 
upbringing and lifestyle, and his insistence on pure art, Schwitters was a 
stranger twice removed. The public and protracted argument with 
Huelsenbeck had the immediate effect of distancing him from "Club Dada", 
but more significantly the distance that grew between him and his would-be 
peers led him to create for himself a movement to which he was guaranteed 
admittance. Understood in this way, it becomes completely self-evident and 
expectable that he would delve so deeply into Merz and would ultimately erect 
a temple of sorts in his own middle-class Hanoverian abode. In an often- 
quoted passage, Schwitters relates the trauma he experienced as a child when 
neighbourhood boys tore apart his diminutive garden in which he had invested 
so much care and attention; the ordeal was so damaging to Schwitters that 
according to him he became an invalid and was sequestered in the serenity of 
his home for two years. During this period of self-imposed solitude and 
recovery, he was introduced to poetic and visual art. As Elderfield suggests, 
1 The quotation is an excerpt from Schwitters' brief 1922 manifesto, "i", reproduced in 
Pvi)ppp (222). The notion of tracing the path of least resistance from the intuition to the 
actualisation of the work is a theme that recurs in Dada and later in Surrealism, where the 
phenomenon of automatic writing and drawing was based on a similar principle. In this 
context consider Joan Mir6's words concerning his later works, in which large expanses of 
space were left unfilled: "It is important for me to achieve a maximum of intensity with a 
minimum of effort. That is why the empty spaces in my pictures gain increasingly in 
significance" (Mink 87). It is curious to note how this ideal of least resistance could promote 
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such traumatic childhood episodes were not uncommon catalysts for artistic 
development: 
what is special to Schwitters' version, however, is that he turned to 
art (or tells us he did) after the idealized form of nature he had 
physically cultivated had been destroyed. Art, it seems, could serve 
to rebuild a new form of nature, safe from interference. (20) 
Elderfield's reading is enticing, particularly when we consider how tethered 
Schwitters remained to nature. If it is correct, we may surmise how difficult 
Huelsenbeck's dismissal must have been for the delicate intellect that resided 
behind Schwitters' (superficially) self-possessed character. We do not wish to 
resort to a psychoanalytic evaluation of Schwitters' personality based on the 
experiences of his youth, but instead we draw attention to the fact that he was, 
from an early age, an introverted and melancholic figure. Such qualities 
predisposed him to becoming an artist who would retreat into a synthetic 
world of his own making. Also, the discrepancy between the private 
Schwitters and the one who laboured intensively on self-promotion made it 
even more urgent for a sanctuary to be established. 
Simmel's essay entitled "Der Fremde" ("The Stranger", 1908) 
elucidates the case of Schwitters as regards his social affiliations: 
If wandering, considered as a state of detachment from every given 
point in space, is the conceptual opposite of attachment to any point, 
then the sociological form of "the stranger" presents the synthesis, as 
it were, of both of these properties. [ 
... 
] The stranger will thus not 
be considered here in the usual sense of the term, as the wanderer 
who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the man who 
comes today and stays tomorrow - the potential wanderer, so to 
speak, who, although he has gone no further, has not quite got over 
the freedom of coming and going. (143) 2 
The second sentence of this quotation describes Schwitters in several ways. 
Firstly, it speaks to his permanence, not just in the art circles of his day, but 
works of both profound emptiness and exasperating clutter at the same time (as with the 
Hanover Merzbau). 
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also in the canon of modem art. 3 Secondly, Simmel identifies in the figure of 
the stranger an enduring union of arrival and departure, a synthesis that 
preserves the mobility of both conditions without sacrificing its own stability 
(the emphasis here is on the embodiment of mobility). Thirdly, there is the 
element of freedom, a freedom not only to partake of the status of citizen as 
much as that of foreigner, but also to transcend both. In his essay "The 
Adventure", Simmel proposes that the work of art itself may serve as an 
adventure into which the conditioned "stranger" (the artist in this case) may 
wander: 
Here, above all, is the basis of the profound affinity between the 
adventurer and the artist, and also, perhaps, of the artist's attraction 
by adventure. For the essence of a work of art is, after all, that it cuts 
out a piece of the endlessly continuous sequences of perceived 
experience, detaching it from all connections with one side or the 
other, giving it a self-sufficient form as though defined and held 
together by an inner core. A part of existence, interwoven with the 
uninterruptedness of that existence, yet nevertheless felt as a whole, 
as an integrated unit 
- 
this is the form common to both the work of 
art and the adventure. ("The Adventure", 245) 
It was always the case with Schwitters that he straddled with great aplomb the 
chasm between labouring as an independent artist and subscribing to a larger 
social group of peers and patrons. His brooding melancholia was frequently 
noted in personal accounts, but so was his effusive nature and willingness to 
promote his talent even to hostile audiences (Huelsenbeck and his group in 
particular, and the gentile Hanoverian society in general). His most enduring 
poetic success, 46 An Anna Blume" (1919), triumphs precisely because it crafts 
a poignantly inward and private fiction out of readymade commercial jargon 
and exploits German Romantic sensibilities in an indelible Dadaist form. The 
2 The essay appears in the book On Individuality and Social Forms. 
3 It is ironic how the name and legacy of Schwitters is probably more recognizable than 
Huelsenbeck's to those on the periphery of avant-garde studies. 
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same holds true for the Merz collages, which testify to Schwitters' ambition to 
assert his singular creative presence through the most mundane and 
impersonalized rubbish the metropolis had to offer. As Elderfield notes, 
"although Merz was indeed the ultimate liberation, the sense of conflict and 
opposition between the external world and the personality and privacy of the 
artist continued as an active and irritant force in Schwitters' subsequent work" 
(Elderfield 27). Certainly this irritant manifested itself to great effect in the 
Merzbau, which was first and foremost a building within a building that 
contained shrinking (but nevertheless active) grottos. One of the greatest 
legacies of the Merzbau was the fact that it provided an unforgettable 
showcase for the public/private dualism under which Schwitters had been 
operating for so long. Still, it refrained from issuing a judgment for either 
side; even in this regard it remained incomplete, albeit intentionally so. Its 
capacious dimensions allowed it to function as a convenient pilgrimage site 
into which the artist could retreat and immerse himself in the mysticism of his 
own Merz universe. At the same time, however, the Constructivist casing that 
Schwitters erected rendered (but only in a superficial way) this fantastically 
private world into one devoid of personality and autobiographical detail. 
Ten pages of illustrations excluded on 
instruction from the university. 
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